Divine Funerals: The Temporal Self in Freud and Rousseau

Divine Funerals: The Temporal Self in Freud and Rousseau

by Nolan Sprokay

One may live one’s entire life, and in hypothesis the span of many lives beyond it, and still never come to terms with the simple fact that existence is narrated retrospectively. As much as one might long to have one’s life story imprinted on the eyes of an absolute, the atheistic perspective demands that an autobiography can only come from the mouth or pen of a subjective being, and this subjective being can only organize experience into narratives while looking back upon it from the future. For the subject, the present experience of each passing moment is characterized by barrages of internal and external sensations, and any narrative of the self is only composed after the subject relates itself to these sensations. The addition of chronological narration to existence is what the human subject comes to understand as temporality: the temporal, or, time, is absent without being, for without being there is nothing to categorize existence with using time. Considering the human subject is perpetually relating to the world through the lens of time, and the subjective place in time is intrinsically at constant change, it must be assumed that conflicts are likely to arise regarding how the human subject identifies with time, and how it identifies with itself in time.

Take the case of nostalgia; when one reminisces on the simple pleasures of their childhood, its security and lack of emotional complexity, it must be assumed that they are actually applying an ideal emphasis, a narration interwoven with the bias of the present, to their pasts. Although the mind of the child will generally tend to lack a strong understanding of abstract concepts, it is unreasonable to assume that the experience of the child is any less complex than that of the adult. Is the child not continuously forced to rationalize and re-rationalize their realities as they come into contact with more and more of the world? Has psychology not proven that the child experiences just as many emotional complexes as the adult?[1] The adult yearning to return to childhood clearly does so from a point of idealization, and when they allow themself to assume a melancholic position for living past these primordial ages, they are needlessly tormenting themself. This arising melancholy, however, is often an inevitable response to the recollection of past experience – how could it not be when this person is fervently rifling through memories which they have idealized to such a great extent, while simultaneously finding themself in a position where they can never relive the experiences tied to these memories? Watching time float these past experiences away, these memories of such profound reverence in the head of this nostalgic person, is nothing less than a horrifying sequence! At one time, the subject had an intimate connection to these experiences and could even feel itself within their presence, yet now the statues of these experiences, memories, are falling into obscurity, and the self of the present is in a state of loss. The nostalgic person finds themself trapped in the wake of a divine funeral, a celebration of worshiped selfhoods that are forever lost in time.

This daunting concept spreads across all kinds of speculation upon how the subject recognizes its own self. The subject reaches a crossroads in its identity when it reminisces in that it is confronted with the fact that it must live in the present, but desires to live in the past. Extending a critical eye into significant historical texts regarding human nature discovers this concept under a variety of different philosophical ideologies. One must particularly consider Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a French Enlightenment philosopher who discussed the dynamics of civilization, especially in reference to property. Rousseau’s work serves as sufficient philosophical representation for the subjective process of rejecting present time, in that he takes an East-of-Eden approach to human society: Rousseau asserts that there was once a utopian period of civilization, but due to the inevitable progression of civilizational development, this utopian era was lost forever. If his vision of utopia is an idealized past, then the impossible Rousseauian desire for civilizational regression is intellectually equivalent to a collective melancholy over idealized pasts. Beyond theories of the collective, however, in order to ground the macro Rousseauian approach in a micro theory of the individual, one must turn to psychoanalysis. The field of psychoanalysis, invented in the late nineteenth century by Sigmund Freud, offers insight into the structural development of human desires and drives, presenting explanations of the psychical incitement of melancholy through the subjective inaccessibility of past experience. By inspecting and comparing elements of both Freud and Rousseau’s philosophies, it becomes clear that their ideas presuppose the notion that melancholy is an intrinsic fixture of human nature, and that a core desire of the human subject is to return the self to a pre-melancholic ideal state.

Freud’s conception of a supposed pathological “oceanic feeling” is the first example the subject will ever face of melancholy in relation to this notion. In chapter one of Civilization and its Discontents, Freud refutes criticism of his atheistic text, The Future of an Illusion, in which his critic mentions an emotional state found within himself of deep connection to the world around him, and claims that it must be an attribute of divine presence. Freud speculates the opposite, that this emotional state is simply a pathology resulting from the unconscious remembrance of an early psychical state. This is the state of infantile narcissism, the very first manner in which the subject understands the world, where the subject is not yet able to distinguish object from subject. “An infant at the breast does not as yet distinguish his ego from the external world as the source of the sensations flowing upon him.”[2] As the subject is still too young to proficiently organize its sensations, it fails to recognize its surroundings as beings outside of the self. Because of this, any sensation it achieves from interaction with its objective environment is falsely conceived as a subjective conjuration. “He must be very strongly impressed by the fact that some sources of excitation, which he will later recognize as his own bodily organs, can provide him with sensations at any moment, whereas other sources evade him from time to time – among them what he desires most of all, his mother’s breast – and only reappear as a result of his screaming for help.”[3] At this point in time, the subject essentially perceives itself as a god – an absolute power over reality, not recognizing reality as an external being, nor frankly the concept of the word external. As time goes on, however, and the subject interacts with more of the objective world, it eventually learns to form the notion of object by the function of acting in certain ways and receiving certain sensations. “In this way, there is for the first time set over against the ego an ‘object,’ in the form of something which exists ‘outside’ and which is only forced to appear by a special action.”[4] Alongside this loss of infantile narcissism, the subject learns that it is a being-in-the-world, and is both protected and endangered by objective forces outside of the self, an individual in a world of infinity. Far later into the life of the subject, whenever it draws upon an “oceanic feeling” of spiritual connection to its environment, one must consider this as essentially the same energy as that of nostalgic reminiscing, for the subject loses itself in a desire to reconnect with a state of the past. In this sense, the subject’s interaction with the oceanic feeling is its very first divine funeral, an expression of mourning over an idealized earlier place in its life, and in this occasion, it almost literally mourns divinity, in that it is mourning its own position of absolutism.

Although this particular moment in the development of the psyche is a sufficient practical connection between the mourning of an idealized past and Freudian psychology, further examination is required to observe its centrality within psychoanalysis. For this, one must move further with Freudian thought and draw upon the psychoanalytic works of Julia Kristeva, a feminist psychoanalyst who proposes in her text Black Sun: Melancholia an innate confrontation that must be taken by the subject with melancholy, and how it may manifest as a pathology. Classical Freudian theory is largely centered on psychical relations to the father, Civilization and its Discontents in particular showing how the superego develops out of patricidal urges and remorse over these extensions of aggression exercised upon the paternal object, which is infused with the love of the subject. “After their hatred had been satisfied by their act of aggression, their love came to the fore in their remorse for the deed. It set up the superego by identification with the father; it gave that agency the father’s power, as though as a punishment for the deed of aggression they had carried out against him, and it created the restrictions which were intended to prevent a repetition of the deed.”[5] Kristeva, however, following the thought of object-relational psychoanalysts like Melanie Klein, suggests that the subject also has a very intense psychical struggle over its own drive toward symbolic matricide. As the maternal object is that which the subject first internalizes, long before the subject identifies with the paternal object as a resolution to the Oedipus Complex, the subject’s internalization of its mother is that which is most primeval and most powerful, and consequently the most heart-wrenching for the subject to lose. Kristeva, however, theorizes that in order for the subject to truly achieve autonomy in its life, it must reach a point in its childhood at which it eliminates its intense internalization of the maternal object, severing its psychical umbilical cord and experiencing the world as a free agent. “For man and for woman the loss of the mother is a biological and psychic necessity, the first step on the way to becoming autonomous. Matricide is our vital necessity, the sine-qua-non condition of our individuation, provided that it takes place under optimal circumstances and can be eroticized […].”[6]

According to Kristeva, this is the most integral period for people who, in adulthood, suffer from the depressive state Freud called “Melancholia,” which is the pathological state in which the subject is afflicted by a severe mourning, the cause of which it cannot consciously produce. This experience of melancholy over matricide, however, in Kristeva’s eyes, is impossible to avoid in the development of a child.[7] “The lesser or greater violence of matricidal drive, depending on individuals and the milieu’s tolerance, entails, when it is hindered, its inversion on the self; the maternal object having been introjected, the depressive or melancholic putting to death of the self is what follows, instead of matricide.”[8] Of course, this pre-matricidal union with the mother that is envisioned by the subject is entirely misinterpreted outside of the ideal, for in reality mother and child can only ever remain two separate beings, despite the vast love both may have for the other. When the subject undergoes melancholic depression, once again, it is mourning an ideal of its own construction. Melancholy, an inevitable experience of the human subject that may be fostered and morphed into the pathology of melancholia, represents a tear in the mind of the subject between the present and the past, as the subject is compelled away from the world and time it must inhabit toward a fantastical time forever sealed away from its grasp, that of its internalization of the maternal object.

Transferring out of the individual and onto civilization, Rousseau’s interaction with societal melancholy and collective desire for regression through time is best seen in his Discourse on Inequality. This is the fundamental text for understanding Rousseau’s arguments about human civilization, how it came to be, and the consequences of its presence. Rousseau describes a pure state of humanity before civilization in which the human subject operated purely on biological urges based around self-sustaining necessity; the drives to fight, flee, and fornicate. “Being subject to so few passions, and sufficient unto himself, he had only such feelings and such knowledge as suited his condition; he felt only his true needs, saw only what he believed it was necessary to see, and his intelligence made no more progress than his vanity.”[9] In this pure state of pre-civilization, mothers only raised their children until they were ready to walk, and then they tossed them headfirst into the wilds.[10] Every human individually foraged and hunted in the woods for food, and then frantically searched around in bouts of thirst for bodies of water to drink. Humans only interacted with each other when their bodies pulled them toward sex, each person moving on from the other only moments after the action was completed. Humans were motivated only by sensation, and as such, did not have the capacity to interact with (and mourn) the abstract.[11] For Rousseau, this is the second best period of humanity, in part due to the notion that humans lacked any reason or ability to experience depression, but also because they lacked social emphasis on personal property that leads to competition and aggression. “For since his mind cannot form abstract ideas of regularity and proportion, his heart is not capable of feeling those sentiments of love and admiration which – even unconsciously – arise from the application of these ideas: he responds only to the temperament which nature has implanted in him, and not to taste (or distaste), which he has not been able to acquire: for him every woman is good.”[12] There was no social dissonance during this period, no struggle for love and property, only survival. Here, the first etchings of Rousseau’s proposed collective melancholy can be found. The natural state of humanity was not built for the dynamics and labors of modern society- it was built for competition with the wilderness, for clashes with the elements! Under Rousseauian thought, the body and psyche of the modern human subject bears weights it was never intended to bear, and in this must at all times experience an unconscious depression, which theoretically could only be relieved by a regression to the natural human state, or some form of civilization that may sustain the pleasures of this state.

The natural human subject under Rousseau’s model, however, no matter how primordial and natural, was forever lost in the relative blink of an eye, thus marking the dawn of civilization; humans decided they wanted not only to survive, but to live! They began to build tools for themselves in order to foster convenience, to build consistent shelters, and most importantly, to observe other humans as objects of reliance.

Soon, ceasing to doze under the first tree, or to withdraw into caves, men discovered that various sorts of hard sharp stones could serve as hatchets to cut wood, dig the soil, and make huts out of branches, which they learned to cover with clay and mud. This was the epoch of a first revolution, which established and differentiated families, and which introduced property of a sort from which perhaps even then many quarrels and fights were born.[13]

This is what Rousseau called nascent society. By the logic of Rousseau, nascent society was the perfect utopian era of civilization. During this era, the human subject operated on what was truly most beneficial for the self, motivated toward self-sustaining biological necessities while still experiencing the delights of the abstract, like love for others. Humans entered a form of contract in which they used each other to benefit the self as best they could, and thus had access to the securities of civilization without any of its attributed oppressions.[14] Already, Rousseauian philosophy demonstrates a great amount of idealization regarding the past. In Civilization and its Discontents, Freud refutes utopian visions of nascent society, suggesting that subjective sensibilities between contemporary cultures are likely to have vast differences, and subsequently there is a possibility that the subject of nascent society will experience issues with its culture that the modern subject would not upon immersion into this culture.

It seems certain that we do not feel comfortable in our present-day civilization, but it is very difficult to form an opinion whether and in what degree men of an earlier age felt happier and what part their cultural conditions played in the matter. We shall always tend to consider people’s distress objectively – that is, to place ourselves, with our own wants and sensibilities, in their conditions, and then to examine what occasions we should find in them for experiencing happiness or unhappiness.[15]

For example, in a state of undeveloped technology like that of nascent society, one would lack access to clean drinking water, sufficient homes and shelters, medicine, and all forms of basic necessities that, while dynamically limited due to class differences in modern civilization, are also nonexistent without modern civilization. This suggests that Rousseau’s adoring vision of nascent society is largely biased due to a separate factor, which will demonstrably prove to be a desire to abandon the present rather than one to assume the past.

Nascent society, allegedly idyllic in disposition, is plagued with a morbid underlining in Rousseau’s eyes. The minute that this contract was formed and the natural state of humanity was abandoned, humans began to emphasize progression. “Those first slow developments finally enabled men to make more rapid ones. The more the mind became enlightened, the more industry improved.”[16] This is the characteristic of civilization most abhorred by Rousseau – its inherent inclination toward progression alongside the passage of time. As humans wanted more convenience, more technology, more enlightenment, they started to develop strategies like agriculture, which demanded division of labor and the claiming of property, officially bringing humanity into the third, final, and worst stage of civilization. The further labor and property relations came into fruition, the more barriers were set between humans. The human subject began to experience emotions like jealousy, for they now had to compete over properties, and the oppressions of slavery as workers were forced into labor by those who had more resources than them in order to receive those resources of self-sustaining necessity.

From another point of view, behold man, who was formerly free and independent, diminished as a consequence of a multitude of new wants into subjection, one might say, to the whole of nature and especially to his fellow men, men of whom he has become the slave, in a sense, even in becoming their master; for if he is rich he needs their services; if he is poor he needs their aid; and even a middling condition does not enable him to do without them.[17]

In Rousseau’s eyes, the instant agriculture was invented, society became post-apocalyptic, the aftermath of a previous state of civilization that no longer exists and cannot be reattained. As has been established, however, there is evidence to support that Rousseau’s conception of pre-apocalyptic society is idealized. Due to labor relations, the human subject most certainly bears weight it did not have to in its natural state, but it also bore weight in the past that it would never have to in the present. Any unconscious melancholic desire for the past in the Rousseauian collective must be a product of idealization, and the real issue the collective faces is once again not a lack of previous conditions, but the existence of current ones.

Mark J. Temmer, a scholar of French and comparative literature from the mid-late 20th century, discusses Rousseau’s biases regarding the temporal in his text Time in Rousseau and Kant: An Essay on Pre-Romanticism. In this essay, Temmer analyzes Rousseau’s attitudes towards different states in time, differentiating Rouseauian perspectives toward the conceptual past, present, and future, specifically relating to Rousseau’s autobiographical texts. Temmer establishes in his introduction that many of these autobiographies are Rousseau’s attempts to categorize human existence under the structure of time. “Similarly, autobiographic works like the Confessions, the Rêveries du promeneur solitaire and Rousseau, juge de Jean-Jacques represent an original effort to comprehend and justify his existence within the framework of human time, responsibility, and salvation.”[18] Temmer elaborates on the notion that Rousseau consistently idealizes the past, and reunification with lost aspects of the past in the future, by suggesting that it is because he wishes to immortalize his own desires. “Desirous of immortalizing desire, he had to have recourse to imaginary possession and to poetic fulfillment… Since possession can only occur in the present, Rousseau was constrained to thrust himself into the future and the past… The here and now is abandoned in favor of hopes and remembrances.”[19] In other words, Rousseau rejects the present because it is the realm of the tangible. Human desire can only be realized by the faculties of the subject experiencing it in the present, and thus to maintain its relation to objects that are only accessible in the future and the past is to render that particular desire eternal in the mind of the subject, as it will forever lack achievement and subjective satisfaction. In Rousseau’s desire to immortalize past objects, one will find an evident comparison to Kristeva’s melancholia, in which the desire for union with the maternal, which is impossible and must inevitably come to an end, is immortalized through introjection of the matricidal drive onto the self. The primary suggestion to be taken out of Rousseauian philosophy regarding temporal effects on subjective existence is that its most authentic motivation exists only in the past, and desires of the present lack the same profound authenticity. From a psychological standpoint, Rousseau and his described societal collective idealize their pasts, and thus the subject fruitlessly desires to realize them, allowing itself to be haunted by unfulfillment.

