Tommo’s Imprisonment to His Own Cultural Values: Recognizing Cultural Bias in Typee

Tommo’s Imprisonment to His Own Cultural Values: Recognizing Cultural Bias in Typee

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by Lillie Goodson

 

Tommo, the main character and narrator in Herman Melville’s Typee, experiences many forms of captivity throughout the novel. He is physically confined to the whaling ship, Dolly, and he is held captive by the Typee islanders, but Tommo is a prisoner to something much more significant: his own cultural values. This form of imprisonment shapes his experience on the island and dictates how he engages with the Typees. This paper will argue that the cultural values ingrained in his mindset actually hinder his ability to understand the different ways that the Typees lead their lives. To support this claim, it will consider various interactions that Tommo has with the Typees that demonstrate this divide. It will look to Douglas Ivison’s critical essay, “I saw everything but could comprehend nothing”: Melville’s Typee, travel narrative, and colonial discourse, to understand that Tommo’s desire for the familiar is dictated by his identity as a white man from a colonial state. This paper will also show how Michael C. Berthold’s “Portentous Somethings”: Melville’s Typee and the Language of Captivity illustrates Tommo’s tendency to rely on unreasonable polarities to understand what is foreign to him. It is important to consider how Tommo’s reliance on his own cultural norms prevents him from ever fully accepting the Typeean practices that are foreign to him because it shows how confined he is to his own conventions.

The first form of Tommo’s captivity, which is briefly described in the beginning of the novel, is his experience as a crewman on the Dolly. The conditions on this whaling ship are what motivate him to escape and flee to the island in the first place. Tommo describes how, onboard the ship, “the sick had been inhumanely neglected; the provisions had been doled out in scanty allowance [… and the captain’s] prompt reply to all complaints and remonstrances was — the butte end of a hand-spike” (Melville 202). These descriptions are convincing, but Michael C. Berthold calls attention to how “Tommo’s argument … lacks specificity”, and he points out that “[Tommo] remains strangely aloof from the abuses he cites” (551). While Tommo undoubtedly suffers the consequences of living on a whaling ship with no personal rank or command, he appears to be relatively spared from any major mistreatments. Tommo also displays this detached behaviour when he is a captive to the Typees. But before this, he is limited to the observations of travelers before him that help him make assumptions about the islanders.

From the moment the captain of the whaling ship announces they will soon reach Nukuhevah, Tommo fantasizes about “naked houris—cannibal banquets—groves of cocoa-nut—coral reefs—tatooed chiefs—and bamboo temples” (Melville 5). These images, of course, originate from a collection of accounts made by travelers before him who had had little immersion into the authentic lives of the islanders and who spent their time observing the islands from their own ships (Melville 171). Their observations barely do justice to the islanders, their traditions, and their culture. Images of cannibalism and other unconventional behaviours cause foreigners, like Tommo, who visit the Marquesas to expect the worse of their fate. Before he even has the opportunity to interact with the islanders and develop a moral judgement about them for himself, he has already internalized the dramatized description of the cannibalistic Typees. This exaggerated interpretation is not the only misconception about the island that Tommo unconsciously adopts.

