A Charkha Between Kallipolis and Worker’s Utopia: Unraveling Gandhian Self-Rule and Self-Control through Marxist and Platonic Philosophy

by Sarah Kwak

 

In Mahatma Gandhi’s work Hind Swaraj, the notion of individual self-control and political self-rule is analyzed in great detail. As a text written to criticize British settler rule and the influence of
modern Western civilization in India, concepts of power and the self are exceedingly prevalent throughout the work. These concepts represent Gandhi’s reason for resistance, with power representing the means of self-liberation, and the self representing a connection between personal morals and commitments to the political. Furthermore, they may be understood as a means of understanding political self-rule and personal self-control as both separate and interconnected entities. In the context of modern civilization and true justice, such notions of power and self also underpin the Platonic and Marxist connotations of the Gandhian “self”. Through the narratives of modernity, moral perfectionism and democratic governance imparted in B.S Chimini and Mohamed Medhi’s textual analyses, Gandhi’s notion of personal self-control may be understood as a spiritual entity transcending both Karl Marx and Plato as well as the text’s conception of modernity. Additionally, they may be collectively utilized, supplementing one another from the perspective of the modern reader in order to encourage political change. Consequently, while Gandhi argues that political self-rule is unattainable without personal self-control, it may be understood that personal self-control is attainable even without political self-rule.

One of Gandhi’s main focuses within the text is the notion of the self, which he understands as foundational to the development of “moral” Indian society. Gandhi writes that a moral self attempts to work towards an honest job in the face of modernity (Gandhi, 2009, p.42), rediscovers cultural and traditional values (ibid, p.69), and accepts one’s duty to better society (ibid, p.75). According to B.S Chimini, Gandhi’s notion of a moral self is similar to that of the “self” that is defined in Marxist philosophy. Gandhi understands the importance of utilizing the self as a means of “understand[ing] the meaning of being” (Chimini, 2012), by recognizing its influence on social conflict and Indian industrial capitalism (Heredia, 1999, p.1876). His liberal usage of the term “swaraj” acts as a faute de mieux “radical” concept depicting “an epistemological break in the world of anti-colonial movements” (Chimini, 2012). Thus, the term “swaraj” depicts the possibility of a world where one could be liberated from colonial rule without sacrificing the ethical and spiritual self. This is especially profound as the notion of the self is understood as fundamental to “bringing about social and political emancipation” (ibid). Without this understanding of the self, the Gandhian notion of the “suck[ing] of our lifeblood” (Gandhi, 2009, p.15) by English settlers is subsequently comparable to the Marxist notion of “self-estrangement” (Chimini, 2012), a term referring to “the alienation of man’s essence” (A Textbook of Marxist Philosophy, n.d.). Gandhi’s understanding of both the spiritual and ethical self as a pursuivant of truth interconnects to the Marxist notion of “objective truth” (ibid)—a similarity reflected throughout his previous conceptions of social and political liberation.

Conversely, Gandhi’s conception of the self may also be interpreted through a Platonic perspective. In the line, “I believe that after all a people has the government it deserves” (Rachel Fell
Mcdermott et al., 2014) quoted from Gandhi, Gandhi expresses the notion that Indian freedom is unattainable, not due to British colonial presence and imperialism, but rather due to the people’s flawed “condition of the mind” (Medhi, 2012). The notion of a collective “condition” here refers not to a communal setback, but rather to the collective inability of Indian civilians to utilize their mind for the better—through perfecting one’s allotted role and fulfilling their “duties”, such as to community service and by working an honest job. This collective inability, in turn, affects the Indian sense of self. Gandhi also writes of the notion of “duty” throughout the text in a way that is seemingly reminiscent of Plato’s notion of State structure and duty—a notion especially comparable to his three classes of the “Guardians”, the “Auxiliaries”, and the “Producers” (Plato & Jowett, 2008, p.111), and their individual roles. Furthermore, Gandhi stresses the notion of individual duty throughout the text, and in doing so, rejects liberal theories and understandings of human rights. This is as modern liberal theories often do the opposite, by “assert[ing] the priority of rights over duties” (Gandhi, 2009, p.82).