Nostalgia is both a euphoric and poisonous emotion for the human subject. It is the meth of the sentimental, the crack of the yearning, and the heroin of the wistful. Idealizations of the past suggest notions of happiness to the subject, but they also leave it sick and riddled with melancholy, torturing itself over the passage of time. In this way, desire is immortalized through this idealization, but gratification is forever shunted aside. Worshiping one’s past, as wonderful as experienced instances may seem from the future, casts one’s selfhood away from an innate characteristic belonging to it, its presence of presents.[20] If one’s self, as psychoanalysis suggests, is developed and influenced by its interaction with its environment, and the transience of its environment is constant throughout time, then one’s selfhood is reliant on its place in time. Consequently, the self of the past cannot be considered the same self as that of its future. Thus, when the subject wishes to rebel against temporality and return to “simple” times long passed, it is longing to assume an idealized selfhood undergoing experience contemporary to its particular time, a selfhood that does not truly belong to the subject itself. The subject idealizes a different selfhood that it perceives to be its own, with different sensations, excitations, and experiences, losing its grasp on its true self in the process. This is what the previously proposed term divine funeral references. The melancholic subject, through nostalgic recollection, is mournfully celebrating these different selfhoods, yet also through idealization allowing them to climb psychical pedestals to that of perfection and godliness, images of what the subject should be but has lost, like God’s garden to Adam and Eve. When, as happens in funerals, the subject is confronted with the fact that the mourned object is, in fact, forever lost, the subject senses a great emptiness within its own real, present self. The human subject with the most consonant sense of self, however, surely addresses this somber desire to realize a fantasized past, and must actively choose not to indulge in its seductions. The self that is the most authentic is that which lives not for the impossibility of the past. This self invents no deities, and this self mourns no deities. This is the self that laughs at its good memories, but desires no immersion in them. This is the self that recognizes, yet rejects its history, choosing to live for the tangibility of its present and the creation of its future!

 

Endnotes

[1] Consider the Oedipus Complex, an extremely significant process in psychoanalytic theory under which the child subject competes with its paternal object over the maternal object, and ultimately identifies with its father in the end so that it may commence reconciliation over its extensions of aggression toward him. This final step in the complex results in the Superego, which is the psychical function that imposes guilt upon the subject.

[2] Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton & Company, 1961), 27.

[3] Ibid

[4] Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, 28.

[5] Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, 127.

[6] Kristeva, Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, trans. Leon Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 27.

[7] The Oedipus Complex, for example, is an extremely important step in the matricidal process, as the subject is seriously faced with the possibility of losing its internalized union with the maternal object to another object for the first time, invoking a degree of separation.

[8] Kristeva, Black Sun, 28.

[9] Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, trans. Maurice Cranston (London: Penguin, 1984), 104.

[10] Rousseau’s opinion is assumedly that mothers raised children up until the walking stage due to a biological maternalistic drive. Rousseau, not being a resolutely feminist thinker, does not elaborate much on the experience of the natural mother.

[11] A proper comparison with Freud’s infantile narcissism should bring one to remark on the similarities between the primeval stages of both thinkers’ subjective models, in that the narcissistic infant and the natural man both operate completely based on their sensations, and in the relation of these sensations to the betterment of the absolutist self. Could it be possible that any nostalgia Rousseau feels for his proposed natural state in particular is an unconscious reflection of the oceanic feeling?

[12] Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, 103.

[13] Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, 112.

[14] Through this contract, human subjects were able to take pleasure in the other, which is what ultimately led to desires and appreciations of love.

[15] Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, 61.

[16] Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, 112.

[17] Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, 119.

[18] Temmer, Time in Rousseau and Kant: An Essay on Pre-Romanticism (Geneva: Droz Bookstore, 1958), 11.

[19] Temmer, Time in Rousseau and Kant, 14.

[20] 😉

 

Bibliography

Freud. Civilization and its Discontents. Translated by James Strachey. New York: Norton & Company, 1961.

Kristeva. Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia. Translated by Leon Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.

Rousseau. A Discourse on Inequality. Translated by Maurice Cranston. London: Penguin, 1984.

Temmer. Time in Rousseau and Kant: An Essay on Pre-Romanticism. Geneva: Droz Bookstore, 1958.

Reaping as we Sow: Gandhi’s View of Modernity in Hind Swaraj

by Annabel Smith

Mohandas K. Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj is an essential text of the Indian liberation and postcolonialism movements, providing a scathing critique of modernity and its impacts on the relationship of the individual to the world around them. In his text, Gandhi discusses at length the development of English colonialism in India, and the factors that contributed to its continued dominance. He characterizes the two nations as fundamentally different, portraying a moral, spiritual Indian civilization and an immoral, secular England. This difference stems from the emphasis that Indians collectively place on morality that is absent from the English nation. Gandhi argues not only that this leaves the English more susceptible to the evils of modernization, but also that the ways in which modern technology and institutions restructure people’s relationship to the world around them pose a threat to Indian civilization. Modern technology, in his view, breeds immorality by erasing the good work involved in the achievement of one’s goals, perpetuating the idea that the ends justify the means. It poses a threat to the future of civilization by leading the people subject to it to view further development as the only way forward. To Gandhi, it is the development of modern civilization itself that is the driving force behind the origins and continuation of colonial rule.

Gandhi’s relationship with modernity is a complicated and at times contradictory one. His writings present a rejection of technology that was not always reflected in his real-life use of modern inventions such as railways and medicine, arguing that these technologies breed immorality while using them himself. Various critics have differing perspectives on Gandhi’s view of modernization, depending on their reading of Hind Swaraj as a set of teachings that should be taken either literally or metaphorically. For Esha Shah, Hind Swaraj represents an ideologically pure “Gandhism,” with his sweeping anti-technology fundamentalism indicating an impossible ideal that must still be pursued. Shah’s critique focuses largely on the ways that these implements of modernity shift one’s way of thinking, causing people to become more immoral and accept constant development as the only possible future. Douglas Allen presents an alternative view in his work, reading Hind Swaraj much more metaphorically than Shah. He sees the text as largely abstract and decontextualized, critiquing what modernity represents rather than what it actually is. Theresa Lee, in her comparison of the philosophies of Gandhi and Sun Yat-sen, views the common interpretations of Gandhian philosophy in the modern day as problematic and dangerous. She identifies a tendency to erase his goals of realizing a true postcolonial society and his rejection of the English idea of modernity in favor of a watered-down, pacifist form of Gandhism. My analysis seeks to prove that Gandhi’s critique of modernity should be understood on both literal and figurative levels. He argues that technology is responsible for breeding immorality, while recognizing that a complete rejection of modernity is impossible when one exists as an active member of society.

To Gandhi, Indian and English civilization are fundamentally different because Indian civilization is built on a foundation of shared moral values, while the English are united as a political but not spiritual whole. This creates a dichotomy between the moral and the material civilization, where the oppressor nation strives for material gains and the subjugated nation seeks a higher, moral advancement. For Gandhi, spirituality and morality are deeply connected, with spirituality presenting a superior alternative to the materialism of modernity. Gandhi describes civilization as “that mode of conduct which points out to man the path of duty…If this definition be correct, then India, as so many writers have shown, has nothing to be learned from anybody else” (Gandhi, 67). In Gandhi’s view, Indian civilization is built on the pillars of self-knowledge and morality, which is how India manages to remain “sound at the foundation” (66) even as it has moved from the ancient to the modern world. Religion is also central to the nationalist argument, with nationalists using India’s rich history of spirituality in their advocacy for Home Rule. For Gandhi, this spirituality has a different significance, as his goal goes beyond driving the English out of India and amounts to the creation of a new kind of postcolonial society. The issue of secularization exemplifies his fears concerning the erosion of these Indian moral values, as he writes, “Religion is dear to me, and my first complaint is that India is becoming irreligious. Here I am thinking…of that religion which underlies all religions. We are turning away from God” (42). English civilization, conversely, is founded on immorality, as the “path of duty” their civilization directs them to leads the English to seek material, rather than moral, advancement. The English are completely disconnected from this “religion that underlies all religions,” as Gandhi claims that “money is their God” (41). The values of the English civilization, according to Gandhi, are not based on the practice of a moral way of life. The colonial presence of the English in India is motivated by their pervasive materialism, and the influence of materialism has proven to be a disruption to the fundamental morality of civilization in India.

It is important to acknowledge, however, that the idealized, moralistic India that Gandhi describes is one which has never really existed. This version of Indian civilization is not a historical one but Gandhi’s imagining of a future postcolonial India, built upon the country’s sound moral foundations that he has already identified. In Hind Swaraj, independence represents a way forward to a postcolonial future, rather than a way back to the way things were in India before English colonialism. Gandhi is aware of this contradiction, writing, “My patriotism does not teach me that I am to allow people to be crushed under the heel of Indian princes, if only the English retire. If I have the power, I should resist the tyranny of Indian princes just as much as that of the English” (Gandhi, 76). Subjugation under one’s own countrymen is still subjugation, as Gandhi points out here in his critique of past Indian princes. However, Gandhi speaks of India as made up of its people, rather than its institutions or its history. This is very significant to his argument, as he believes the present and future condition of Indian civilization is dependent on the beliefs and actions of its people rather than the moral values, or lack thereof, of its ruling powers. Of Gandhi’s postcolonial aims, Lee writes, “Independence is simply a precondition to building the kind of postcolonial society that Gandhi had envisioned for India, and arguably beyond” (Lee, 146). His goal is not limited to the expulsion of the English from India because a return to an oppressive power structure is antithetical to the message of swaraj, or self-rule. The concept of swaraj, as Gandhi defines it, does not simply refer to rule by one’s own countrymen rather than rule by outsiders. Self-rule in India can only be achieved when society is structured based on the moral values of Indian civilization. Gandhi’s ideal society is just as impossible under India’s pre-colonial regimes as it is under English rule.

The moral principles that Gandhi sees as foundational to the Indian national identity are corrupted by the modernizing influence of the English. Gandhi views technology as a largely evil force that hinders us from the pursuit of self-knowledge that is so essential to swaraj. The ease with which modern technology allows people to perform various tasks is generally thought of as a positive feature of modernity, but Gandhi is more skeptical. In his view, hard work is integral to a moral way of life: “Nature has not provided any way whereby we may reach a desired goal all of a sudden. If, instead of welcoming machinery as a boon, we would look upon it as an evil, it would ultimately go” (Gandhi, 111). He extols the merits of hard work in the achievement of one’s goals, and the idea that technology can be used to erase this work is repugnant to his ideas of self-improvement and self-rule. A prominent example of this in Hind Swaraj is Gandhi’s critique of the railways:

Good travels at a snail’s pace – it can, therefore, have little to do with the railways. Those who want to do good are not selfish, they are not in a hurry, they know that to impregnate people with good requires a long time. But evil has wings. To build a house takes time. Its destruction takes none. (47)

To Gandhi, it is the speed and convenience of railways that makes them immoral. They spread evil more easily by transporting evil people at a greater speed. More significantly, however, we lose our penchant to do good when we travel on the railways, as we become accustomed to having the work of our lives done for us. This speaks to the European “[addiction] to the limitlessness of the future” (Lee, 149), as the European idea of modernization hinges on constant developments in technology that improve the ease of our lifestyle. However, Gandhi claims that we lose our virtues of discipline and self-knowledge in this quest of progress for the sake of progress.

Gandhi’s critiques of technology here present an ideological purity that even he himself could not live up to in his day-to-day life. Hind Swaraj condemns these technological developments across the board, even those that Gandhi himself was guilty of using (Allen, 111). Shah interprets Gandhi’s strict anti-technology views as an element of confusion in his relationship with modernity: “Gandhi does not oppose technology per se but its non-technological core and what it does to human experience or consciousness; he talks about what it means to be a human being shaped by such a technological mode of thinking” (Shah, 126). His critique of modernity is complex, per Shah, because it is not the developments in and of themselves that are immoral, but the ways in which we come to interact with the world because of those developments. In Shah’s view, the contradictions in the text are intentional, meant to demonstrate an aspirational level of moral purity. Critiques of elements of modernity such as medicine, law, or railways are meant to show what happens to a person going through the world in interaction with these institutions and colonial implements, not necessarily as criticism of the technology on its own. Conversely, Allen identifies this as indicative of Gandhi’s hypocrisy:

He may dogmatically dismiss modern hospitals and modern medicine as evil, but he goes to the modern hospital when faced with life-threatening appendicitis. He may dogmatically dismiss railways, but no one uses railways more than Gandhi to promote his values and energize the masses. (Allen, 111)

Allen views the actions advocated by the Editor as a hypocritical flaw in Gandhism, since Gandhi is guilty of taking advantage of the very technologies that he condemns. However, it seems that the large-scale condemnations of institutions from which Gandhi benefited that are present in Hind Swaraj are indicative of the realistic swaraj efforts that he describes. In the conclusion to Hind Swaraj, Gandhi presents a list of actions that people in different circumstances can take to promote self-rule (Gandhi 115). This call to action suggests different steps that can be taken by people with various resources or roles in society. In contrast with his total rejection of technology in earlier sections of the text, Gandhi suggests here that this immorality is something that should be held in mind and it is unreasonable to expect even the most morally pure of Indians to act with complete purity. He acknowledges that with different means, one must take different actions.

The crux of Gandhi’s criticism of technology and modernization in India is the ways in which modernity perpetuates the idea that the ends justify the means. For Gandhi, the ends and means are inseparable. This can be seen in his aforementioned condemnation of technology, where the hard work and good intentions involved in performing a task inform its moral purity, a purity that is erased when the ease of achieving something increases. Allen describes the dominant view of modernity in his writing on Gandhi: “As formulated by a wide variety of Western anti-modernists and post-modernists […] and as critiqued by existentialists and phenomenologists, this dominant modern approach embraces the view that the ends justify the means” (Allen 115). This is at the center of Gandhi’s moral opposition to the modern world in general and to modernity as exemplified by the English in particular. For Gandhi, being good comes from living and acting in a way that is good. Morality is not something that can be circumvented. Modern ideals, however, have made prevalent the idea that we can achieve noble aims without doing the necessary work, or through work that he considers to be improper and immoral. He condemns this idea, saying, “I am not likely to obtain the result flowing from the worship of God by laying myself prostrate before Satan. If, therefore, anyone were to say: ‘I want to worship God, it does not matter that I do so by means of Satan’ it would be set down as ignorant folly. We reap exactly as we sow” (Gandhi 81). This imagery comes from an argument regarding the use of brute force in the achievement of Home Rule in India, where he argues that freedom accomplished through the use of violence is not freedom, as the end result of an action is inseparable from the methods used to accomplish it. True peace can only be achieved by peaceful means.

Recognizing modernization as responsible for intensifying English immorality and eroding Indian morality, it follows that Gandhi views modernity itself as responsible for the evils of colonialism. Gandhi identifies a negative cycle in the spread of modern technology and institutions in India, where modern developments lead to a rise in immorality, which in turn causes further development. This occurs when the institutions and technologies that Gandhi classifies as immoral become largely accepted, which he argues is often influenced by the supposed perception of India by Western nations: “There is a charge against us that we are a lazy people, and that the Europeans are industrious and enterprising. We have accepted the charge and we, therefore, wish to change our condition” (42). The evaluation of Indian society by English standards that we see here causes an imbalance in the relationship between moral (Indian) and immoral (English) civilization. When immoral civilization is lauded as good and moral civilization is made to seem unfavorable in comparison, the society that is looked down upon will necessarily desire to advance. In this case, the consequence of this is India becoming more like England. Additionally, Gandhi argues that modernization creates artificial problems that it then claims to solve, writing, “An opium-eater may argue the advantage of opium-eating from the fact that he began to understand the evil of the opium habit after having eaten it” (49). In India, colonial powers have swooped in and created problems, then “solved” those problems with their modern methods. Here, Gandhi is speaking in reference to the supposed issue of divisions among India’s large population that the English, like the opium user who understands the problems with opium after using it, have attempted to solve through the introduction of railways and English law. For Gandhi, this is a way for colonizers to influence the colonized to accept their subjugation as a positive force.

When a society accepts these modern influences as necessary for its advancement, that society is led to believe that that version of modernity is the only future possible. In her critique of Hind Swaraj, Shah describes Gandhi’s condemnation of technology as a negative enframing of consciousness, wherein the problem is not with technology itself but the way it structures our thinking and interactions with the world. Gandhi illustrates this enframing of consciousness in his discussion of the practice of medicine:

I over-eat, I have indigestion, I go to a doctor, he gives me medicine, I am cured, I over-eat again, and I take his pills again. Had I not taken the pills in the first instance, I would have suffered the punishment deserved by me, and I would not have over-eaten again. (63)

Modern medicine is a problem for Gandhi because it reconstructs our relationship with our body and the world around us. Rather than pursuing the self-knowledge that he sees as essential, when we act in error we are encouraged to continue to do so because there is an easy cure, eliminating the work involved. In Shah’s words, “Technology alters our experience of the world and, in doing so, mutates, downplays and even undermines or makes it impossible to experience this world differently. Technology operating like a rationalising force makes any alternative imaginations impossible” (Shah 130). According to Shah, Hind Swaraj teaches that becoming dependent on technology instead of learning from our interactions with our bodies and the world around us makes a way forward without continued technological advancement seem increasingly impossible. A literal interpretation of these teachings, as Shah advocates for, implies that present-day society, over a century after the writing of this text, is effectively doomed, with further technological developments that have led to further disconnects between mind and body. However, as Gandhi describes individual self-rule as a process that anyone can undergo, it is clear that he sees this dependence as something we are able to control to some extent. The process of swaraj is one that frees people from the rule of ideas and developments as well as the rule of human oppressors.