Tommo is certain that the Typee tribe is dangerous and to be entirely avoided, and that the Happar tribe is friendly and relatively civilized in comparison. Until he arrives in the Typee Valley and becomes fully acquainted with the islanders, he is infatuated with asking the question “Typee or Happar?” (Melville 66). For the first ten chapters of the novel, the answer to this question means either “a frightful death at the hands of the fiercest of cannibals, or a kindly reception from a gentler race of savages” (Melville 66). Berthold calls attention to Tommo’s habit of polarizing things in his effort to understand them. The “Typee or Happar?” question shows Tommo’s eagerness to categorize each tribe as “good” or “bad”, and it exposes Tommo’s inability to recognize that most things are on a continuum rather than simply black and white. While he is “in the Typee Valley, Tommo begins to realize the limitations of rubrics that are clear and contrasting” (Berthold 554). Berthold also points out that the interaction between Tommo and Toby and the Typee boy and girl they first encounter in the Typee Valley demonstrates Tommo’s keenness for polarization. In this scene, he attempts to find out whether the boy and girl are Happars or Typees by “conjoining ‘Happar’ and ‘Motakee,’ which he takes to mean ‘good’” (Berthold 557). After Tommo realizes that the boy and girl are Typees, despite the fact that they also connected “Happar” with “Motakee” (Melville 69), he gathers that “[‘Motakee’] does not denote a single standard but connotes a sliding scale of good” (Berthold 557). As he becomes acquainted with the Typees, he realizes that there is more to understanding an entire population of people than just categorizing them as “good” or “bad”.
Tommo’s life in the Typee Valley is quite favourable to him, but he still becomes dissatisfied when “[he] realizes that the Typees are holding him captive, no matter how indulgent that captivity” (Berthold 550). He continuously gives the impression that he is in danger of being harmed by the Typees. However, similar to Berthold’s discussion of how he is spared from any actual abuse on the Dolly, he never really appears to be mistreated by the Typees. Berthold even goes as far as to argue that because of “its paucity of incident” “Typee … lacks the melodramatic pleasures of the typical captivity narrative” (559). What is really causing Tommo discomfort is his own desire for the familiar. He is in a constant pursuit of a life that satisfies his yearning for comfort, but he also clings to the lifestyle and norms that he is accustomed to. This unease makes it impossible for him to be able to fully accept the unfamiliar behaviour of the Typees. Although his confinement to the Dolly and his detainment in the Typee Valley are both important forms of his captivity in the novel, they are not as significant as his reliance on his own cultural values.

Once Tommo has spent a substantial amount of time living with the Typees, he begins to develop his own interpretations of their culture and no longer relies on the accounts of travelers before him. In order to understand their daily lives and rituals to the best of his ability, he compares the social customs of the Typees to his own societal norms. One example of this is when he attempts to comprehend the Typeean attitude towards sexual and marital relations. When Kory-Kory first explains that a certain combination of tattoos on a woman’s “hand and foot” are “the distinguishing badge of wedlock”, Tommo immediately ceases to “venture to indulge in the slightest approach to flirtation with any of their number”, in order to treat them with the same respect that he would treat any married woman in his homeland (Melville 190-191). He is quite alarmed when he realizes that “the peculiar domestic customs of the inmates of the valley did away in a measure with the severity of [his] scruples” and that “a regular system of polygamy exists among the islanders; but of a most extraordinary nature,—a plurality of husbands, instead of wives” (Melville 191). This sanctioning of the idea that women can have multiple husbands and lovers baffles him, when he tries to visualize this behaviour occurring back home. To a man who has spent his entire life immersed in a culture where monogamy is the norm and where sex is stigmatized outside of wedlock, this system with so little structure and so much encouragement to act on one’s free will seems entirely unimaginable. Instead of accepting the value of a system that has most likely been present on the island for centuries, he assumes that it is inherently flawed.