While this collective sense of self is initially directed at those influenced by English materialism and a “‘satanic’ modern Western way of life” (Medhi, 2012), Gandhi frequently compares the morally perfect notion of the traditional Indian village to the intrinsic inadequacy of the world just outside of it. He writes that the introduction of British colonialism marked the beginning of the masses’ inability to revert back to “the ideal of performing moral dut[ies]” (ibid). This is consequently used as a critique against all who live outside of the narrow confines of what Gandhi deems as an acceptable lifestyle. In a manner reminiscent of Plato’s dualistic conception of the real world versus the realm of “forms” (Plato & Jowett, 2008, p.37), Gandhi also vehemently rejects the “singular conception of [a] good life that is inhospitable to the idea of an ethical and spiritual self” (Medhi, 2012), as demonstrated by the modern world. This is done through his emphasis on the importance of cultivating and perfecting the inner self. As opposed to modern liberal interpretations of true justice that typically adheres to philosopher John Rawl’s measure of “fairness” (Wenar, 2021), Gandhi instead focuses on a subjective belief in the “greater good”, that contains proximity to Platonic philosophy.

This aforementioned subjective belief is further demonstrated in the quote, “[t]he political form is but a concrete expression of that [average individual’s] soul-force” (Rachel Fell Mcdermott et al., 2014), which enforces the notion that the self plays a larger role in one’s life beyond that of one’s personal life. Furthermore, it insinuates that the “lack of political representation” in India and throughout “is not due to political oppression by corrupt powers, but rather a case of those entitlements not having been earned, or deserved, through the development of the requisite moral capacities” (Medhi, 2012). In this case, even the established form of one’s government reflects the moral identity of the people and their ability to practice self-control, rather than their desires regarding the future of self-rule.

This notion is alternatively echoed in Plato’s The Republic, which introduces the possibility of establishing a “philosopher-king” (Plato & Jowett, 2008, p.400) system. This outlines a hierarchical structure where wise and just philosophers, guided by reason rather than by self-interest, encompass and inspire the moral values, as well as the development of self-control within the people. Gandhi’s “bottom-up” approach to prioritizing people’s responsibility of self-control before self-rule, and Plato’s “top-bottom” approach of prioritizing the political responsibility of the King’s self-rule before self-control establishes the core difference between both philosophies. Despite this, both Plato and Gandhi stress the individual responsibility of the “self” in establishing a just society. Leo Tolstoy’s understanding of India’s loss of freedom being the fault of Indians themselves in the text Letter to a Hindu (Medhi, 2012) implies a similar advocacy for self-reflection, and stresses the need for individuals to reject the flaws of colonial modernity by firstly embracing the self.

Consequently, it may be argued that what Gandhi understands as crucial to confronting Western modernity or British colonial rule is only possible through firstly establishing, and developing one’s control over the self. This may be achieved by rejecting the colonial narrative of modernity, and by abandoning its deficient narrative on the self. For instance, this may be understood as adopting fearlessness in order to attain the ultimate goal of independence. Gandhi writes that “one who is free from hatred requires no sword” (Gandhi, 2009, p.99), even when fighting for self-rule. The lack of a “sword” additionally symbolizes the idea that, due to one’s prioritization of the self, one could be liberated not only from the aftermaths of violence, but also from the burden of hatred that accompanies it. While self-control may be exercised during political events in less dramatic ways, such as by slowing the spread of radical rhetoric or calling for a smaller military presence, Gandhi argues that the very core of his political philosophy is rooted within this emphasis on self-control.

Furthermore, Gandhi argues that in the context of political rebellion in Bengal, where a call for independence was prompted by “people [who] were ready to resist” (Gandhi, 2009, p.20) and exhibit self-control, self-rule became possible—and the consequences of violence and hatred were also successfully avoided. The notion of political “discontent” (ibid, p.25)—which Gandhi refers to as “the [people’s] awakening”(ibid, p.24) [1]—is described as a mechanism that further encouraged people to “outgrow [political unrest]”. In fact, while notions of political self-rule may initially spark feelings of rebellion, it is through self-reflection and growth that rebellion is organized, and self-rule is achieved. Thus, self-control arguably prompts positive and more effective means of collective action and self-rule. Gandhi connects the self and the collective group in his writing, stating that, “just as the state between sleep and awakening must be considered to be necessary, so may the present unrest in India be considered as necessary and, therefore, a proper state” (ibid, p.24). While unrest may invoke political instability, it also initiates personal self-control; thus, when utilized successfully, one may see it lead to political self-rule.