The cognitive restructuring that comes with the conveniences of modernity is proven to exist by Gandhi’s own historical recasting. As a radical advocate of postcolonialism and critic of modernization in life, Gandhi’s posthumous portrayal as a pacifist with widely palatable views demonstrates the cognitive dissonance that comes with modernity. We are not doing the true work of swaraj when we reject colonial rule while accepting its legacy, meaning we must make Gandhian philosophy acceptable to the colonial legacy as well. The embrace of this conception of modernity as the only way forward conflicts with Gandhi’s (questionable) status as something of a modern saint, since the views he expresses in his writings condemn the very things that make this progressive view possible: “By recasting Gandhi as a harmless Luddite with a contemporary moral sensitivity which is fit for progressive global causes, the global community has conveniently tamed an otherwise relentless critic of modernity as setting the definitive standard of life” (Lee, 149). Lee identifies the contradiction here between Gandhi’s portrayal and his actual views and actions as emerging from a sort of widespread cognitive dissonance, wherein the hero-worship of Gandhi as an advocate of peace and nonviolence is impossible when we ascribe fully to the necessity of constant development. Erasing the complexities of Gandhi’s view of modernity in Hind Swaraj allows readers to embrace ideas such as passive resistance while rejecting his criticism of technology . Allen embraces a more nuanced view of Gandhian philosophy, writing, “Yes, Gandhi is opposed to the key terms as defined by modern civilization in the above modern formulation of the either-or dichotomy. However, he is in favor of real progress, real development, appropriate technology, and raising the standard of living of all” (Allen, 122). As Allen points out, Gandhi’s purported desire to eliminate machinery, as seen in Hind Swaraj, is not one that comes at the cost of the well-being of the average Indian citizen. However, Allen’s more abstract view of Hind Swaraj ignores the real issues that Gandhi has with technology and the immoral relationship between the individual and the world that it cultivates. Stating simply that Gandhi is in favor of raising the standard of living without acknowledging what constitutes a better standard of living for Gandhi is antithetical to the substance of Gandhi’s critiques of modernity. The list of actions Gandhi advocates for in the conclusion to the text, as previously mentioned (Gandhi, 115), show a nuance to his views that is often overlooked, as he writes that different people in different circumstances cannot have the same contributions to a nationalist movement and cannot achieve individual swaraj in the same way.

Gandhi’s critiques of modern civilization and the enframing of consciousness that comes with it implies an impending struggle for dominance between what he sees as “true” and “false” civilization, exemplified in Hind Swaraj by the relationship between India and England. The relationship of the Indian and English people to their respective states is a complicated one. Gandhi sees this relationship as largely informed by the morality of India and the materialism of England. The English are united as a political body, with a shared national commitment to material and colonial gains: “As are the people, so is their Parliament. They have certainly one quality very strongly developed. They will never allow their country to be lost” (Gandhi, 33). For the English, country takes precedence over individual self-knowledge, where government rule transcends self-rule in significance. While the English are united in their materialism, the Indians are united in morality. Gandhi writes, “[W]here this cursed modern civilization has not reached, India remains as it was before…The English do not rule over them, nor do you ever rule over them” (Gandhi, 70). The Indian people’s refusal to accept the moral changes that come along with the supposed advances of modernity gives colonial rule no real power in these places in India. It is not tangible political power that Gandhi is concerned with here, but the power over a people, the ability to shape a culture as one sees fit, and this kind of dominance will never be achieved by the English once modernization is rejected.

This struggle between the moral and material civilizations is, in Gandhi’s view, inseparably tied to the principle of swaraj, pointing out a path to the future where the colonized India will prevail and the colonizing English are doomed. Swaraj, or self-rule, is described in the text as a process involving great discipline and becoming well-acquainted with oneself, a process which is possible for anyone but, due to India’s foundations as a largely moral civilization, this process is much more ingrained in their culture than it is in that of the English. Gandhi describes the necessity of this process of self-rule for his anti-colonialist goals, writing, “[S]uch Swaraj has to be experienced by each one for himself. One drowning man will never save another…If the English become Indianised, we can accommodate them” (Gandhi, 73). In the case of the English, Gandhi provides an avenue for the development of individual self-knowledge for them, if they are able to undergo the transformative process of self-rule. Again, moral gains trump political and material ones, as even a colonized India remains superior to England in its foundational qualities. The process of swaraj is not merely a spiritual act, however, as Shah points out: “Swa [meaning self] therefore emerges from the political necessity to challenge the English rule and awaken India’s self that was forgotten during the sway of English dominance” (Shah, 135). As she implies here, the advancement of the individual is a deeply political act in Hind Swaraj. The formation of an Indian identity, on a national as well as an individual level, is a more powerful tool in the independence movement than military mobilization and violence could ever be.

In his evaluation of English dominance over India, Gandhi identifies an unbalanced relationship between what he deems as true and false civilization. True civilization, which he associates with India, is moral and immaterial. The Enprimewglish, however, are both perpetrators and victims of the idolatry of false “modern” civilization. Colonialism as it is characterized in Hind Swaraj amounts to an attempt to spread the ideals of false civilization, and specifically to force Indians to give up their morals. At the root of this condemnation of modernity is the way that the technologies and institutions imposed by the English cause a restructuring of consciousness, as Shah argues. Allen furthers this argument by suggesting that Gandhi’s sweeping views on modern technology are largely metaphorical, and his real issue is with the way these technologies fuel the view that the ends justify the means. It is clear from Gandhi’s text that he sees these developments as immoral in and of themselves, but his central concern is the way that the Indian and English populations relate to the world around them. His arguments on modernity as the root of colonial rule reframe the struggle between the English and the Indians as two systems of morality grappling with each other, rather than the material domination of one state over another. This issue of the spread of modern civilization is at the heart of what is at stake for Gandhi: from his perspective, only time will tell if true or false civilization will win out in the end.

Works Cited

Allen, Douglas. “Is Gandhi’s Approach to Technology Irrelevant in the Modern Age of Technology?” Gandhi after 9/11: Creative Nonviolence and Sustainability, Oxford Academic Books, 2019, pp. 99-137. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199491490.003.0006

Gandhi, Mohandas. ‘Hind Swaraj’ and Other Writings, edited by Anthony Parel, Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Lee, Theresa M. L. “Modernity and postcolonial nationhood: Revisiting Mahatma Gandhi and Sun Yat-sen a century later,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 41(2), 2015. https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453714554025

Shah, Esha. “Ethics of Technological Modernity: Reading Hind Swaraj towards Critiquing Craig Venter’s Synthetic Biology.” Re-reading Hind Swaraj: Modernity and Subalterns, edited by Ghanshyam Shah, Routledge India, 2013, pp. 123-141. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367818548

To Love or Not to Love Thy Neighbour: Civilization As a Window to the Good

by Stella Xia

Prompt: Gandhi offers a sustained critique of “modern civilization.” Apply Gandhi’s criticisms of modern civilization to the representation of civilization in another text on our reading list and assess your findings.

“We are the innately philosophical animal, moral and political theoreticians by trade, forced to an unending concern with what we are and who we can and should be.” (Chapman, 313)

That our conceptions of the moral self build our conceptions of moral civilization is not an especially assertive claim. Still, it is nonetheless remarkable the cultural ubiquity of such a phenomenon, and the subjects of this essay are a prime example: upon a closer reading, it becomes apparent that Gandhi’s view of society is not so different from that of Nietzsche or Freud. All three see civilization as an extension of the self and a manifestation of human nature, acknowledging that humans have equal capacity based on their internal states to create an environment of love and community as well as greed and exploitation. However, the moral assignations attributed to each scholar’s unique view of civilization depend on the culture and politics in which they are situated: in particular, Nietzsche and Freud attempt to rationally analyze the source of virtue, while Gandhi’s traditional religious ideals come prepackaged with its own morality system and associated practice, one that delineates between a “natural” or “true” state of self and a corrupt one mapped respectively onto a “true” and “false” civilization. Notably, Nietzsche and Freud do not make such moral distinctions. Although the Western scholars agree with the existence of these dichotomous world states as following from the individual, they contradict him by arguing for their inevitable coexistence, positing that both conventionally virtuous and sinful aspects of civilization find their origin in one unchangeable human nature, not two, and therefore, immorality as popularly conceived cannot be banished in the way Gandhi envisions while still preserving morality. For Nietzsche, the piety Gandhi necessitates in his ideal image of India is merely a manifestation of slave morality; for Freud, it is a coping mechanism for inescapable suffering. Similarly, Gandhi’s godless and developed modern India is analogous to Nietzsche’s powerful master morality, as well as the social productivity arising from Freud’s sublimation of libido. This essay will position Gandhi, the East, and religion across from Nietzsche, Freud, the West, and reason in the analysis of how traditional and modern civilizations are moralized based on the interpretation of individual human nature, ultimately concluding with a broader speculation about the influence of political environment on how we decide we ought to live.

Gandhi’s argument is parallel to Freud and Nietzsche in one key respect: he attributes the social condition to the sum of its parts, that is, its people. The book begins with the rejection of English occupation, proclaiming it a self-imposed oppressive force rather than an external one and asserting famously that “We alone keep [the British]” (Gandhi 40) and India is wholly responsible for its own subjugation. Gandhi cites godlessness and overzealous materialism as the source of the problem, criticizing Indians for chasing “worldly pursuits” over holy ones and losing sight of their sense of duty and moral compass (41). This is further developed by his indictment on railways and doctors, which is similarly founded on the premise of straying from what God intended: railways are man’s abuse of intellect to override the “limit to a man’s locomotive ambition” (49), leading to cultural overstimulation and the unnatural spreading of evil, and the burgeoning medical profession is an “institution for propagating sin” that “violate[s] our religious instinct” (61-62) by using the availability of cures to encourage vice and indulgence. It follows, then, that “true civilisation” is closely related to individual observance of religious duty, a framework of happiness based in acknowledgement of finitude and appreciation of tradition (66). Therefore, the home rule that he advocates must arise from the individual, and “has to be experienced by each one for himself” (71) in the training of passive resistance, which involves a strengthening of one’s body and mind to face the self-sacrifice necessary to stay true to the values of swaraj. On a collective scale, such an endeavour is crucial to shrugging off English influence and enhancing the resilient spirit of the country.

John W. Chapman, in his 1977 essay “Toward a Theory of Human Nature and Dynamics”, classifies both Nietzsche and Freud as instinctivists in their conception of the self, one of three psychological theories in Western politics alongside plasticity (the belief that we are infinitely malleable by culture or habit, epitomized by behaviourists like Skinner) and developmentalism (the Rousseauian idea that we are a host of unrealized potentialities that may or may not manifest based on our institutions and belief systems). Instinctivists join Plato in the recognition of “subterranean drives … decisive for thought and motive” (Chapman 296). At its extreme, they believe that there is a singular, unchanging internal force that drives all action: for Nietzsche, this force presents itself as a will to power, which controls the morality of society as a whole; he understands history as a continuous chain of power struggles, a lens he uses to explain the authority of value systems thus far taken for granted. In questioning the origin of constructs, he reliably arrives at deeper, inalienable truths about the human condition: the innate pleasure of cruelty gave rise to punishment (Nietzsche 41), the pleasure of protection (“the basic relationship of the creditor to his debtor”, 46) to community, and the “consciousness of power” (47), or the awareness of the superiority necessary for withholding punishment, to mercy. Although Nietzsche’s analysis is more chronological than cross-sectional, he nonetheless relates the conception of society to the cumulative expression of life acting “in its basic functions–in an injuring, violating, pillaging, destroying manner”, or else as “partial restrictions of the true will … as means for creating greater units of power” (50), analogous to Gandhi’s relating natural godly duty to the Indian spirit.

However, instinctivism in its more moderate form sees its subscribing members advocating for a “multiplicity of propensities or dispositions, more or less independent and autonomous, and yet sufficiently compatible to render us ambivalent rather than incongruent creatures” (Chapman 296). Freud exemplifies this variation of the school of thought, proposing multiple ideas for the root of human activity. For one, he cites all conduct as motivated by either the pursuit of pleasure (“the pleasure principle”, Freud 43) or the avoidance of displeasure. His idea that there lies a subconscious of which we lack awareness holds remarkable explanatory power for the components of civilization, even seemingly contradictory ones. This subconscious suffering-avoidance becomes both “voluntary isolation”, a turning-away from a painful world, as well as a joining of hands against it – becoming part of the “human community … working with all for the good of all” (45). Community, however, is explained in parallel with a force he dubs Eros, or libido, which for reasons to which he admits ignorance endeavours to “combine single human individuals … into one great unity, the unity of mankind”. Friendship and communal love, then, are merely inhibited sexual desire channelled into an avenue with less disappointment (82). Additionally, the titular discontents plaguing civilization are attributable to none other than the death instinct, which turns into aggression that grapples with our libido on an individual level in a manner directly reflective of civilizational development. Freud asserts that “[t]his struggle of civilization may … be simply described as the struggle for life of the human species” (111); every human phenomenon is also by extension a social one, and thus the tensions of our internal instincts predict the tensions in our interactions – the standard of cleanliness, for instance, is merely a manifestation of human “anal erotism”, or our supposed infantile obsession with excretory function (74). As per the instinctivist worldview, these human phenomena are all manifestations of drives that make up fundamental humanity.

Where Gandhi fundamentally differs, though, is the moral perspective ingrained in his approach to civilization. The impetus behind his work is political antagonism, meaning that he must necessarily start with a “bad” in mind that can be cleaved from the “good”. Thus “modern civilization” is mobilized and villainized, a force acting on human nature instead of being a product of it: he calls the modern mode of governance a “disease”, but also specifies on multiple counts its partition from the English people, who are only “at present afflicted by it” (Gandhi 37) and have the potential to turn themselves around if they so choose. In contrast, the “true” civilization he seeks is the core of human nature, a truth without which “the universe would disappear” (87); that soul-force has prevailed in spite of turmoil over centuries is “the greatest and most unimpeachable evidence of the success of this force” (88). The characterization of modernity as transient and moral spirit as permanent, aside from an Englishman’s “Indianisation” being synonymous with his uncovering of humanity (72), is not self-servingly arbitrary, but rather rooted in religious principle. Gandhi calls modern civilization “irreligion” and contrary to dharma (36), the law that governs the universe of which the core is pity (86); his faith, his belief that some truths are higher than others, is Hind‘s foundation.

For Gandhi, religion is more than just a belief system – it is a way of life, and thus “every activity of a man of religion must be derived from his religion, because religion means being bound to God, that is to say God rules your every breath” (Karuvelil 55). When he advocates for true civilization, he advocates not just for the eradication of innovation, but a collective embracing of faith, regardless of what form it may take. In the essay “Gandhi on Religion in Public Life”, George Karuvelil highlights how the tension between Gandhi’s belief in all-encompassing religiosity and his secularist political stance is reconciled by the fact that, unlike Western secularism in which faith and reason are mutually exclusive, the nonconformity of the government to any particular faith enables the harmony of India’s pluralistic religious setting so that “[o]n the strength of merit … a Christian could be the Chief Minister without exhibiting greater merit than a Hindu or Muslim” (56). Morality, then, is not dictated by the specific strand of faith, but the general presence and practice in an individual, a “solitary spiritual journey of ‘self-realization or knowledge of self'” in pursuit of the great Truth (59), which is subjectively interpreted and adapted for the optimization of the pursuer’s life. By identifying commonalities among every faith, this ethos grants the state a moral compass, an Eternal Law that transcends discrete belief systems, revolving around ahimsa, or care for all living beings. This may be further broken down self-suffering, or discipline imposed only upon oneself to “vindicate his particular view of truth” (64), and suffering-love, in which one suffers in service of his fellow living beings. These tenets combined make up the satyagraha philosophy, Gandhi’s brand of nonviolent resistance against British occupation. Religion to Gandhi is understood as morality and thus intimately related to public life, informing his political activism against the divine deprivation of the English.

In absence of a God to substantiate moral claims, the atheistic Nietzsche and Freud adopt a much more passive, rational stance in their discussion of civilization, exhuming the fruits of their analytic approach for notions of good and bad. The phenomena they observe about society are not different than Gandhi’s – both point out selflessness, religion, and a sense of moral duty as well as human progress and self-interest as features of the community living experience – but instead of an ultimatum between faithful and faithless, they are positioned as coexisting. Nietzsche agrees with the setup of Gandhi’s conflict in that there are two moralities at war with each other, but in Nietzsche’s conception there is no valorization of asceticism; a victor is not self-evident. Gandhi’s “true civilization”, for Nietzsche, is simply the slave morality, which “always needs an opposite and external world” (Nietzsche 19), and is ideologically bound to an ascetic ideal that follows from the ressentiment of powerlessness. Therefore, “modern civilization” – what Gandhi calls sacrilege – Nietzsche calls flourishing, master morality, “spirits strengthened by wars and victories” (66). And instead of one necessarily vanquishing the other by way of godly sanction, Nietzsche contends for the never-ending battle of “Rome against Judea, Judea against Rome” (31), fueled by collectivized wills against the backdrop of imbalanced power dynamics, not religion as motivator but humanity.