Tommo also subconsciously scrutinizes the Typee physical body. In Douglas Ivison’s essay “I saw everything but could comprehend nothing”: Melville’s Typee, travel narrative, and colonial discourse, he discusses how “[Tommo] subjects the bodies of the Typees to the colonial gaze”. “The colonial gaze” is the lens through which a person who originates from predominantly white European colonial states or America observes a population that is foreign to them. Ivison argues that “[Tommo’s] emphasis on the nearly naked young girls participates in the colonial representation of the body of the colonized object, which is … aestheticized as an object of sexual desire”. Reminiscent of his reaction to their encouragement of non-monogamy and sexual freedom, Tommo is simultaneously affronted and endeared by how exposed these women are. Despite the fact that he clearly seems to enjoy when Fayaway removes the few garments that clothe her and uses them “like a sail” on the mast of her own naked body, he appears to remain unsatisfied with her habitual nudity (Melville 134). Not long after he recounts this story, he boasts that “Out of the calico [he] had brought from the ship [he] made a dress for this lovely girl” (Melville 134). He feels the implicit need to conceal her naked body so as to reserve it for himself in a way that is conventional to the standards of colonial societies. This specific interaction demonstrates that Tommo is a captive to Ivison’s “colonial gaze”. Tied to the conventions of his cultural norms, he instinctively desires to clothe Fayaway in order to claim her and her body for himself in a way that aligns with the customary presentation of the female body in America and Europe.
Judging by how challenging it is for Tommo to adjust to the unfamiliar habits of the islanders, it is no surprise that he has a very difficult time comprehending “taboo” on the island (Melville 221). “Situated as [he] was in the Typee valley, [he] perceived every hour the effects of this all-controlling power, without in the least comprehending it” (Melville 221). Not only does he not understand taboo, he also lacks respect for it. This is painfully evident when he persuades the chiefs of the valley to allow Fayaway to be exempt from the taboo that prevents women from boarding canoes. In doing this, he makes it clear that “although the ‘taboo’ was a ticklish thing to meddle with, [he was] determined to test its capabilities of resisting an attack” (Melville 132). His inability to fully understand the purpose of the taboos causes him to see no harm in disrespecting them. After he successfully makes an adjustment to the regulation that prevented Fayaway from boarding the canoe with him, he appears to “trust that the example [he] set them may produce beneficial effects” in the future for the Typees (Melville 133). This shows Tommo’s arrogance. Although he may be a prisoner to the islanders, he still believes that his judgement is superior to theirs. It is a wonder that he remains this confident in his own conventions at the same time that his survival is entirely dependent on the Typees. He basks in the luxury of his preferential treatment, yet he fails to even minimally remove himself from the bounds of his own frame of mind and see any value in the rituals on the island. Though he does his best to become acquainted with the aspects of the islanders’ lives that are foreign to him, he remains loyal to his own biases. Tommo embraces the features of the valley that contribute to his own comfort at the same time that he rejects those that are too much for him to tolerate.
Among other conventions that Tommo disdains, he vehemently rejects the Typee practice of tattooing. While he describes Mehevi’s “warlike personage” during his second encounter with him, he notes that “in their grotesque variety and infinite profusion [he] could only compare [Mehevi’s tattoos] to the crowded groupings of quaint patterns we sometimes see in costly pieces of lacework” (Melville 78). This description is clearly not meant to compliment the warrior’s appearance. Instead, it is meant to depict his tattoos as unattractive disfigurations of his body. While romantically describing Fayaway’s appearance, Tommo reluctantly adds that her “beauteous form … was [not] altogether free from the hideous blemish of tattooing” (Melville 86). His reaction is undoubtedly a result of the societal attitude towards tattoos in Europe and America that he has embraced. After being pestered by islanders who forcefully insisted that he get a tattoo on his face, he expresses his fear “that in some luckless hour [he] should be disfigured in such a manner as never more to have the face to return to [his] countrymen, even should an opportunity offer” (Melville 219). Such a statement, considering his helpless captivity within the valley, is profound, because it shows how partial he is to Western societal stigmas, despite his having lived on the island for months already.

Tommo’s blatant rejection of the custom of tattooing is intriguing because he has remarked in other instances “that being in Typee [he] made a point of doing as the Typees did” (Melville 209). He “ate poee-poee as they did” and attentively imitated their actions, doing his best to “[conform] with their peculiar habits” (Melville 209). In his essay, Ivison also touches on the idea that a white man such as Tommo can “simultaneously [express] the horror of losing one’s identity as European and the attraction of gaining a new identity as the Other”. Throughout the novel, Tommo fluctuates between being afraid of assimilating with the Typees and experiencing a fondness for their foreign lifestyle. He demonstrates this “fear of loss of identity … most explicitly in the fears of being marked as Other by being tattooed” (Ivison). Tommo “vigorously rejects the total ideological enslavement he thinks tatooing symbolizes” because, in his eyes, to be marked with the Typeean tattoo would signify a loss of self (Berthold 564). This attachment to individual self and freedom is heavily dependent on the idea of the Typees as the “Other” (Ivison).