It must be stressed, as mentioned previously, that while political self-rule may be crucial in prompting initial collective action (to work towards the betterment of society), self-control is necessary in achieving self-betterment. This commitment to self-betterment and control is thought to encompass true political liberation, as well as what Gandhi personally defines as “Swaraj”: a notion mentioned previously in connection to Marxist philosophy. In the quote, “[t]o build a house takes time. Its destruction takes none” (ibid, p.48), Gandhi suggests that effective political self-rule may only be curated when personal self-control is entirely achieved. Furthermore, his reliance on the term “Swaraj” additionally distinguishes between the two principles of political self-rule and personal self-control. Though political self-rule and personal self-control are indeed inseparable to an extent, the foundations of Gandhian “Swaraj” may be argued to be far more dependent on the personal self rather than the political. This contrast leads to the belief that true “swaraj means control over the mind” (Gandhi, 2009, p.68), and not political liberation. This notion of personal control and liberation is further expanded in the line, “if we become free, India is free” (ibid, p.73), and that “Swaraj has to be experienced by each one for himself [for] one drowning man
will never save another” (ibid, 73).

Here, Gandhi’s notion of “swaraj” begins to converge from its initial ties to Marxist ideology. While the mutual notion of collectivity and the importance placed on self-understanding indicates a
fundamental similarity between both philosophies, the notion of non-violence, passive resistance, and the prioritization of the self over collective class struggle and liberation indicates the core difference between Marx’s focus on self-rule and Gandhi’s focus on self-control. This is further emphasized in that while one’s political environment may prompt political action, Gandhi argues for the importance of saving one’s self first and channeling inner self-control before working towards that of others. In doing so, he relays a clear order of achieving “Swaraj”—a state that is translated as occurring “when we [first] learn to rule ourselves”, and “by each one for himself” (ibid, p.73).

Circumstances depicting self-rule without personal self-control, as arguably practiced in Marxism, is exemplified by Gandhi as people “blindly” wishing to expand governmental power (Gandhi,
2009, p.93), such as through the spread of “radical politics”. This is then referenced as “kick[ing] against the very step from which we have risen higher” (ibid, p.15). Furthermore, the hastened desire to expand government authority stemming from a lack of personal self-control and self-reflection may lead to people’s desires for a stronger military presence, resembling a “want[ing] [of] English rule without the Englishman” (ibid, p.28), or as a precipitated desire for modernity, referenced as “evil ha[ving] wings” (ibid, p.48). This fear is similar to Plato’s wariness regarding the notion of hastened modernity, as well as that of prioritizing ease and instantaneous gain over self-rule and thoughtfulness. Indeed, this is exemplified in the quote, “and so at last, instead of loving contention and glory, men become lovers of trade and money” (Plato & Jowett, 2008, p.315). Plato, like Gandhi, thus stresses the importance of self-control in the context of political self-rule.

Additionally, the importance of self-control within self-rule is necessary to understand the essence of Gandhi’s claim against modernity. Parallel to Marx, Gandhi understands the significance of the relationship between capitalism and imperialism in India. His critique of capitalist modernity and imperialism but not fundamental modernity—referring to a critical examination of all things modern—is arguably comparable to the pillars of Marxist philosophy (Chimini, 2012). Indeed, Marx also addressed systemic issues in his philosophy rather than the entirety of modern inventions. This is mainly expressed through Marx’s understanding of capital and technology, which is seen as a direct parallel to Gandhi’s notion of a Platonic “good life” and the means of achieving such a lifestyle. Gandhi’s disdain for trains (Gandhi, 2009, p.36) and not sewing machines (ibid, p.166), also known as charkhas, elicits a seemingly similar vein of thought, where trains as conceived as maintaining capital, which both “exploits wage labour” (Chimini, 2012) and upholds systems of imperialism and capitalism.