Freud goes even further, abandoning Gandhi and even Nietzsche’s temporal analysis and placing both moral and immoral civilization on the same timeline, implying that the societal condition can simultaneously display virtue and vice. For him, religion is also a human construction, attributable to a number of causes: a misinterpretation of the “oceanic feeling” (Freud 25), the need for a paternal figure in the face of “infantile helplessness” (36), a “lullaby about Heaven” to alleviate the strife of the death-instinct and Eros (111), or a preset path to happiness to avoid dealing with one’s own neuroses (56). The morality accompanying it serves only to “defen[d] against human aggressiveness” (146), a custom of loving thine neighbour to guard against acting on the repressed urge to attack or have sex with them.

However, he does not see belief in a higher power as antithetical to human flourishing like Nietzsche, but as branches of the same tree, equally symptoms of repressed desire. Freud fancied himself a rationalist, and, aside from adamantly avoiding any association with Nietzsche in his early career, heavily criticized the German philosopher for his moralizing of Christianity and “transform[ing of] ‘is’ into ‘ought’, which is alien to science”, deeming him unable to “free himself of the theologian” (Roazen 37). This is somewhat hypocritical of him, however, given that his later argument against the Christian edict to “love thy neighbour as thyself”, echoes Nietzsche (“The means employed by the ascetic priest with which we have thus far become acquainted – … ‘love of one’s neighbor’ … are, measured according to a modern standard, his innocent means in the battle with listlessness,” Nietzsche 99), only thinly veiled in an appeal to the rationality of his overarching instinctivist sentiment – he reasons that “I should be wrong to [love a stranger], for my love is valued by all my own people as a sign of my preferring them, and it is an injustice to them if I put a stranger on par with them” (Freud 92). Thus, Freud argues, such an edict is merely a compensatory measure against aggression or libido enacted upon such neighbours, and the super-ego’s conception of morality is civilization forcing the instincts inward, reminiscent of Nietzsche’s “internalizing of man”, in which “the entire inner world … has taken on depth, breadth, height to the same extent that man’s outward discharging has been obstructed” (Nietzsche 57).

Interestingly, Nietzsche and Freud are not immune to the arbitering good and bad that comes out so clearly in Gandhi’s ideology; rather, they obscure their morals in an analytical framework rather than a faith-based one. Gandhi’s modern civilization – characterized by progress and innovation driven by power hierarchies – is analogous to Nietzsche’s master morality, both of which are then analogous to Freud’s sublimation, the “displacements of libido” into higher pursuits in an effort to evade base physical suffering (48). Gandhi and Nietzsche are actually aligned in that Gandhi is the manifestation of Nietzsche’s great fear, the realization of a shrewd and compassionate ascetic priest who “intuits this instinct [for herd organization] and fosters it” (Nietzsche 98); Gandhi, however, celebrates his Nietzschean priesthood as a quest towards Absolute Truth and would revolt at the “spirits strengthened by wars and victories” on which Nietzsche waits anxiously (66). Freud proves the least attached to either end, arguing for the most part with indifference that the technological flourishing that Gandhi so abhors is driven by the same mechanism of the abhorrence itself, “the non-satisfaction … of powerful instincts” (Freud 75) as a source of both innovation and the religious activism against it, and it would consequently be impossible to cauterize one consequence of these instincts without also affecting the others.

Chapman’s essay raises a fascinating debate on whether there is an innate, unchanging morality derived from some core truth about human nature (“A good man is, perhaps, one who is courageous, temperate, wise, prudent, liberal and just; and whatever the moral or ideological fashion of the times, such a picture … cannot change”, Chapman 298), or whether the often contradictory plurality of our natures, the fragment of truth to which each aforementioned psychological model lays claim, forces us to “choose among drastically different values and ways of life … that would account for the variety of human cultures” (Chapman 300). In other words, is Gandhi wrong about morality’s inherence to God? Are Freud and Nietzsche wrong about morality’s inherence to aggression? Or are all three valid anthropological samples of arbitrary value selection based on culture? He makes a distinction between the penchant towards rationality of the West, finding its roots in the “legalistic ethics of the Hebrews and the legal unity of the Greek polis”, and the “arbitral, ethical, and totalizing modes of thought” characteristic of the East (316), noting that Gandhi himself was opposed to legal order. This culturally-informed dichotomy offers a plausible explanation for the differing conceptions of morality between Western and Eastern thinkers as presented in this essay; Nietzsche and Freud as analytical and Gandhi as spiritual. Upon acknowledging the merits of each point of view, Chapman ultimately concludes that regardless of the true source of morality, it is self-evident across all culture that we have a drive to politicize our beliefs, regardless of what the beliefs are, that “what becomes of men depends on the kind of social and political unity they achieve” (316). For instance, religions like Gandhi’s Hinduism “offer ‘ … the genuinely reasonable way to live … , given the facts of life …'”; it coheres naturally from a certain perspective of the world how we should hope to inhabit it (298). The question of how civilization is conceived is closely relates to how we conceive our morals, which is in turn held flush against how we conceive ourselves.

Gandhi’s moral interpretation of civilization stems from his understanding of morality as rooted in God; for Nietzsche and Freud, morality and God are both rooted in the instincts, a conclusion informed by Western rationalist ideals. Yet, all three writers acknowledge, in a time of shifting political and by extension moral allegiances, that the influence of a people can amass staggering change. In Gandhi’s protest against the English, this manifests as his insistence upon the rediscovery of the Indian spirit, its goodness affirmed by the same ascetic ideal that Nietzsche warns will make us nihilistic sheep. Freud, meanwhile, plays mediator, demanding from the human condition both extremes at the same time without needing to compromise, though still agreeing with Nietzsche’s physiologically-founded conception of humanity. Despite the complexities in their dialogue, the three thinkers nonetheless all stumble into agreement on one point, perhaps our strongest case yet for a universal truth: how we ought to live is inextricably tied to who we ought to be.

Works Cited

Chapman, John W. “Toward a Theory of Human Nature and Dynamics.” Nomos, vol. XVII, 1977, pp. 292-319.

Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and Its Discontents. Translated by James Strachey, W. W. Norton & Co, 2010.

Gandhi, Mohandas. Hind Swaraj and Other Writings. Edited by Anthony J. Parel, Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Karuvelil, George. “Gandhi on Religion in Public Life.” Indian Philosophical Studies, vol. V, 2001, pp. 53-79.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic. Translated by Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen, Hackett Pub. Co, 2009.

Roazen, Paul. Political theory and the psychology of the unconscious : Freud, J.S. Mill, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, Fromm, Bettelheim and Erikson. Open Gate Press, 2000.

The Self, Society, and Liberation in Black Skin, White Masks and the Philosophy of Mohammad Iqbal

by Aiman Fatira

Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks provides a robust account of the historical processes and forces instrumental in the experiences of objectification and loss of selfhood of Black/colonized peoples. Fanon describes the creation of an inferior sense of self through the process of objectification and belittlement in racial subjugation, which often entails, for the colonized subject, a sense of responsibility for dominant imagined histories that persist as a result of colonial hegemonic structures. The late-colonial Indian poet Mohammad Iqbal’s use of poetic devices that obscure a defined sense of self, and his view of the connection between the development of khudi (i.e., the highest potential possible for an individual) and society comprise a useful heuristic device for exploring ideas introduced in Black Skin, White Masks, and vice versa. Iqbal’s philosophy is formed in part as a critique of his contemporaries for their views of Muslims in British India as existing in a denigrated state, while Fanon critiques attempts at reclaiming history as a tool of liberation in response to colonial paradigms. Iqbal theorizes the necessary connection between the reclamation of the self through the attainment of khudi and its connection with societal development, endorsing a renewal of Muslim society in British India, whereas Fanon argues that appeals to history and the past are ultimately futile, and do not comprise a practical strategy for the liberation of colonized peoples as subjects or as an aggregate, instead arguing that liberation comes from the prioritization of the liberation of the self from colonial history and its structures for future freedom.

Iqbal’s Asrar-i-Khudi (Secrets of the Self) delineates his conception of khudi, or the self. In Iqbal’s poetry, the attainment of khudi consists in the awareness of oneself through the awareness of God and the connection between the two, and thus, the capacity of the improvement of the self in realizing its full potential in becoming the ‘Perfect Man’, another concept described in Iqbal’s writings. This point is the crux of much scholarship and commentary on Iqbal’s work and philosophy [1].However, Shah in “‘A Stranger in the City’: Selfhood, Community and Modes of (Un)belonging in Muhammad Iqbal’s Self-Portraitures,” elaborates further on Iqbal’s stance on the self, arguing that Iqbal’s use of portraitures and poetical devices that posit him (as a figure in his poems, and as an author) as an ambiguous, mutable, and undefined individual work as a critique of the notions of selfhood and its relation to society. For example, Shah analyzes the use of this effect in his poem Zuhd aur Rindi (‘Piety and Profligacy’), which presents a dialectic between the personifications of zuhd (conventionality) and rind (unconventionality) [2]. Shah describes the final portion of the poem:

The puritan Zahid attributes these mischiefs of Rind to his apprenticeship in philosophy, but catches hold of him one day and urges him to clarify who he really is in the bundle of contradictions he instantiates. Iqbal, in his candid response, seconds his view and acknowledges that he is equally clueless about the ‘real’ Iqbal underneath or beyond the bundle of contradictions, or the Muslim Iqbal minus his heterodoxies [3].

These personifications/characters, particularly Rind, may be used as a way to analyze Iqbal’s conception of himself as an enigmatic or unclear figure: “Iqbal the Rind presents himself to the world as the enigma of his own strangerhood, attentive to his own otherness in open and unapologetic ways,” which allows for the “opening up [of the] possibility for his community to strive to live with, and eradicate its fear or aversion of, and anxiety about, difference, non-adherence, otherness.” [4] The use of self/characters presented in ways that provide social commentary in text is a rhetorical device employed in Black Skin, White Masks as well. Fanon leads his philosophical, social, and historical commentary into a narrative-style retelling of his experience of racism on a train:

“Look, A Negro!” It was a passing sting. I attempted a smile.
“Look, A Negro!” Absolutely. I was beginning to enjoy myself.
“Look, A Negro!” The circle was gradually getting smaller. I was really enjoying myself.
Maman, look, a Negro; I’m scared!”[5]

Fanon’s use of the train episode in the narrative is arguably similar in some sense to Iqbal’s usage of self-portraitures within his writing. Shah draws from Beaujour’s writings on self-portraits, noting that “[i]n a self-portrait, [Beaujour] argues, there is no reconstruction of the story of one’s complete personality or an exhaustive narrative of one’s identity.” [6] The self-portrait is rather a form of situating the individual within a wider cultural and societal context that provides the ability to analyze the relationship between selfhood and social processes. As Shah writes, “Iqbal’s discourse of ‘I’ about ‘I’ is a way of establishing connections between the microcosmic ‘I’ and the macrocosm at large […] demonstrating their discursive and public character.”[7] This connection is most pointedly demonstrated in Fanon’s use of narrative devices to conduct analysis of the self’s relation to racial hierarchies situated in their historical context, rather than the product of simply phenological observations or objective realities, and the resulting creation of a normative reality of racial hierarchy.

Fanon comments on a “third person” body image in colonized/Black subjects, but within the narrative of the train incident, notes that, “[my body was] no longer in the third person but in triple.” [8] Use of everyday experience/interaction as a narrative device allows Fanon to illustrate the alienation from the self that occurs through racialization and imposed narrativization (i.e., the colonial imagination of the concepts of “races” and their respective histories), which ultimately results in total objectification. He describes the outcome of this process as being one which causes him to “give myself up as an object […] [p]eeling, stripping my skin, causing a hemorrhage that left congealed black blood all over my body.” [9] Nielsen, in “Resistance through re-narration: Fanon on de-constructing racialized subjectivities,” comments on the train incident presented in the narrative, stating that it “highlights the way in which phenotypic or so called ‘racial’ differences […] result in the oppressed group living in what amounts, historically speaking, to a different world than the dominant group.”[10] The implication of this cleaving of subjective realities is a binding of the self-perception of colonized subjects and societal impositions of racial schemas, a topic further explored within the text.

Fanon describes that during the process of colonization, “[Black people’s] metaphysics […] were abolished because they were in contradiction with a new civilization that imposed its own.” [11] This erasure of an autonomous ontology occurred as a result of a historical event, i.e., the imposition of a new ontology by an outside civilization. The notion of contradiction in this statement is important to note—if the imposition of European civilizations is that of subjugation/power, then the mode of existence in past civilizations contradicted it due to the autonomy it bestowed upon its subjects. Using historicity, Fanon provides a basis for a contemporary reality, which supports his following arguments concerning race and liberation as a political issue. Accordingly, Fanon explains through his assertion that a Black person must be Black in and of themselves, but also in relation to the “superior” race as it is posited within the hierarchy, i.e., White people. He states that “not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man.”[12]The imposition of a subjugation/power schema by European civilizations is naturalized through the establishment of racial hierarchies. Parris, in “Frantz Fanon: Existentialist, Dialectician, and Revolutionary,” writes that “[o]ntology for the Black subject is not an a priori reality; instead, it is a reality that becomes permanently compromised and defined by its inescapable duality with whiteness and all that it represents– white supremacy, anti-African racism, and racist stereotypes.”[13] The implications of this are two-faceted: 1) the imposition of the novel ontology by colonizing forces inextricably binds colonized subjects and their senses of self to this society-wide model (being Black in relation to White) and 2) the sense of self of colonized subjects, even on a personal level, is forever shifted within these conditions to accommodate this inferior racial status. The creation of this condition of an “inferiority complex,” for Fanon, is an essentially historic event, in that its lineage can be traced to a specific locus, and that it is not a consequence of biological or natural conditions, nor a result of a nebulously originating interpersonal strife that results in the permeation of unfounded racial prejudice.

Shah argues that “[a]t the heart of Iqbal’s work is an elaborate case for ‘I am another’, or, to be precise, that ‘I is another’, a project, as it were, of self-differentiation […] strangerhood and selfhood function in Iqbal’s work as each other’s mirror images—self-differentiating, heterogeneous, intractable, undocile, individuating forces that resist assimilation to any larger whole, and remain irreducible to representations given to them,” meaning Iqbal presents himself in a self-distinguishing fashion which escapes societal imposition or definition.[14] In contrast, Fanon’s analysis rests primarily on the forcible assimilation of the self into a larger, societal paradigm of racialization, and the violent imposition of a racial ontology. He describes the process of racialization as making him “responsible not only for my body but also for my race and my ancestors,” which occurs through a process of reckoning with images invoked by the White/colonial imagination: “At the start of my history others have fabricated for me, the pedestal of cannibalism was given pride of place so that I wouldn’t forget.”[15] From the imposition which was described previously at the origin of colonial rule and racial hierarchies, as well as in the being of Black people in relation to White people, Fanon gives examples of specific essentialist qualities which are imbedded into White people’s perception of Black people. The corrupted sense of being is consolidated through the recognition of belonging to a certain corrupted group, a notion linked to racial hierarchy. Colonized subjects are indeed positioned as irredeemably inferior due to their status within racial hierarchy, but most importantly, they are left helpless under the fate of a history which has been dictated for them: doomed to failure as a natural process of historical development, and left to forever lament in the shadow of a constructed history of savagery and inferiority.

Iqbal and Fanon’s conceptions of the self arguably intersect in their ideas of liberation of the self, or the actualization of the full potential of the self. For Fanon, this is primarily communicated through the colonial subject’s freedom to enact their liberation even under oppression. As Nielsen writes, “this ability to choose, to act as a free (yet greatly constrained) agent highlights the fact that the [B]lack person in a colonized or similarly oppressive context is in reality not a mere res, a thing determined from the outside and lacking genuine freedom.”[16] The notion of a free will and form of agency even for the subjugated colonized subject aligns with previously mentioned concepts of a discontinuity between the self and the societal background in Iqbal’s writings. This is in contrast to the colonial imaginations of Black/colonized people that Fanon delineates that enforce certain narratives and histories upon the subject, pushing them into ontologies that limit their sense of self and ways of being. The idea of removal from this structure, and the genesis of anti-colonial resistance is, for Fanon, the exercise of the subject’s autonomy, and the abandonment of societal racial hierarchy. Parris states that “Fanon asserts that the colonizer will remain the principal catalyst of the colonized subject’s actions until the colonizer recognizes the native as a human being,” and so the decolonial mission is inextricably linked to the assertion of a selfhood in contradiction with conventional racial hierarchies, and the liberation and actualization of this selfhood.[17]

The idea of the liberation of the self is explored by Fanon and Iqbal in their own respective fashions. For both, history is of key importance in conceptualizing the process of liberation of the self from societal impositions, but, more important is the idea of a future that supersedes the contemporary issues discussed in their writings. As Fanon conceives of racial hierarchization as a historically occurring force that imposed its structures upon colonized populations, he argues that a solution based on subverting the purely superficial effects of this structure through the construction of narratives that espouse a previous glorious history or culture (such as the Négritude movement) in attempt to gain a form of political power is ultimately futile. Fanon describes the phenomenon of the racial inferiority complex as a historical force that brought about the dominance of ideologies which perpetuate a structure to constantly affirm this complex through methods of subordination expressed in daily life and internalized by the self. Due to this, his solution does not lie with the modification of racial systems, and accordingly, their narratives, but rather in the total liberation from these structures, and subsequently, the historical narratives they perpetuate. As such, he asserts that “I do not want to sing the past to the detriment of my present and my future.”[18] Fanon not only views the constant invocation of the past as a limiting strategy for liberation, he also views it as an active hindrance to real struggle for liberation, as it obfuscates the origin of anti-colonial resistance, which is the struggle for freedom from domination and oppression in the present state, and for the sake of a future free from such burdens. He explains this using the example of the Vietnamese resistance at the time: “[…] they don’t expect their sacrifice to revive a forgotten past. They accept death for the sake of the present and future.”[19] Additionally, he argues that this drive for enacting change does not begin from an identification with past struggles, which have an essentializing effect on colonized subjects (e.g., identifying with enslaved ancestors), but from an attitude of emancipation of the self and the collective from suffocation.