Ivison and Berthold both frequently use “Other” to refer to the Marquesan native islanders in relation to the European and American colonizers. The use of the term “Other” to describe the natives implies that the non-natives are the ones who are not foreign. Ivison argues that “in the terms of European civilization, the Other is always already judged to be inferior”, which further perpetuates the idea that the white men and their cultural values are superior. This is the same idea that is rooted in the biased accounts of the Typees. It is what further fuels Tommo’s sense of isolation. Long after Toby had left him, Tommo laments that “there was … no one to whom [he] could communicate [his] thoughts; no one who could sympathise with [his] sufferings” (Melville 231). Although he finds comfort in the valley, he is still not content as long as he thinks that he has no one like him to relate to.

Tommo is given the impression by previous travelers’ reports about the Typees “that human victims are daily cooked and served up upon the altars [and] that heathenish cruelties of every description are continually practiced” (Melville 170). However, after living among them, he observes that, “in all [his] excursions through the valley of Typee, [he] never saw any of these alleged enormities” (Melville 170). It is only at this time that he begins to consider associating the Typees with “good”. But once he discovers the human heads hanging in the Ti and he later finds the freshly-stripped human bones, he perceives the Typees as cannibals, and he decides that they are “bad” after all. Despite how evident it is that they only practice cannibalism in the event of a great battle victory, Tommo is so captive to his mindset that he still believes that cannibalism is an unjustifiable savagery. It is “the signifier of the authentic Other”, and it therefore draws the line between what Tommo can and cannot accept (Ivison). From this point on, his desire to escape from their captivity becomes even stronger.

What makes Tommo a prisoner to his Western mindset and why does it matter that his interactions with the Typees are so heavily dictated by it? His inability to see beyond the walls of the cultural norms that have been developed by and for his colonial society shows how trapped he is. Because they are so ingrained in him as a person, he is unable to adapt his perspective to truly accept the different ways that the Typees go about their lives. As a direct result of this, the

reader is left to develop an understanding of the Typees based on the way Tommo presents them. By recognizing this key element, the reader can see the biases present in Tommo’s account in order to develop an impartial understanding of the Typee islanders.
Once Tommo is able to move past the misconceptions that he initially had about the Typees, he sees the richness of their lives and recognizes how each component contributes to the fluidity of the operation of the valley. Yet, no matter how much he learns to value and respect the Typees and their customs, he is incapable of fully embracing the “Other” (Ivison). To do so would mean that he would have to cut the ties that he still has with his own culture. Until he does this, he is unable to embrace the realities of the island and will continue to be caught up in how he thinks things ought to be. It is not his fear of captivity among the Typees that leads him to escape them. Instead, it is his own discomfort in a society that he cannot fully grasp that fuels his frantic desire to flee. Tommo is so firmly held in the captivity of his own cultural values that he is not even conscious of how they dictate his interactions.

Works Cited

Berthold, Michael C. “‘Portentous Somethings’: Melville’s Typee and the Language of

Captivity.” The New England Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 4, 1987, pp. 549–567. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/365417. Accessed 12 Apr. 2021.

Ivison, Douglas. “‘I saw everything but could comprehend nothing’: Melville’s Typee, travel

narrative, and colonial discourse.” ATQ: 19th century American literature and culture, vol. 16, no. 2, 2002, p. 115+. Gale Literature Resource Center, link.gale.com/apps/doc/A88583553/LitRC?u=ubcolumbia&sid=LitRC&xid=3700536d. Accessed 8 Apr. 2021.

Melville, Herman. Typee. Penguin Books, 1846.