This idea of exploitation is emphasized in the quote, “A man, whilst he is dreaming, believes in his dream; he is undeceived only when… awakened… A man labouring under the bane of civilisation is like a dreaming man… one by one, we are drawn into the vortex” (Gandhi, 2009, p.35). When machinery allows for benefit to human labour in the case of sewing machines, but doesn’t take from the hard-earned fruits of one’s work, Gandhi deems modern inventions as acceptable. As such, Gandhian philosophy is often symbolized through the image of the charkha, or the spinning wheel. Furthermore, his emphasis on the need for class equality in Indian society demonstrates a profoundly Marxist understanding of social change and modernity, even despite the splitting difference between Marx and Gandhi’s political philosophies.

Gandhi’s analysis regarding modernity also centers around a personal conception of the “modern conduct of politics” (Medhi, 2012), which in turn contains similarities to Platonic philosophy. As
previously explored within his critique of modern technological developments, Gandhi’s critique of the government is seen as “inseparable from a moral critique of the people” (Medhi, 2012). This is similar to Plato’s argument mentioned previously that a politician would learn to enforce the preconceived beliefs of the masses, rather than reconstruct them. Moreso, this also connects to Plato’s belief that a politician ultimately “adopt[s] [the people’s] conception of the good” (ibid). In a society that is, arguably, deeply affected by the values Gandhi attributes to modernity—that of ease and “comfort” (Gandhi, 2009, p.130), “exploitation” (ibid, p.173) and material “greed” (ibid, p.166)—it could be argued that Gandhi, similar to Plato, feared that the government could soon exemplify and exacerbate such values. However, unlike Gandhi’s emphasis on self-rule and self-control, Plato criticized actions that could reap instantaneous benefits, especially when done for one’s self. Instead, he believed that individuals focusing on working towards the greater good of society could avoid the possibility of conflict—further dodging the ultimate possibility of undermining the overall stability of society.

Be that as it may, Gandhi and Plato both believed in the notion that political change includes the conception of a morally perfect community—one based within further developing the structure of their community through shared moral identities. On a deeper level, this insinuates a shift within the masses, which contains the opportunity for emancipation, switching from the various negative effects of modern industrial society to a newfound “ethical” outlook rooted in “duty and service to humanity” (Medhi, 2012). This shift may be actualized in two distinct ways. Firstly, this may be Platonically actualized through the means of organization: for example in The Republic, the text’s depicted hierarchical structure includes individualized roles, means of education, and notions of child-rearing. Secondly, in the case of Hind Swaraj, this shift may be actualized through one’s moral identity instead—Gandhi found political change to be based within the collective development of a new, morally perfected identity for the individuals within the “emerging” nation of India (ibid), which is especially poignant within their struggle for independence.

The similarities and differences explored between Marxist, Platonic and Gandhian philosophy thus far have explored Gandhi’s notion of personal self-control as a spiritual entity, transcending both Marx and Plato, as well as Hind Swaraj’s conception of modernity. It may be equally as crucial, however, to explore this examination of self-rule and self-control in order to understand the notion of one’s rights and government in the context of modern society. This is especially as such an application allows for insight into the role of individuals in shaping the dynamics of modern governance as well as the notion of person duty within pressing issues of social inequality and political power. Afterall, the balance between one’s freedoms, which may represent self-rule, and well-being, which may represent self-control, arguably often verges on disproportionate and morally flawed, as argued throughout the whole of Hind Swaraj (Gandhi, 2009, p.130).