Sevea writes in The Political Philosophy of Mohammad Iqbal that a spectre of the “backward Muslim” was invoked frequently in commentaries on the status of Muslims in British India.[20] Though not entirely true in fact (due to different definitions/aggregations of religious groups, as well as the variance in status and its dependence on multiple factors, not just religion), Sevea notes that this idea “had an important psychological impact on the former Muslim aristocracy […] The crumbling of the social, cultural and political world which they were accustomed to and its displacement by the rule of an alien power were interpreted as a substantial decline in the fortunes of Muslims in India.”[21] Ideas of a loss of former glory (particularly in looking back to former great Muslim societies) and a diminution in status informed patterns of thought, social discourses, and thus, the literature of Indian Muslims at the time, consolidating and perpetuating the notion.[22] Iqbal, on the other hand, “sought to provide a message of renewal [through his poetry and prose] […] In line with this, Iqbal argued that the role of the poet and intellectual was not to wallow in lamentation but to chart a path of action, to blaze the path of regeneration.”[23] As such, Iqbal and Fanon once again intersect at similar positions; Fanon, in rebellion against history as a definitive marker of personhood, and a critic in its usefulness in liberation of colonized subjects, and Iqbal, in contradiction to popular cultural mythos of Indian Muslims as a group of people in a state of damnation. Iqbal writes:

They do not see the truths which are veiled
Whose eyes are laden by slavery and blind imitation,
How are they to revive Iran and Arabia
These who are themselves enchained by western civilisation?[24]

In this, he forms a critique aimed at both “traditional religious authorities” and “‘modernist’ intellectuals” due to the former’s inability to reconceive and revive Islam in accordance with modern needs and due to the latter’s (perceived) adherence to Western conceptions (such as the nation-state).[25] Critiques of this fashion form the crux of Iqbal’s arguments surrounding the future of Indian Muslims, in accordance with the development of khudi and a Muslim community of a higher spiritual status.

Iqbal’s notions of khudi are not solely focused upon the individual capacity for improvement, but also on the connection between this self-attainment and the development of (a Muslim) society. Sevea explains that “[a]lthough he championed the need for the fullest development of the khudi, Iqbal located its development firmly within the ambit of the social body, […] [arguing] that society was an indispensable medium for the development of the individual.”[26] For Iqbal, this formed the basis for his political assertions of a community united through religion. However, Sevea also states that Iqbal’s conceptions of the connection between society and the development of khudi still meant that “the individual was never completely merged into the social body. The khudi maintained its selfhood even as it was tied to society; in fact, it was strengthened by its link with society.”[27] For Iqbal, this is of importance due to his own place in the political discourses of the Muslims of India at the time, and his own conceptions of religious community as opposed to the nation-state. Additionally, khudi was postulated as a conception applicable to each human; each person had the ability to actualize or reach their full potential, being a uniting concept in this sense.

Fanon writes, after the retelling of the train incident, that “I wanted quite simply to be a man among men. I would have liked to enter our world young and sleek, a world we could build together.”[28] When analyzed in conjunction with Iqbal’s observations on khudi, it can be said that the ethos of Fanon’s project lies, firstly, in recognizing the denial of Black/colonized subjects’ ability to participate in the world without impositions of racial categorization and hierarchies, which hinder them in their selfhood, both in the way they are viewed in society, and in the way they view themselves. This has implications for colonized subjects who are denied connection with a liberated world in which harmony and self-actualization are promoted. Secondly, Fanon acknowledges the possibility of the subversion of this model through resistance. This is an undeniably collective struggle, as Fanon says, “I was committed to myself and my fellow man, to fight with all my life and all my strength so that never again would people be enslaved on this Earth.”[29] Fanon’s assertion here shares similarities with the development of khudi, in that Iqbal asserted that it was possible for each person to realize their full potential, which was particularly important within the context of societal connection – for Iqbal, this idea was the foundation of his vision of a renewed Muslim society.

The humanistic and all-encompassing style of Fanon and Iqbal’s writings, as well as their focus on the potential for a future, liberated society, results in striking parallels in the way they conceive of this future. Fanon asks towards the end of Black Skin, “[w]as my freedom not given me to build the world of you, man?” underscoring the centrality of the human figure to a future post-colonial reality, as opposed to society under racial/colonial hierarchy.[30] Iqbal expresses similar sentiments of a world designed after a higher-level selfhood:

Build thy clay into a Man,
Build thy Man into a World!
If thou art unfit to be either a wall or a door,
Someone else will make bricks of thine earth.
O thou who complainest of the cruelty of Heaven,
Thou whose glass cries out against the injustice of the stone,
How long this wailing and crying and lamentation?
How long this perpetual beating of thy breast?
The pith of Life is contained in action,
To delight in creation is the law of Life.
Arise and create a new world![31]

Throughout Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon investigates the instillation of the colonial inferiority complex and the naturalization of race as an ostensibly natural phenomenon, and how this manifests for the colonized subject as a corrupted sense of self, who is then bound to such a societal imposition. Iqbal uses the device of obscuring himself within his poetry to illustrate a dialectic between the known self and an unknown self, positing that both should not be suppressed under societal constraints and norms. Through this device, Iqbal is able to illustrate the essential difference between the self and the surrounding society and its norms. In terms of the possibility of future liberation, Fanon advocates for moving beyond reassertions of the past in an attempt to reconstruct an identity and for forcibly demonstrating selfhood/humanity before the colonizer, while Iqbal discusses the connection between the realization of selfhood and societal processes, within his historical context, as the basis for a revival of Islamic society. When analyzed in synthesis, both philosophies reveal a central impetus of collective liberation from colonial structures/realities, which allow for the manifestation of autonomy for all subjects in the present and future.

 

Bibliography
Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. Translated by Richard Philcox. New York: Grove Press, 2008.
Iqbal, Mohammad. Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, 531–532. Quoted in Sevea, Iqbal Singh. The Political Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal: Islam and Nationalism in Late Colonial India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 62.
Iqbal, Mohammad. “Setting forth the inner meanings of the names of Ali.” In The Secrets of the Self (Asrar-i-Khudi). Translated by Reynold A. Nicholson. Project Gutenberg, https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/57317
Nielsen, Cynthia. “Resistance through re-narration: Fanon on de-constructing racialized subjectivities.” African Identities 9, no. 4 (2011): 363–385. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14725843.2011.614410
Parris, LaRose, “Frantz Fanon: existentialist, dialectician, and revolutionary.” Journal of Pan African Studies 4, no. 7 (2011): 4-23. https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A306596764/LitRC
Sevea, Iqbal Singh. The Political Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal: Islam and Nationalism in Late Colonial India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Shah, Saliha. “‘A Stranger in the City’”: Selfhood, Community and Modes of (Un)Belonging in Muhammad Iqbal’s Self-Portraitures.” Life Writing 21, no. 2 (2024): 333–48. doi:10.1080/14484528.2023.2205547.

Endnotes

[1] Saliha Shah, “‘A Stranger in the City’”: Selfhood, Community and Modes of (Un)Belonging in Muhammad Iqbal’s Self-Portraitures,” Life Writing 21, no. 2 (2024): 338. doi:10.1080/14484528.2023.2205547

[2] Shah, “‘A Stranger in the City,’” 340.

[3] Shah, “‘A Stranger in the City,’” 341.

[4] Shah, “‘A Stranger in the City,’” 341.

[5] Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 91.

[7] Shah, “‘A Stranger in the City,’” 337.

[8] Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 90-92.

[9] Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 92

[10] Cynthia Nielsen. “Resistance through re-narration: Fanon on de-constructing racialized subjectivities.” African Identities 9, no. 4 (2011): 368. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14725843.fz2011.614410

[11] Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 90

[12] Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 90

[13] LaRose Parris, “Frantz Fanon: Existentialist, Dialectician, and Revolutionary.” Journal of Pan African Studies 4, no. 7 (2011): 15. https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A306596764/LitRC

[14] Shah, “‘A Stranger in the City,’” 344.

[15] Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 92, 100.

[16] Nielsen, “Resistance through Re-Narration,” 370.

[17] Parris, “Frantz Fanon,” 17.

[18] Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 201.

[19] Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 202.

[20] Iqbal Singh Sevea, The Political Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal: Islam and Nationalism in Late Colonial India. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 69.

[21] Sevea, The Political Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal, 71.

[22] Sevea, The Political Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal, 73-74.

[23] Sevea, The Political Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal, 78.

[24] Muhammad Iqbal, Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, pp. 531–532, quoted in Sevea, The Political Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal, 62.

[25] Sevea, The Political Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal, 62.

[26] Sevea, The Political Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal, 139-140

[27] Sevea, The Political Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal, 167.

[28] Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 92.

[29] Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 202.

[30] Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 206/

[31] Mohammad Iqbal. “Setting forth the inner meanings of the names of Ali.” In The Secrets of the Self (Asrar-i-Khudi), trans. Reynold A. Nicholson, Project Gutenberg, https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/57317

There’s No Place Like Home: The Role of Cities in Shaping the Self in The Reluctant Fundamentalist

by Amelia Agrawal

In the labyrinthine streets of Lahore, seated across the table from a gruff and mysterious stranger, Changez, an erstwhile New Yorker, finds himself recounting the tale of his time in America. The Reluctant Fundamentalist by Mohsin Hamid unfolds across cities and continents, valleys and skyscrapers, from the bustling heart of Lahore to the glittering skyline of New York, the melancholic beauty of Valparaiso, and the urban tapestry of Manila. Starting as a young Pakistani student chasing the “American Dream,” Changez’s journey maps not only his geographical movements but his evolving consciousness in a post-9/11 world. In this novel, cities transcend their roles as mere settings to become conduits of memory, emotion, and ideological conflict. Changez’s narrative is guided by these cities, which shape and reflect his internal struggles – each locale embedding itself in his story, influencing his identity amidst both global and personal upheavals.

This paper contends that Changez’s identity is shaped by his engagements with Lahore, New York, Manila, and Valparaiso, each influencing and reflecting the fragmentation and reformation of his selfhood as he navigates the aftermath of 9/11. Utilizing narrative analysis and examining transnational identity and cultural hybridity, this essay will discuss how these cities shape Changez’s identity, not just as mere backdrops but as active participants in the story of a man searching for identity, caught between diverging cultures and shifting allegiances.

The story begins, and in many ways perennially resides, within Lahore. The city is not merely Changez’s birthplace; it represents the foundational bedrock of his identity. To understand Changez’s actions and the difficulties he faces in regard to his identity, it is crucial to understand the roots from which his character grows. “I said I was from Lahore, the second largest city of Pakistan, ancient capital of the Punjab, home to nearly as many people as New York, layered like a sedimentary plain with the accreted history of invaders from the Aryans to the Mongols to the British” (Hamid, 7). In Lahore, Changez’s story is deeply entangled with the city’s history of resilience and ruin. It is here, in these familiar streets, that he begins to recount his ideological odyssey.
After four years at Princeton, Changez gets a job at a prestigious company called Underwood Samson (initials U.S.), and moves to New York City. Initially, New York represents a beacon of opportunity and belonging for Changez, in contrast to his feelings of alienation at Princeton, a mere two-hour train ride away. Unlike the homogeneous, suburban environment of his alma mater, New York’s vibrant multiculturalism immediately resonates with him. “I was, in four and a half years, never an American; I was immediately a New Yorker” (Hamid, 33). He recalls the familiarity of hearing Urdu spoken by taxi-cab drivers and finding a taste of home at the Pak-Punjab Deli, just blocks from his East Village apartment. “That was one of the reasons why for me moving to New York felt – so unexpectedly – like coming home” (Hamid, 33). This initial integration into New York underscored the city’s welcoming, open-minded ethos at that time, providing Changez with a newfound sense of belonging within America. “It was a testament to the open-mindedness and – that overused word – cosmopolitan nature of New York in those days that I felt completely comfortable on the subway in this attire” (Hamid, 48). However, it is not New York on its own, as an American city, that Changez takes a liking to – it is the similarities he connects between New York and Lahore that make him enjoy it so much. This is a crucial distinction: he does not connect with New York for its American-ness, but because he is able to find a piece of his home within the complex tapestry of the city.

Underwood Samson, with its motto “Focus on the Fundamentals,” epitomizes the quintessence of the American Dream that Changez initially aspires to achieve. The firm, representing both opportunity and the ruthlessness of a purely capitalist spirit, becomes the epicentre for Changez’s burgeoning disillusionment with America. At Underwood Samson, success is measured by one’s ability to strip away emotional considerations in favour of maximizing profit. Something, it turns out, Changez is very good at. As Changez ascends the corporate ladder, he is increasingly required to adopt a clinical detachment in his work, evaluating companies not for their human impact but for their financial value. “His sole motivation for going to America is to pursue the American Dream, to climb the social ladder and reclaim some of the grandeur he believes he has lost as his family’s fortunes dwindle. In this sense, he exemplifies the individualism that characterizes Western thought, particularly the notion of the American Dream” (Rukmini). This professional environment delineates the conflict between the idealistic promise of meritocracy and the reality of a corporate America indifferent to individual struggle and cultural heritage. Underwood Samson represents a broader American mindset that Changez grapples with—inviting but imperious, promising yet prejudiced.

At the end of his time at Princeton, Changez meets Erica, with whom he shares a deep connection for the rest of the novel. Changez’s relationship with Erica is pivotal – it is another metaphor for his larger engagement with America (her name literally being (Am)Erica), at a personal level instead of a corporate or economic one. Erica, charming yet haunted by her past and a love she cannot forget, symbolizes an American nostalgic for its preeminence and struggling with its contemporary identity. Erica is in many ways the vision of the perfect American woman: gorgeous, learned, wealthy, and well-connected, at least as described through Changez’s eyes. Yet he cannot fully connect with her while he still retains his own identity.

While the stage of the story is set in Lahore and most of his time is spent in New York, the two biggest turning points of the novel — the 9/11 attacks and his decision to permanently leave America — take place in neither city. Changez’s job at Underwood Samson requires him to travel to Manila, Philippines and Valparaiso, Chile which is symbolically significant as they represent the transnational spaces where Changez’s hybrid identity is most definitively challenged. As is astutely pointed out in Transnational Voices in Contemporary Pakistani Literature: An Exploration of Fragmented Self and Hybrid Identity in Mohsin Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist: “Manila, in the end, functions as a mediator for Changez’s divided identity; it refers to an intermediary step on the civilizational ladder (from Changez’s perspective), and it triangulates Changez within a complicated system of imperial power relations” (Rukmini). The same holds true for his trip to Valparaiso – it is an allegorical choice by Hamid to have Changez physically between the two cities while he is likewise ideologically torn between them.

Manila marks the first of these two turning points for Changez. The trip is in general unsettling for Changez – he acts “more like an American” (Hamid, 65) in an effort to be respected, but at the same time, he realizes that he feels more connection to the Asian locals than to his Western colleagues. “I looked at [my colleague] and thought, you are so foreign. I felt in that moment much closer to the Filipino driver than to him; I felt I was play-acting when in reality I ought to be making my way home, like the people on the street outside” (Hamid, 67). This moment, although he attempts to forget it, highlights Changez’s growing disenchantment with American culture and throws him off-kilter.

However, the true turning point for Changez is the 9/11 attack. “I stared as one – and then the other – of the twin towers of New York’s World Trade Center collapsed. And then I smiled” (Hamid, 72). This reaction is not a pro-American one; it is a reaction that comes from someone who is (subconsciously) disillusioned and angry with America. Although Changez’s time in Manila represents the peak of his efforts to embrace an American identity, his response to the collapse of the Twin Towers is still not an American one. His initial detachment shifts dramatically when he remembers that Erica is likely in New York, possibly in danger. His concern for Erica illustrates the personal stakes Changez holds in America, despite his growing disillusionment. This moment is crucial for Changez: his feelings for Erica and, by extension, his life in America, are now linked to his own identity.