Cannibal Continuity: Social Cannibalism in Melville and Coates

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by David Collings

 

Herman Melville’s Typee depicts cannibalism at a time when the practice’s nature, and even its existence, is an uncertain question for its contemporary readers. During the colonization of Pacific islands such as the Marquesas, on which Melville spent time after abandoning a whaling vessel and subsequently set Typee, groups indigenous to the islands were often assumed to practice anthropophagy, but evidence for these practices was primarily second-hand and of limited reliability. Melville’s text is similarly limited in its ability to view or provide evidence for cannibalism, but Tommo’s perspective on it nevertheless changes over the course of the work. Geoffrey Sanborn’s The Sign of the Cannibal suggests that the specific mechanism at work is a change in the understanding of cannibalism’s motive: from enjoyment of the taste of flesh to a belief that the Typees possess no motive and the practice is fictitious; then to vengeance against enemies such as the Happars; and finally to an understanding that the figure of the cannibal, which generates fear and apprehension in colonizers, is more significant than the act itself (Sanborn, 76-7). However, although Melville’s portrayal of cannibalism is more nuanced than might be expected of the time, to the degree that scholarship like Sanborn’s frames it as postcolonial in its exposure of imagined cannibals in contrast with the truth of the practice, it is equally noted that Melville does not finish Typee in postcolonial terms. While Melville interrogates the practices of colonialism, Typee still confines the Typee people he depicts to a purely natural setting, and through narrative sidelines such as the British takeover of Hawai’i suggests that such indigenous groups need not be afforded equal footing in contexts British or American readers might recognise as civilized; these elements of the work may be read as providing a model for continued inequity, complicating access to any postcolonial work in Typee.

Elsewhere, in Ta-Nehisi Coates’s Between the World and Me, both cannibalism and the effects of Melville’s revised social structures are visible, to lesser and greater extents. Cannibalism is mentioned explicitly only once in Between the World and Me, when Coates considers the ramifications of “a democracy independent of cannibalism” (Coates 105). Though its appearance is brief and the text itself does not mark its use as significant, Coates’s definition of cannibalism can be loosely mapped onto Melville’s work with the concept, and these links are illustrative of a possible continuity between Typee and Between the World and Me. Coates’s cannibalism, which might more clearly be called “social cannibalism,” describes the creation of the Dream through the systemic destruction of Black bodies, elevating the Dreamers into their comfortable world by situating them apart from and above America’s Black citizens. In this system, where an ingroup is created and defined through the literal or figurative consumption of an outgroup, Melville’s work echoes; certainly one of the motives proposed for Typee cannibalism, ritualized vengeance against a Happar outgroup, bears some similarity to the process Coates describes, but in a broader sense Melville critiques the reliance of colonial groups such as the French occupiers of Nukuheva on the same force. The indigenous peoples of the Marquesas are used exclusively to reinforce French superiority, without any real insight into the peoples so used. However, Melville’s new framework for the handling of non-white outgroups, where such groups can be accepted and celebrated only on the terms of the ingroup, renders Typee as much a precursor to Coates’s modern Dream as it is a critique of its principles. Although these two texts are most often read separately, both leave space for the other to contribute important elements, and their complexly interlinked relationship is worth exploring.

Cannibalism’s invisibility in Melville is central to its depiction, and to the effect it has on the sailors who fear it. When Tommo first arrives in Nukuheva’s largest bay, he says of the groups living on the island that “although I was convinced that the inhabitants of our bay were as arrant cannibals as any of the other tribes on the island, still I could not but feel a particular and most unqualified repugnance to the aforesaid Typees” (Melville 25). This demonstrates two linked factors essential to the way cannibalism works in Melville: first, that distant sailors arrive convinced of cannibalism’s presence in spite of the absence of evidence; and second, that the figure of the cannibal that Tommo and the sailors fear is disconnected from the act of cannibalism itself, as Tommo expresses greater terror at the thought of the Typees’ cannibal reputation despite his certainty that all the inhabitants of the region practice anthropophagy in equal measure. As his experience with the reality of Typee life grows, Tommo briefly disbelieves their cannibalism altogether, but the appearance of “three long narrow bundles, carefully wrapped in ample coverings” after a skirmish with the Happars and before a grand celebration to which Tommo is refused entry persuades him that the Typees have brought home and devoured Happar bodies, an understanding that Sanborn terms “vengeful cannibalism” (Melville 235; Sanborn, 91). This representation suggests, but does not mirror, the social cannibalism of Coates, as Typees seem to devour Happar bodies after a border skirmish in defense of Typee space; cannibalism occurs after a conflict between ingroup and outgroup, and the subsequent consumption only reinforces Typee-ness instead of creating it. It is worth noting, as well, that even in this moment of apparent clarity Tommo makes assumptions based on seemingly-implicating evidence—it has been suggested that non-cannibalistic Polynesian burial practices may have produced evidence capable of being mistaken for cannibalism (Jones). Returning to Sanborn, Melville may already have grappled with this idea: the absence of definitive evidence can allow cannibalism in Typee to be read as “a kind of stage effect,” produced by the unfamiliar sailors as a category into which the Typee people and others can be comfortably fit, easing and justifying colonialism in the process (Sanborn 77).