As previously exemplified in the line, “I believe that after all a people has the government it deserves” (Rachel Fell Mcdermott et al., 2014), Gandhi’s tendency to prioritize the “greater good” over
the minority may evoke a sense of bewilderment, especially for those raised “in the age of liberal interventionism” (Chimini, 2012)—referring to people preadjusted to majoritively sympathetic
government systems. This is often understood through the means of foreign aid and intervention for those seeking escape from tyrannical governments, whether that be through “the form of money [or] arms” (Medhi, 2012). The idea of essentially prioritizing oneself and one’s moral self before others may thus seem bizarre, particularly in a society that understands the notion of democratic governance as a right. As Gandhi singularly advocates for passive resistance and non-violence to attain rights, the implications that those engaged in such political turbulence are inherently morally righteous, and the exclusion of those who don’t meet this ideal to achieve self-rule may strike as particularly troubling. As quoted by Gandhi, “religion, pity or love is the root…of the body…we should not abandon pity so long as we are alive.” (Gandhi, 2009, p.88). Hence, Gandhi seemingly suggests that one’s personal values, and means of self-control must not be surrendered in the name of political change—even at the cost of indicting a lengthier process.

As such, Medhi questions who in society may be tasked with identifying and bringing about necessary moral reforms within communities—and how Gandhi’s dedication to participatory politics is
consequently incompatible with his moral judgment regarding citizens and their society. The notion that democratic governance is earned and not given is especially concerning, particularly in an era where democratic rights and governance are considered one’s birthright. In the quote, “There is an excess of international law today. What is more, international law is forgetful of the ethical and spiritual self” (Chimini, 2012), Chimini’s claim that international rules have developed to facilitate the worldwide production and circulation of consumer goods in order to promote bodily comfort represents the sum of Gandhian philosophy. In short, Gandhi emphasizes that nations must be left alone by international law and institutions as much as possible, in order for them to create and fulfill their own futures. The implications of international regulations is that it works against self-control, rather than cultivating it. This further prevents the culmination of swaraj, as demonstrated in the quote, “we cannot bring ‘self-rule’ to others” (ibid).

As such, Gandhi raises the profound significance of understanding, practicing, and perfecting the self through his various illustrated means. The comparison of his political and social philosophy to that of Marxist and Platonic philosophy demonstrates a collective, societal toil to discover and define the notion of “true” justice and true “self”—as well as an examination on how to balance both phenomena in a way that allows for the ultimate “good life”. Though each philosopher illustrates a diverging conception of such liberation, such as through the careful criteria of the “kallipolis”, “worker’s utopia”, or “home rule”, it may be argued that their merging in the end goal of achieving true justice illustrates the vastly profound possibility of a society that is, at the very least, reflective and synchronously self-ruled and self-controlled. By analyzing Gandhi’s conception of moral perfectionism, the controversial nature of his conception of democratic governance, his critique of modernity, and ultimately, his notion of self in contrast to that of Marxist and Platonic philosophy, it can be ultimately understood that the notion of justice transcends political self-rule, and begins through personal self-control.

In conclusion, through Gandhi’s depictions of both personal self-control and political self-rule, one can understand that personal self-control is attainable even without political self-rule. Though both are, at times, inseparable in achieving specific goals, self-control can be understood as a crucial element in everyday life—not just in achieving political liberation. Beyond this, these concepts offer a means of transcending both Marxist and Platonic understandings of justice and existing narratives surrounding modernity, moral perfectionism, and democratic governance. This is particularly crucial because, from the perspective of the modern reader, these ideas can collectively reinforce one another, effectively encouraging and inspiring relevant political change. As such, they exemplify differing understandings of modernity which may result in the general betterment and moral development of people and societies across the globe. The points in which these three philosophies often diverge upon is ultimately the core of Gandhi’s argument—the belief that by critically examining one’s self, it is possible to work towards self-betterment, and thus, toward the betterment of one’s nation. It is here where the reader may find the greatest gift of Gandhian philosophy. As Gandhi writes throughout the text, “real home rule is possible only where passive resistance is the guiding force of the people. Any other rule is foreign rule” (Gandhi, 2009, p.95). Indeed, it can be concluded that the ultimate barrier to achieving “Swaraj”, and therefore
“true” justice, is simply the inability to look within oneself.

 

Endnotes

[1] in the vein of political rebellion and liberation

 

Works Cited

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8. Wenar, L. (2021, April 12). John Rawls (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Stanford.edu. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/