The attack on the Twin Towers not only reshapes the cityscape but also significantly altered its socio-political atmosphere, affecting its residents’ views and behaviours toward Muslims. Changez describes the palpable change in the air: “I flew [back] to New York uncomfortable in my own face: I was aware of being under suspicion; I felt guilty […]” (Hamid, 74). The open-mindedness that once made him so comfortable in New York is replaced by suspicion and scrutiny. He is pulled aside at the airport, threatened outside his place of work, and made uncomfortable on the subway. Places he once was able to blend into, he is now ostracized from. “Changez becomes conscious of his marginalization and placelessness in America. The policies and regulations set for immigrants like Changez to follow, such as the ‘fundamentals’ in Underwood Samson, exemplify the extent he needs to sacrifice and acculturate in order to belong to the political community of the Americans” (Tayeb, Ahmed-Sami). The ideological reckoning for Changez intensifies as he observes the American response to the attacks. He is struck by the symbolic weight of the Towers’ fall, which he perceives as a challenge to America’s invincibility: “I was caught up in the symbolism of it all, the fact that someone had so visibly brought America to her knees” (Hamid, 73).

Changez’s cognitive dissonance is further exacerbated by his professional life at Underwood Samson, which epitomizes the capitalist mentality that values productivity and profit above individual well-being. His role in the firm, while initially offering a sense of achievement and integration that he excelled at, gradually becomes a source of ethical conflict as he realizes the dehumanizing aspects of his work. Underwood Samson becomes emblematic of a broader American culture that Changez grows increasingly uncomfortable with, as he witnesses its implications not just economically but also morally. “I wonder now, sir, whether I believed at all in the firmness of the foundations of the new life I was attempting to construct for myself in New York. Certainly I wanted to believe; at least I wanted not to disbelieve with such an intensity that I prevented myself as much as was possible from making the obvious connection between the crumbling of the world around me and the impending destruction of my personal American dream” (Hamid, 93). Changez’s eventual rejection of New York and what it stands for is, in part, a critique of the unfulfilled promises of the American Dream that led him there.

Sent to Chile on another assignment for Underwood Samson, Changez finds himself at a critical juncture in his identity crisis while in Valparaiso. “Valparaiso was itself a distraction: the city was powerfully atmospheric; a sense of melancholy pervaded its boulevards and hillsides” (Hamid, 144). The South American city becomes a backdrop against which he measures the stark differences between the American values he has been pursuing and the deep-seated cultural roots he cannot sever. He meets Juan-Baptista, who works for the company Changez must assess, but he finds he identifies much more with this poetic and introspective man than the profit-driven cynicism of his colleagues. “Of course I was struggling! Of course I felt torn! I had thrown in my lot with the men of Underwood Samson, with the officers of the empire, when all along I was predisposed to feel compassion for those, like Juan-Bautista, whose lives the empire thought nothing of overturning for its own gain” (Hamid, 152). Juan-Bautista shares with Changez the parable of the Janissaries — Christian boys taken by the Ottoman Empire and trained to fight against their own people, a story which compels Changez, as it reflects his own predicament. By drawing parallels between the Janissaries’ loss of identity and his own, Changez begins to see his assimilation into American corporate life as a loss of his intrinsic values and cultural heritage. He quits Underwood Samson, rejects the American ideals he’d been uneasily embracing, and returns to New York to pack his things.

Changez journey finally takes him back to Lahore, and he confronts a city that has not much altered but is now different in his eyes. His experience abroad has impacted his perception of his city of birth, and he is unable to fully acclimatize to it – he cannot renounce the part of his identity that has become American quite as easily as he quit his job and left that country. “But as I acclimatized and my surroundings once again became familiar, it occurred to me that the house had not changed in my absence. I had changed; I was looking about me with the eyes of the foreigner […]” (Hamid, 124). Lahore is now a psychological battleground where Changez wrestles with his dual identities, struggling to reconcile his deep-seated Eastern cultural heritage with his increasingly Westernized viewpoints. “He effectively foregrounds his fractioned, hybrid identity by recognizing that he has embraced an American/Western way of looking at things. In the end, it is his home that allows him to integrate his Westernized worldview with his split identity: he cannot see the place he calls home and loves dearly as simultaneously being lowly and untidy without feeling divided and broken” (Rukmini).

Changez never fully re-adapts to his life in Lahore, at least not the way he tries to convince the American stranger he has. It is the very fact that he sits there, telling his story to the American in an attempt to endear himself, that solidifies that Changez has not entirely left behind that Western way of life. “The entire novel is a narrative of Changez explaining himself, his motives, and his journey to an American. For Changez, America is still the epicentre and he is still on the margins, still an Other to both countries he belongs to” (Khan). Changez never leaves America fully behind, even once he returns to Lahore, and that is crucial to understanding the rest of his story. “Despite Changez’s overview of his new life, as a close reader of the novel tracing the evolution of Changez’s character, it becomes obvious that Changez is still an outsider in society. In Lahore, he is a vagabond professor who builds his career and place in society based on his anti-American views” (Khan).

As Changez’s journey unfolds, it becomes evident that his understanding of “home” is linked to his experiences abroad. The initial depiction of Lahore as a foundational anchor in Changez’s life gradually gives way to a more nuanced perception as he navigates the various cities that appear within the text. In New York, he discovers a multiculturalism that allows him to transcend his outsider status. This transient belonging is shattered by the seismic shifts of 9/11, which not only disrupt the physical landscape of New York but also the social fabric that once embraced him. “Changez’s problems stem from his desire to be recognized as both American and Pakistani. Because assimilation is (unofficially) America’s immigration policy, there is not much space for Changez’s Pakistani culture” (Rukmini). Changez’s realization that his ambitions in America are fundamentally at odds with his cultural and ethical values causes a personal crisis.
Changez’s narrative arc encapsulates a broader exploration of identity and belonging in a world where the traditional dichotomies of East and West are inadequate to describe the complex and nuanced realities of globalized lives. Back in Lahore, Changez is unable to let go of his newly Americanized world view completely. “I remained emotionally entwined with Erica, and I brought something of her with me to Lahore– or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that I lost something of myself to her that I was unable to relocate in my city of birth” (Hamid, 172). This sentiment captures the essence of Changez’s internal conflict, reflecting the broader theme of how personal connections and emotional ties transcend geographical and even cultural boundaries, complicating the notion of home. His journey from Lahore to New York and back, set against the backdrop of global upheavals, is a geographic loop and an exploration of belonging. Changez’s experiences challenge the very essence of home as a singular or static place, presenting it instead as a fluid construct shaped by ongoing personal experiences and the larger geopolitical happenings that frame them.

The Reluctant Fundamentalist navigates both the personal and political, weaving a tale that is as much about the inner life of its protagonist as it is about the physical world that shapes him. Through the busy and beautiful streets of Lahore to the towering and then bruised skyline of New York, Changez’s journey is an exploration of the meaning of home and identity in a world fraught with divisions. Changez begins his journey with a firm grasp of what he perceives home to be—a place of origin, Lahore, rich in history and familiarity. Yet, as he navigates through the complexities of assimilation and alienation in the West, his understanding of home undergoes a metamorphosis. The multicultural vibrancy of New York initially presents a mirage of inclusivity, suggesting a potential for a new type of belonging. However, the aftermath of 9/11 dispels this illusion, revealing a societal fracture that relegates him to the periphery of American society. The Lahore Changez eventually returns to is seen through the eyes of a man who has straddled continents and cultures, embodying a hybrid identity that defies the simple categorization of “home”. The narrative he recounts to an American stranger is tinted with a nostalgia for a clarity that no longer exists. It becomes clear that home is an elusive concept – it is not just a city or physical space – it is shaped by memories, relationships, and the constant negotiation of identity in spaces that are at once welcoming and alienating. Perhaps home is not a destination, but a journey in itself.

Sources:

Hamid, M. (2008). The Reluctant Fundamentalist. Anchor Canada.

K., A. A., & Rukimini, S. (2022). Transnational Voices in Contemporary Pakistani Literature: An Exploration of Fragmented Self and Hybrid Identity in Mohsin Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist. OpenEdition Journals.

Khan, S. (2017). Alienated Muslim Identity in the Post-9/11 America: A Transnational Study of The Reluctant Fundamentalist. Taylor & Francis Online.

Tayeb, K., & Ahmed-Sami, A. (2021). Home, Belonging, and the Politics of Belonging in Mohsin Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist. HJUOZ.

Shedding Fundamentalism— The American Identity

by Anna Wu

The Oxford Dictionary defines fundamentalism as a “strict maintenance of ancient…doctrines of any religion or ideology, notably Islam.” This religiously loaded word can be interpreted many different ways, usually within political or cultural contexts. Interestingly, Mohsin Hamid does not utilise this word within either of these expected contexts in his novel, The Reluctant Fundamentalist; rather, as he narrates from the perspective of a Lahore native named Changez who had spent years residing in New York, the meaning and symbolism of fundamentalism becomes apparent as the reader is introduced to Changez’s evolution from a New Yorker clinging to his social status in the corporate world, to a Pakistani embracing his cultural identity back home after renouncing his previous love for America. Hamid brings a new light to the meaning of the word as he defines it within the context of the morals of Changez’s highly demanding finance company, which emphasises fundamentalism in the sense of corporate efficiency, material success, and lack of empathy in favour of professionalism. The book centres around the protagonist’s journey from actively competing for a position at the company, to diligently performing his best to keep said position, to then utterly rejecting his highly sought-after position and ultimately leaving the company. Numerous changing factors occur in Changez’s personal life as well as the world around him for him to arrive at such a decision; the reader is led through his initial excitement as a young New Yorker, his increasing awareness of the world’s political state and his resulting internal turmoil, as well as his eventual shedding of his American identity and the fundamentalism he once welcomed.

Changez’s initial love for New York and America plays a crucial role in his determination to identify with their culture. His exciting integration into being a New Yorker was at first “wrapped up in [his] excitement about Underwood Samson,” (33) a prestigious company of great reputation. The company holds a powerful name and status, which naturally leads to it being associated with feelings of immense pride and achievement when one is a part of it. Changez recalls this initiation feeling in child-like wonder, saying, “I remember my sense of wonder on the day I reported for duty. Their offices were perched on the forty-first and forty-second floors of a building in midtown— higher than any two structures here in Lahore would be if they were stacked one atop the other… nothing had prepared me for the drama, the power of the view from their lobby” (33-34). This movie-like romanticism of the corporate world echoes the magic of the American dream, wherein Changez is bathed in the delight of emerging victorious in a competitive society; he marvels at the grandeur of it all, especially in contrast to his native birthplace. Interestingly, at the same time Changez’s love for New York and the corporate world grows, his slight judgement and disdain for Pakistan peeks through. Not only does he observe that Underwood Samson’s building is taller than any building from his hometown, he notes that this “was another world from Pakistan; supporting my feet were the achievements of the most technologically advanced civilization our species had ever known” (34). His praises and extreme categorization of New York as not just advanced but “the most” advanced civilization indicates a border-line idolisation he holds for the majesty of the city; simultaneously, the clear contrast with his home country hints at a possible dismay at his native culture. Moreover, Changez proceeds to remark that “America had universities with individual endowments greater than our national budget for education. To be reminded of this vast disparity was, for me, to be ashamed” (34). Not only is America’s abundance of financial resources outstandingly different from Pakistan’s lack of resources, but the fact that Changez admits to being ashamed of it is what calls attention to his growing discomfort in being Pakistani and preference for identifying as a New Yorker instead. This sentiment is evident as Changez concludes, “On that day, I did not think of myself as a Pakistani, but as an Underwood Samson trainee, and my firm’s impressive offices made me proud” (34). Evidently, an important moment occurs here in which Changez sheds whatever way he used to identify himself and, fueled by the pride and impressiveness of the corporate world, gladly adopts the persona of his company and inherently, its city, instead of his native birthplace. Such pride and high self-esteem is displayed on his first business flight: “We had flown first-class, and I will never forget the feeling of reclining in my seat, clad in my suit, as I was served by an attractive and— yes, I was indeed so brazen as to allow myself to believe— flirtatious flight attendant” (63). An air of superiority and vanity pervades this scene, as well as a kind of innocent enjoyment of his new status as a respected figure in society. Changez whole-heartedly enjoys the privileges of being important and highly-regarded, paying no heed to the possible consequences of the kind of ignorance that can result from being a part of the elitist class. Therefore, Changez’s eagerness to detach from his cultural identity and instead embrace the identity of his workplace and a city he just moved to signifies the power and pull of corporate New York, as well as his initial excitement in belonging to it.

However, nothing lasts forever in the shallow glamour of the corporate world, and neither does the cloak of New Yorker identity Changez desperately tries to put on himself. As Changez begins work, he establishes himself as a good performer and well-liked employee, thus further securing his New Yorker identity. He follows the company’s fundamentalism, which “mandated a single-minded attention to financial details,” (98-99) and “valued above all else maximum productivity” (116). Nonetheless, despite his efficiency as a worker and his successful assimilation into the New York society as well as the adoption of his American persona, cracks start to appear in Changez’s facade as an unusual moment occurs wherein “[He] was riding with [his] colleagues in a limousine… [He] glanced out the window to see, only a few feet away, the driver of a jeepney returning [his] gaze” (66). This occurrence was striking because “there was an undisguised hostility in his expression; I had no idea why… But his dislike was so obvious, so intimate, that it got under my skin” (67). It seems that although Changez had been upholding his New York persona extremely well, somehow the stranger saw through it, making him feel exposed and uncomfortable. The stranger’s hostility is also more understood when one compares the two’s social position side-by-side — one the driver of a public transport vehicle, the other a suit-clad businessman sitting in a limousine. However, what makes this interaction significant for Changez is the fact that he “looked at [his colleague] — at his fair hair and light eyes and, most of all, his oblivious immersion in the minutiae of our work — and thought, you are so foreign” (67). The crucial point in this line is that for the first time, Changez steps outside of his New York insider identity and perceives his co-worker as different from him, hence marking himself as an outsider. This thought is amplified as he concludes, “I felt in that moment much closer to the Filipino driver than to him; I felt I was play-acting when in reality I ought to be making my way home, like the people on the street outside” (67). What could be perceived here as imposter syndrome from the protagonist can also be seen as a moment of uncomfortable reflection, wherein Changez realises he still innately sees himself as an inferior foreigner, and for the first time, is being made aware of such a peculiar feeling within himself.

The turning point of the novel and the beginning of Changez’s deconstruction process is the attack on the twin towers on September 11th. After that, Changez’s identity as a Pakistani in America becomes increasingly exposed, despite his attempt to stay purely a New Yorker. As stated by Toosi in their article “Contingency of Empathy and Mohsin Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist,” “Before its collapse, his world gives him the illusion that he lives in a post-racist world. His Princeton degree and his high-income career provide him with an assured sense of membership in transnational capitalism” (259). Hence, Changez’s world before 9/11 offered him a great sense of safety and security, as he was able to live confidently over the backdrop of his acclaimed credentials and status. The reality of a post-9/11 world is shown in Changez’s flight back to the city he loves, which is glaringly different from his first flight as an Underwood Samson employee, as this time around “[His] entrance elicited looks of concern from many of [his] fellow passengers. [He] flew to New York uncomfortable in my [his] face: [He] was aware of being under suspicion” (74). The stark contrast that is laid between this anxious scene versus Changez’s first flight, wherein he is filled with relaxed confidence, highlights a significant disparity in the attitude of his “fellow” New Yorkers, which in turn completely shifts his own perception of himself and possibly makes him question his identity as well. This sharp change of atmosphere for Changez and New York in general is only the beginning of a series of continuous shifts in atmosphere as the country deals with the aftermath of 9/11. Thus, the reader is able to witness the slow deterioration of Changez’s carefully constructed, but always fragile, American identity, as he admits, “I prevented myself as much as was possible from making the obvious connection between the crumbling of the world around me and the impending destruction of my personal American dream” (93). The foreshadowing here that is acknowledged even by Changez himself speaks volumes as the reality of whether Changez ever fully belonged in America comes into question. The identity that he had worked hard for and previously found much comfort in had suddenly become threatened, because the country he had called home was now in mourning and sees him as part of the problem. Changez makes an effort to not let his inner turmoil affect his work, but professes that, “I found it difficult to concentrate on the pursuit — at which I was normally so capable — of fundamentals” (100). His persistence in attempting to be an efficient employee comes not only from a desire to satisfy his employer, but from a personal desperation to cling on to his New York, American identity and to distance himself from the political reality around him. Therefore, in light of the gradual rejection from his changing world, Changez unsuccessfully tries to continue to do what his identity was once rooted in— focusing on the fundamentals.

Additionally, an evident shift in Changez’s internal attitude occurs during his visit back to Lahore; a deeply-embedded and internalised racism is displayed as Changez unwillingly finds himself in a state of disdain as he looks at his family home and the place where he grew up:

I recall the Americanness of my own gaze when I returned to Lahore that winter when war was in the offing. I was struck at first by how shabby our house appeared, with cracks running through its ceilings and dry bubbles of paint flaking off where dampness had entered its walls. (124)

Ironically, Changez is made aware of a condescending feeling within himself that he had identified against his whole life — a superiority complex against developing countries and non-Western cultures. Instead of looking in from the point of view as a Pakistani, Changez looks down at his own home through the eyes of a foreigner, a Western person, an American. However, the significance of this visit is not simply just his observation of the house, but what he proceeds to reflect on after noticing it within himself. As Changez acknowledges that he felt “shamed. This was where I came from, this was my provenance, and it smacked of lowliness,” (124) he reaches the realisation that “[he] had changed; I was looking about me with the eyes of… that particular type of entitled and unsympathetic American who so annoyed me when I encountered him in classrooms and workplaces of your country’s elite” (124). With this acknowledgement, Changez sees his own hypocrisy as he realises that he had become the very type of person he used to detest. Immediately, he “resolved to exorcise the unwelcome sensibility by which [he] had become possessed” (124). By actively trying to rid himself of this new American trait, Changez demonstrates a clear intention of wanting to return to his roots and de-fundamentalise at least this aspect of his American identity. His efforts prove successful as after a hard look at himself in the mirror, Changez “saw [his] house properly again, appreciating its enduring grandeur, its unmistakable personality and idiosyncratic charm” (125). This significant shift in attitude, from first indulging in the American superiority complex, to recognizing it, and then actively fixing it, is an essential process in Changez’s “de-fundamentalism.”

After this meaningful visit back to Lahore, Changez’s response to the hostility around him changes from passive defeat to active resistance. This new attitude is best represented in the symbolism of his beard, wherein “despite my mother’s request, and my knowledge of the difficulties it could well present me at immigration, I had not shaved my two-week-old beard. It was, perhaps, a form of protest on my part, a symbol of my identity” (130). Having always been previously clean-shaven since his Princeton days, Changez’s deliberate change in appearance, especially considering the fact that he knows the microaggressions that are bound to ensue, signifies a crucial shift in how he sees himself. His own acknowledgement of his beard as a “symbol of [his] identity” also directly marks a change in his perception of himself from New Yorker, to Pakistani. Furthermore, Changez’s reasoning for his beard provides additional insight into this change in identity: “I did not wish to blend in with the army of clean-shaven youngsters who were my coworkers, and that inside me, for multiple reasons, I was deeply angry” (130). Changez’s letting go of the need to belong in America is significant in the way he describes his coworkers; instead of seeing them as familiar fellow colleagues, Changez’s description of them as an “army of clean-shaven youngsters” exhibit a sense of distinct alienation that makes clear he does not approve of nor identify with them anymore. By referring to them as an “army,” Changez’s use of military vocabulary also hints at a sense of forced participation and lack of uniqueness that comes from being in the corporate world. Additionally, his confession to being “deeply angry” can be explained in his reflection on “how it was that America was able to wreak such havoc in the world— orchestrating an entire war in Afghanistan, say…with so few apparent consequences at home” (131). This contemplation from Changez is at the core of his “de-fundamentalism” and return to his cultural identity, as he comes to the realisation that the country he once idolised was never on his side after all. Specifically, as Mleitat, Hamamra, and Qabaha point out in their article, “Navigating Economic Inclusion and Psychological Exclusion: Immigration in Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist,” “Pakistan’s fragile economy is inextricably linked to America’s neo-imperialism…through military and financial aid, America manipulates and corrupts Pakistan’s political and economic institutions and brings them under the yoke of enslaving policies” (292). Understandably, Changez’s realisation that the country he works for, contributes to, and identities with in fact has been and continues to harm his native birthplace is what leads to such a substantial change in attitude, which is evident in his last business flight:

We again flew in the relative comfort of first class, but I was no longer excited by the luxuries of our cabin… I turned down our flight attendant’s many offers of champagne. For all the hours that we were airborne, I neither ate nor slept; my thoughts were caught up in the affairs of continents other than the one below us, and more than once I regretted coming at all. (140)

Once more, a direct contrast is established between his first business flight, wherein he indulged in the lavishness of status and acclamation, fully enjoying the materialism and validation of the corporate world, and this scene, wherein the glamour of New York and America has faded, and Changez is no longer is entranced by it. Instead, he has become very much aware of the political state of the world, which Samson Underwood’s fundamentalist motto had prevented him from doing: “Now I saw that in this constant striving to realise a financial structure, no thought was given to the critical personal and political issues that affect one’s emotional present” (145). Changez’s journey of continual de-fundamentalism eventually leads him to this conclusion, that the maxim he had modelled his life behind, one that emphasised material success and willful ignorance of reality, was in fact harmful to his personal wellbeing and prevented him from seeing the political actuality around him. This reflection comes to a climax when Changez “[tells] the vice president [he] refused to work any further,” (152-153) and despite being unsure of the future, was sure that “[his] days of focusing on fundamentals were done” (153-154). By quitting his role midway through a work trip knowing he was going to be fired, lose his visa, and have to leave New York, Changez completely renounces and undoes everything he had worked hard for in his life to achieve. However, his corporate downfall is his personal success, as he finally liberates himself from being blinded by Underwood Samson’s, New York’s, and America’s fundamentalism. He becomes free of his American identity and starts a new life back in Lahore, where he is able to fully embrace his cultural identity instead.

To conclude, Mohsin Hamid brings new meaning to the word fundamentalism in his novel, The Reluctant Fundamentalist. Throughout the story, Changez evolves from a naive and excited New Yorker, to a desperate and scrutinised “American,” and eventually to a liberated and proud Pakistani. His personal development can be seen as a process of “de-fundamentalising,” wherein he progresses from a firm believer in his company’s motto on corporate success and a willful blindness to politics, to an unbeliever in this motto and quits the company, thereby completely restarting his life in Pakistan. Through the story of Changez, Hamid challenges one to rethink what the American dream and identity can offer to a foreigner, and whether that is something one should be chasing after at all.

Works Cited

Hamid, Mohsin. The Reluctant Fundamentalist. Anchor, 2008.

Mleitat, Ayman, et al. “Navigating Economic Inclusion and Psychological Exclusion: Immigration in Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist.” Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 45, no. 4, 2023, pp. 288–301. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48750181. Accessed 16 Apr. 2024.

Toossi, Zarei K. (2021). “Contingency of empathy and Mohsin Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist.” International Journal of Arabic-English Studies, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 253–272. https://doi.org/10.33806/ijaes2000.21.2.14

Let Me Tell You A Story: Nonlinear Narratives and Generational Influence in A Bird in the House and As I Remember It

by Lilah Dymund

When getting to know one another, we tend to wonder, “what’s her story?” In fact, it might be more accurate to ask, “what are her stories?” Both Margaret Laurence’s collection of short stories, A Bird in the House, and Elsie Paul’s multimedia digital work, As I Remember It, are uniquely structured works that challenge conventional linear storytelling [1]. While Laurence’s collection focuses on protagonist Vanessa’s life and identity, Paul’s memoir employs a nonlinear, multimedia approach to narrating memories and cultural teachings from the perspective of a Sliammon elder. Despite these structural differences, both texts emphasize the idea that identity is not the product of a singular, linear narrative but a complex interweaving of stories, experiences, and teachings. Through their distinctive narrative techniques, Laurence and Paul both explore the evolving relationship between the younger and older versions of their narrators, highlighting the ways in which time and reflection deepen understanding of familial and cultural heritage.

Though they are presented differently, both of these works are uniquely structured in ways that reject a linear pattern of storytelling. While Laurence follows a singular protagonist throughout A Bird in the House, the book is not a novel but rather a collection of short stories that each explore an aspect of Vanessa’s life and identity outside of a chronological framework. In Challenging Territory: The Writing of Margaret Laurence, Christian Riegel describes the text as “a series of intertwined recollections … that are told retrospectively from the perspective of an older and mature narrator” (69). As I Remember It, on the other hand, is an entirely nonlinear, multimedia collection of stories and memories from Elsie Paul’s life. The structure of Paul’s work mirrors the “cornerstone of indigenous educational practice” (Patrick 73) that is storytelling. For Indigenous peoples, “It really is through stories that we share our existence, not just our identity, but our existence in the world” (Thomas King, qtd. in Patrick 15). Paul’s nonlinear narrative demonstrates how Indigenous storytelling “transmits thousands of years of knowledge, anchored by time and space, as well as the immediate, personal experiences of the storyteller” (Patrick 16). Contrary to the idea of a person having a story, both As I Remember It and A Bird in the House explore how identity can instead be made up of a collection of stories that come together to shape the individual—as Vanessa herself puts it, “being set into the mosaic of myself” (Laurence 182).

These stories do not consist only of what a person has done, but also what they have learned from others, what they have observed about the world, and events that have happened outside of their control. In A Bird in the House, Vanessa does not always seem to do much in her stories, especially in those stories where she is a younger child. She is primarily an observer, “spen[ding] so much of [her] life listening to conversations [she is] not meant to hear” (71), and yet these are the experiences that make up her identity. In a similar way, As I Remember It is not made up only of stories about Paul’s own life: instead, Paul’s own life stories are told along with those of her grandmother and other relatives, as well as legends and tɑʔɑw, meaning “the teaching, what we learned from our ancestors, the traditional teaching, the traditional values” (“An Invitation to Listen”). Paul specifically recalls that,

You learned by watchin’. You were always brought along. So when the older women went root diggin’, you went along—the children went along. So it was by watchin’. Because every step of the way, everything they did…was really important to pay attention. (“Root Digging”)

These teachings, though not stories about her own life, are a fundamental part of Paul’s identity. Each of these texts in its own way rejects the idea of an individual’s story following a linear path from the younger to the older self. Through these nonlinear forms of storytelling emerge complex relationships between the older and the younger versions of these stories’ narrators and their mosaics of identity.

While each of these works is structured differently, both feature stories about the younger self which are told from the perspective of the older self. Paul writes, “sometimes I think I was always old” (“Childhood Fun”), while Vanessa is pushed by her family to “`grow up before [her] time´” (Laurence 44). These two women, who come from very different families and live very different lives, share this sense of interconnectedness with a younger version of the self. As well as carrying their childhood selves with them into adulthood, both Paul and Vanessa feel that some version of the older self has always been with them, ever since they were young. In A Bird in the House (which is ostensibly a fictional work), Laurence creates a sense of young Vanessa’s stories being narrated simultaneously by the younger and older versions of Vanessa. As Arnold Davidson puts it, “Vanessa marks—and retrospectively maps—her course to self-determination[,]…restructuring or re-creating those memories into meaningful stories” (qtd. in Riegel 67). Vanessa’s childhood stories are told with the added awareness of her adult self, using mature concepts to understand the emotions she experienced as a young girl. At one point in “The Mask of The Bear,” Vanessa witnesses her Aunt Edna struggling to understand her relationship with her mother, Vanessa’s Grandmother Connor. Older Vanessa reflects that,

I understood that she was not speaking to me, and that what she had to say could not be spoken to me. I felt chilled by my childhood, unable to touch her because of the freezing burden of my inexperience. (Laurence 65)

Here, Vanessa’s “words are tinged with the thoughts of young Vanessa, and not the older narrating person” (Riegel 74). Though it is the older Vanessa who narrates this event, overlaying her child self’s experience with adult vocabulary, the phrase “chilled by my childhood” creates a sense of alienation from that childhood self that Vanessa has developed as an adult. Paul touches on a similar idea in her chapter on residential school, directly addressing the limitations of children’s understanding when it comes to complex, mature issues. She reflects on the “anger and hate towards their parents” that so many children felt in the residential school system, though “In those days, they take your child away whether you like it or not” (Agnes McGee, qtd. in Patrick 64). Paul comments on the children’s inability to understand the complexity of the situation, saying “That’s the child’s mind, right? You’re rejected from your parents” (“Residential School”). As she recounts these stories of her younger self through the eyes of her older self, Paul recalls the struggle of the child’s mind to process the complex challenges of Indigenous life within a settler-colonial context. The reflective form of storytelling in both of these works allows us to recognize the way in which depth of understanding develops with age, a theme which can also be connected with the cultural importance of elders Paul describes in As I Remember It.

Throughout As I Remember It, Paul discusses the importance of relationships between young people and elders which existed in Sliammon culture long before the trauma of European contact and the residential school system. In particular, she explores the importance of practical education, teaching and learning through real-world experience. The role of community and family—especially elders—is central to the traditional education system of the Sliammon people:

Elders play a critical role in a child’s education. Grandparents frequently raised their grandchildren which allowed them to pass on family history and cultural knowledge. Elsie recalls that she only went to residential school for one year, “But I learned other things from my grandparents. I was raised by my grandparents and to me that is just as important. I try to share that with my children and other younger people in the community, to share with them the values and the traditional practices that is our culture, and how rich it is.” (Patrick 66)

The traditional education Paul received from her elders was made up of two main components: observation and storytelling. Paul writes, “our people did not teach, per se. Wasn’t a lot of lecture, but it was a lot of examples. A lot of legends and stories were talked about” (“Learning by Example”). Throughout As I Remember It, Paul provides several examples of these “legends and stories,” such as the legends about qɑyχ that she recounts in the “Territory” section and the story of her grandmother’s brother, which she shares in “He Got His Spirit Back.” It is through this traditional education that Paul’s younger self came to understand herself, her culture, and the world around her.
One teaching in particular that Paul emphasizes in As I Remember It is the way she learned from her grandmother to process grief and pain. Paul’s grandmother was well-versed in the experience of loss: “She had sixteen children, and out of the sixteen, six survived. So she had lost ten children throughout her life” (‘My Grandmother”). However, she never allowed this grief to weigh her down in her everyday life. Paul recalls that her grandmother would go outside early in the morning and practice sohoθot (spirit cleansing)—wailing and cleansing herself with water and cedar branches in order to release her pain—“And she would talk to us: ‘You must have heard me cryin’ out there. But I do that. That’s my medicine. I have to release my pain in the morning. Otherwise, it’s too heavy. It’s a burden for me to carry that’” (““sohoθot [Spirit Cleansing]”). In addition to setting this example of a healthy way to grieve, Paul’s grandmother clearly communicates to her children and grandchildren why this process is important:

And she’d come in and, “I’ve done what I needed to do,” and get everybody up and get busy. And she would say, “It’s okay to grieve. It hurts, because I’ve lost someone I love. But we don’t stay in bed and cry all day. Life goes on. You have to get up and get things moving, get things done. We got a lot of work to do.” So for her, it was fine. And we understood that. We all knew that! (““sohoθot [Spirit Cleansing]”)

Paul’s grandmother demonstrates how, for the Sliammon people, learning by example was not just imitating the behaviour of elders, but was instead a careful and intentional educational process that ensured young people understood not only what they were learning, but why they were learning it. As well as following examples set by elders, important teachings—such as the ability to live with grief—were shared with Paul through stories. In As I Remember It, Paul provides the example of her Grandmother’s brother, who lost his son: “And for a long time, he wasn’t able to do anything with his life. He was grieving. He just kind of fell apart: everywhere he went, he was mourning, he was crying” (“He Got His Spirit Back”). Paul shares his story, describing how a healer determined that he had lost his spirit along with his son, and helped him to call it back from the mountain where it had gone. Stories such as this were used to teach Paul the consequences of holding onto grief, further emphasizing the importance of learning to process and release it.

A clear distinction can be made here between this practice of releasing pain and the grief that seems to consume Vanessa’s family in A Bird in the House. Vanessa’s family is wrought with “undue attachments to the dead,” and Vanessa learns very early in life “how such attachments can have harmful effects on those still living” (Riegel 72). Vanessa’s Grandmother MacLeod in particular embodies an inability to move on from loss. Her son, Vanessa’s Uncle Roderick, was killed in the First World War before Vanessa was born, and now Grandmother Macleod’s bedroom is lined with “silver-framed photographs of Uncle Roderick—as a child, as a boy, as a man in his Army uniform” (Laurence 39). These photographs symbolize a refusal to let go of grief, which contradicts the lesson taught to Paul by her own grandmother. Despite Grandmother MacLeod’s valiant efforts to bestow a kind of order on her surroundings (“God loves Order — he wants each one of us to set our house in order” [Laurence 42]), Vanessa comes to associate Grandmother MacLeod’s house first with death and discomfort, describing it as being “like a museum, full of dead and meaningless objects…which had to be dusted and catered to for reasons which everyone had forgotten” (Laurence 73). Grandmother MacLeod carries her grief with her like one of these “meaningless objects,” maintaining it not because it has any continued purpose in her life, but simply because she has become accustomed to its presence. Like Paul’s Grandmother’s brother, Grandmother MacLeod is “so absorbed in [her] grief” (“He Got His Spirit Back”) that her spirit is broken and her grief begins to seep into her everyday life and define her identity.

Paul notes that when it comes to pain, “You’re going to have to deal with it sooner or later. And when you do it the way I remember seeing it done, then you’re dealing with it right from the moment of your loss” (“sohoθot [Spirit Cleansing]”). Vanessa, however, is prevented from healing “right from the moment of [her] loss” due to “the prevailing notion that children should not be exposed to such rituals but should be protected from death” (Riegel 77). Despite losing so many immediate family members throughout her childhood, Vanessa attends her first funeral—that of her Grandfather Connor—at age twenty, noting that “I could no longer expect to be protected from the bizarre cruelty of such rituals” (Laurence 191). Instead of teaching her to process grief, Vanessa’s family tries—and fails—to protect her from it, leaving her lost and confused in her mourning. What Vanessa’s family fails to realize is that she cannot be protected, and that neither her youth nor her family’s efforts to shield her can prevent her from feeling pain and grief. In their effort to protect her, Vanessa’s family instead remove any potential outlet for her grief. When Vanessa’s Grandmother Connor dies—her first personal experience of loss—she remarks that, “I had not known at all that a death would be like this, not only one’s own pain, but the almost unbearable knowledge of that other pain which could not be reached nor lessened” (Laurence 74). Unlike Paul, who learned from her grandmother that grief should be shared with one’s family and community, Vanessa finds herself juggling the pain of her various family members while at the same time not having the space to feel her own.

This childhood example remains with Vanessa as an adult and fundamentally shapes how she views herself, her emotions, and the world around her. Paul, too, carries the example of her elders with her throughout her life, and both women are fundamentally shaped by these early influences—both when it comes to processing grief, and to other important teachings. However, just as the example set for Paul and Vanessa in childhood differs greatly, so too does the influence that example has on each of them in their adult lives.

Paul, having learned healthy patterns of behaviour from her elders, continues to live out those teachings as an adult. She is faced with a challenge, however, since “European contact ruptured the education Tla’amin children received” (Patrick 67),2 threatening the continuation of the traditional knowledge she was given as a child. Both the Sliammon people’s ways of teaching and the teachings themselves have been nearly destroyed by the residential school system, as generations of children have been “[f]orced from their communities and sent to alien educational institutions, …deprived of the spatial anchors that grounded their understanding of the land” (Patrick 73). Paul’s older self reflects on how much her own world has changed since she herself was young:

It’s so different now. Attitudes have changed, and it’s totally different. I try to keep it alive. I know some people my age keep it alive and I think my own family are really good about, I think, doing things that way that I think I’ve brought down. My grandmother’s teachings, and lot of people her age, that taught—lived! Not so much teach, but lived. And you followed that example. It was not about teaching. (“Learning By Example”)

Paul has been one of the lucky few to have retained her culture, language, and teachings through the destructive colonial systems that have sought to destroy that very culture. Paul moves through her adult life working to pass on the same teachings she received as a child, fighting to maintain that knowledge in a changing world. Young Paul was given the tools she needed to live a healthy, traditional life, and the older Paul continues to put those tools to use.

Vanessa, on the other hand, must build her own tools. Without the kind of education Paul received, and provided with nothing but harmful and confusing examples as a child (such as that of her Grandmother MacLeod), Vanessa is forced to learn for herself what her family was unable to teach her. The young Vanessa longs for this kind of knowledge, romanticizing the character of Piquette, a Métis girl who spends the summer with Vanessa’s family at Diamond Lake. Vanessa reflects, “[i]t seemed to me that Piquette must be in some way a daughter of the forest, a kind of junior prophetess of the wilds, who might impart to me, if I took the right approach, some of the secrets she undoubtedly knew” (Laurence 110). Vanessa’s conception of Indigenous culture is extremely flawed, however, owing again to the example of her elders (such as Grandmother MacLeod, who declares, “if that half-breed youngster comes along to Diamond Lake, I’m not going” [Laurence 107]) and to her environment, in which Indigenous peoples are constantly othered. Vanessa’s transition from childhood to adulthood is marked by her departure from Manawaka at age eighteen, when she escapes both the physical environment she grew up in and “all the restrictions such an environment places upon individuals” (Riegel 68). In fact, the entirety of A Bird in the House can be seen as Vanessa’s act of “free[ing] herself psychologically by remembering a place she earlier left physically and by then restructuring or re-creating those memories into meaningful stories” (Arnold Davidson, qtd. in Riegel 67). This psychological freedom is imperative to Vanessa’s process of separating herself from her family’s influence and creating her own traditions.
It is after she leaves Manawaka that Vanessa begins to recognize the harmful examples set for her as a child, and upon returning to Manawaka years later, the older Vanessa is able to separate herself from that influence. She returns to Manawaka alone, without her husband or children, since “[i]t would have no meaning for anyone else” (193). Vanessa has made the intentional choice to separate her new family from the one she grew up in, and she will not allow the setting of her childhood to have meaning for her adult self’s family. As Vanessa herself puts it, “everything had changed in the family which had been my childhood one, but now I had another family” (Laurence 193). The only way for older Vanessa to start anew—to create her own new traditions and teachings to pass down to her children—is to draw a separation between the family she grew up in and the family she has created for herself. She herself acts as the barrier between those two families, refusing to pass on the same harmful teachings she received as a child to her own children. Vanessa’s role as an elder is therefore very different from Paul’s. The older versions of both narrators demonstrate intentionality and awareness in the teachings they pass on to the younger generation, but their contrasting influences and environments call for them to take on different teaching roles. Where Vanessa rejects the harmful example of her family and begins a new tradition of teaching, Paul clings to her cultural teachings in a changing world where youth are increasingly surrounded by harmful examples.

The narrative structures employed by Margaret Laurence in A Bird in the House and Elsie Paul in As I Remember It offer unique insights into the intricate relationship between identity and storytelling. Laurence’s use of interconnected stories rather than one singular narrative challenges linear conventions, exploring the complex influence of childhood experience on adult identity. Similarly, Paul’s nonlinear, multimedia approach in As I Remember It underscores the multifaceted nature of one’s identity, emphasizing the particular importance of cultural teachings and personal experiences. Through their respective works, both authors highlight the power of storytelling to shape one’s outlook on the world, demonstrating how the interplay between past and present narratives can enrich our understanding of the self.

Endnotes

[1]A print version of Paul’s text, entitled Written As I Remember It, also exists and was published in 2014, five years before the digital text.

Works Cited

Laurence, Margaret. A Bird in the House. Penguin Random House Canada, 2017.

Patrick, Lyana Marie. Storytelling in the Fourth World: Explorations in Meaning of Place and Tla’amin Resistance to Dispossession. MA Thesis. University of Victoria, 2004.

Paul, Elsie. As I Remember It. University of British Columbia Press, 2019, https://scalar.usc.edu/ravenspace/as-i-remember-it/index.

Riegel, Christian. “‘Rest Beyond the River’: Mourning in A Bird in the House.” Challenging Territory: The Writing of Margaret Laurence. Edited by Christian Riegel, University of Alberta Press, 1997, pp. 67-79.

Heir to the Brick House

by Mehul Bhagat

It is no secret that we inherit the attributes of those we look up to: our mothers, fathers, siblings, relatives, and even friends. We inherit all that they are and all that they leave for us, though as much as these inheritances can be blessings, often there is little distinguishing them from burdens. Margaret Laurence’s A Bird in the House is a series of connected stories that centre on how a person’s self can be influenced by this weight of inheritance, along with the relationships they have with whom they inherit from. This theme surrounds the narrating protagonist of Vanessa, and how her life and sense of self are shaped by her connections to those around her. More prominent than all connections, however, is her difficult and complex relationship with her maternal grandfather, the stubborn and prideful character of Timothy Connors. Within Margaret Laurence’s A Bird in the House, Vanessa’s independent sense of self is shown to be inherited from her controlling grandfather, which ironically explains the resentment she holds towards him. This can be derived by seeing how the desire for control that permeated within her grandfather is also shown in Vanessa, how themes of captivity are intrinsically tied to him, and how, due to these points, the complex emotions that Vanessa holds towards her grandfather are on account of the captivity she believes him to represent.

Vanessa’s grandfather Timothy Connor, simply called ‘Grandfather Connor’ by her, is the most influential character to Vanessa throughout the collection of short stories. The book itself begins and ends with a focus on the man. It opens with Vanessa mentioning how “when [her] grandfather built [the Brick House] … it was the first of its kind”, and ends with Vanessa paying respects to her now deceased grandfather via this house, what she considers as “his monument” (1, 193). Through this undeniable precedence that he takes throughout the stories, his most defining quality is easily the desire he has to be in control. He takes pride in the patriarchal command he has over his family, and exists purely as a voice of rude or even rage-filled disdain when anything goes remotely against his wishes. A vivid example of this is when, upon the death of Vanessa’s father, Grandfather Connor is too prideful to have another family’s heirlooms within his home. He states to Vanessa’s mother, “I don’t know why you’re unpacking all that stuff, Beth … it’ll just have to go in the back in again” (164). His control is further shown by how he does not face any resistance. Vanessa’s mother states, following this demand by her father, how resistance against him is “like batting your head against a brick wall … [he gets] his way in the end … he always does” (165). Grandfather Connor acts this way and faces the same lack of resistance throughout the entire book, such as his interactions with his wife, Vanessa’s cousin Chris, and many of Edna’s boyfriends, but to describe these instances in detail would require an essay in and of itself. Most important, however, is how Vanessa is acutely aware of this control he has. She states that she is constantly “holding back with a terrible strained force of fear of letting go and speaking [against her grandfather] and having the known world unimaginably fall to pieces” (123). By stating that an act on him as equivalent to an act against the world, she insinuates him to be the basis upon which her world rests, showing the immense amount of influence that Vanessa believes him to have. This, combined with the precedence Vanessa’s grandfather has throughout the stories, makes it clear why his desire for control would be impactful to Vanessa’s life.

The effect of this impact is shown through how Vanessa manifests similar traits throughout the stories. Not only does Vanessa’s family remark about the connections between her and her grandfather, but his traits are vividly seen in certain ways that Vanessa acts and thinks. An example of this is how, after he insinuates that Vanessa’s boyfriend could be married, she “shouted at him, as though if I sounded all my trumpets loudly enough, his walls would quake and crumble”, then proceeded to run “upstairs to [her] room and lock the door” (187). While the rage that Vanessa has here can be connected to the rage prevalent to her grandfather, what is striking is her reaction when she loses control. The act of her running upstairs is similar to how, when faced with a situation he fears to be out of his control, her grandfather would “descend the basement steps to the rocking chair” (57). As an example, this habit of his often occurs when the women of the house try to do anything with their boyfriends, such as when Edna’s past boyfriend Wes asks her to “like to go to Winnipeg” for a day, or even when Vanessa was “doing the dishes” with her boyfriend (170, 185). In all of these instances, Vanessa’s grandfather goes to the chair to regain some sense of control when he believes he has lost it. The desire for control that her grandfather has is inherited by Vanessa, proven by how such a unique attribute is displayed by her.

Another aspect of this inheritance can be seen in how Vanessa’s grandfather’s desire for control is what causes her to strive for freedom and independence. As shown in the previous example, Vanessa is somebody who values the ability to have control over her surroundings, and further, she values the ability to not be burdened by being controlled. A powerful example of this through one of the main ways that Vanessa chooses to express herself, her stories. All of them involve a sense of ‘freedom’ to some extent, and reflect these desires that exist within her character. For example, her first story mentioned in the book, “Pillars of the Nation”, is described by Vanessa to be “about pioneers”, a group of people practically synonymous with the idea of having no geographical constraints (20). A similar thing can be found within a story she titles “The Silver Sphinx”, and how it centres on a heroine “very [much] like the [queen] in The Song of Solomon”, and someone madly in love (62, 59). Unlike the pioneer story, this story additionally focuses on the freedom of being able to be in love, something that, as described, is a freedom she constantly sees being oppressed by her grandfather. Even outside of her stories, the desire for freedom is prevalent. In conversation with her cousin Chris, Vanessa states that “it would be keen [to be a traveller]”, and that “that’s what [she is] going to do someday” (129). The reason she wants to be a traveller is for the same reasons as shown in her stories, she desires the ability to control that which she is unable to. Vanessa constantly sees how her grandfather desires and can do as he pleases without any repercussions, and she inherits these attributes in her desire for independence.
With the understanding of how the attributes of her grandfather shape Vanessa’s self, the reasons for her dislike of him, and why she often “hated [her] grandfather” are made clear (189). Overall, the idea of captivity is prevalent within Vanessa’s family, such as how her father Ewen has familial obligations to be a doctor, and how Chris is forced to work on his family farms despite his dreams of being a civil engineer. Within Vanessa’s grandfather, this theme could not be felt any deeper. As stated, he takes pride in his ability to have control over his family, and it is made quite clear how this makes them feel quite captive to him. This is seen vividly through his children, Vanessa’s Aunt Edna and her mother, Beth. In a conversation in which Beth is trying to get Edna to go out with Wes, her past boyfriend, Vanessa overhears:

“Oh [Edna], I didn’t mean it to sound [propagandizing]. Honestly, I didn’t. It’s just that you’ve been keeping house for Father all this time, and you’ve had so little life of your own. It’s just that it would be wonderful if you could get out” “What about you?” Aunt Edna said. “How are you going to get out?” it’s different for me,” [Beth] replied in a low voice. “I’ve had those years with Ewen. I have Vanessa and Roddie. Maybe I can’t get out. But they will.” (174)

This example demonstrates how Vanessa sees the people she cares about as not able to have freedom, all because of her grandfather. Although his captivity of Edna is more apparent in this quotation, it still exists with Beth. If the situation were somewhere where she had freedom, she would not equate leaving Grandfather Connor as being able to “get out” while wishing deeply for her kids’ escape as well.

It makes more than enough sense for Vanessa then, as someone who desires freedom, to see how her grandfather prevents the freedom of others and harbour a deep hatred for him. What is interestingly ironic about this hatred however, is how it is fuelled by Vanessa’s inheritance of his attributes. This polarizing emotion that Vanessa holds is especially apparent within the closing moments of the last story, “Jericho’s Brick Battlements”. Here, Vanessa returns to Manawaka as an adult, but after paying respects to her mother’s grave, she refuses to do so with her grandfather. Instead, she decides to go to The Brick House, what she considers to be “his monument” (194). She states:

I parked the car beside the Brick House. The caragana hedge was unruly. No one had trimmed it properly that summer. The house had been lived in by strangers for a long time. I had not thought it would hurt me to see it in other hands, but it did. I wanted to tell them to trim the hedges, to repaint the windowframes, to pay heed to repairs. I had feared the old man, yet he proclaimed himself in my views. But it was their house now, whoever they were, not ours, not mine. (194)

As one of the most striking moments within the book, it is apparent here how Vanessa has gained freedom because of her grandfather while still having complex resentments regarding him. The freedom comes with how, to the relief of Vanessa’s mother, she manages to escape the Brick House. She is no longer tied to the building, and as a result, she is physically free from her controlling grandfather. Despite this, the way that she describes how “[she] had feared the old man, yet he proclaimed himself in [her] veins”, implies that his presence within him, the same reason that she still cares for the Brick House’s quality, is something that she is resentful towards. Vanessa’s grandfather technically provided her freedom, he even paid for her university by “selling some bonds which [he had] been hanging onto”, yet Vanessa cannot bring herself to respect his blood within her veins (190). This is due, in line with the reasons mentioned prior, to how similar she is to him.
Lastly, the few moments where Vanessa doesn’t hold a hatred towards her grandfather push the same arguments that her freedom is shaped by him. During her time when she would hide and write in her grandfather’s loft, coincidentally exercising the same ‘self-isolation’ which was described previously, she describes how she “remembered something [she] didn’t know [she] knew … riding in the MacLaughlin Buick with my grandfather” (167). During this memory, she describes how he was “gazing with love and glory at my giant grandfather as he drove his valiant chariot through all the streets of this world” (167). The significance and fondness of this moment is due to how this is one of the first instances where she sees her grandfather not being controlling. Instead, she sees him allowing himself to have a sense of pure freedom and, due to this, sees her freedom-desiring self within him. A similar thing occurs during her grandfather’s funeral. Earlier in the book, whenever Vanessa’s grandfather tries to tell her about his time as a pioneer, she states, “To me there was nothing at all remarkable in the fact that he had come out west by stern wheeling and had walked the hundred-odd miles from Winnipeg to Manawaka” (7). During the funeral service, however, Vanessa states that the “minister’s recounting of these familiar facts struck [her] as though [she] had never heard any of it before” (191). She then follows this moment by stating that “[she] wondered what the car might have meant to him, to the boy who walked the hundred miles from Winnipeg to Manawaka with hardly a cent in his pockets” (191, 192-193). Just like within her story: Pillars of the Nation, Vanessa sees and admires the freedom that her grandfather must have felt as a pioneer. In this moment, she doesn’t see and hate the controlling man he was to her and her family, but as a person like her who revels in their ability to be in control of their life.

Margaret Laurence’s A Bird in the House is a brilliant collection of stories about a normal girl living in an uneventful town, and the role that inheritance has in shaping who she becomes. It is endearing to see how her independent and freedom-seeking self is inherited from her controlling grandfather, and how their relationship with each other is defined by the subtle similarities which they hold. It manages to tell a beautiful message about how we are shaped by those we look up to, regardless of the feelings we may have towards them. Despite the simplicity of each story’s overall plot and setting within A Bird in the House, the intricacy of the characters and their relationships with one another create an unforgettable overarching story about the humanity that arises within the character of Vanessa. It beautifully speaks on the impact that inheritance has in making someone their own, brilliant self.

Works Cited

Laurence, Margaret. A Bird in the House. Penguin Modern Canadian Classics, Toronto, Canada, 2017.

“I am not a fascist, since I do not like shit. I am not a sadist, since I do not like kitsch: Sadism, Serial Killing, and Kitsch”

“I’m in Love! I’m a Believer!: Structures of Belief in Jonathan Glazer’s Birth”