The colonial figures most clearly described in Melville are the French soldiers sent to Nukuheva to claim the island, and they adhere neatly, in different ways, to both Melville’s and Coates’s account of cannibalism. When the “king” of Nukuheva, set up with French backing as the rightful ruler of the island to cement their control of it, boards the French man-of-war alongside his wife, the ship band “[strikes] up ‘The King of the Cannibal Islands,’” mocking the Nukuhevans while appearing to honour them (Melville 7). This is the social cannibalism at work in Coates transposed directly into a colonial setting; the French soldiers perform their French-ness and their supposed colonial superiority at the expense of the king and queen, elevating their own position by making explicit both who the outgroup is and where they are situated—namely, below them in power and prestige. The words they use for this practice, however, resonate with Melville’s treatment of cannibalism: the Nukuhevans are other because they are cannibals and their king is a cannibal king, more out of colonial fear of the term than due to any authentic consideration of the practices the term implies. The greater comprehension of cannibalism’s role that Melville demonstrates over the course of the novel gives him standing to criticize the colonialist practices which rely on it, putting weight behind his suggestion that the forcible French occupation of Nukuheva is “a signal infraction of the rights of humanity” (Melville 17). Here, the Typees and other inhabitants of the island are included in the definition of humanity, bringing the human underlying the figure of the cannibal to the foreground. Melville critiques social cannibalism by revealing, despite Tommo’s reflexive revulsion, the complex nature of the actual cannibals it uses as fuel.

When so laid out, Coates’s critique of the Dream, that it relies upon the inferiority of Blackness and forcibly projects this vulnerability onto America’s Black citizens, seems to align itself closely with Melville. The comfort the Dream provides to the Americans who “believe that they are white,” a belief Coates goes on to interrogate, is composed of “bedding made from [Black] bodies” (Coates 7, 11). The Dreamers are elevated because they have created a division along racial boundaries, allowing them to ensure “that there was someone down in the valley because a mountain is not a mountain if there is nothing below” (Coates 105). This is social cannibalism on a grand scale, although Coates refers to it as such only rarely; the Dreamers, having defined Black Americans as the outgroup fit to fuel their worldview, leverage their otherness to create and reinforce their own superior whiteness in the same way that Melville’s French soldiers leverage the Nukuhevans. The racism common to both groups, then, is also a common method of social cannibalism. In Coates, the complicating factor is the degree to which such social cannibalism is systematized; from America’s foundation on the back of slavery, the system has enshrined “rape so regular as to be industrial,” referring to the constant violence both literal and figurative experienced by Black Americans in the course of daily life (Coates 103). The Dreamers can benefit from their brand of cannibalism even without directly perpetrating it, as the system embedded in Coates’s description of American culture will continue to perpetuate the superiority of the Dream. Coates, then, represents the individual act of social cannibalism committed by Melville’s French sailors taken to a further extreme, where the process of group creation the act aims at has succeeded and become self-perpetuating.

Although accepting that Melville and Coates align neatly in their respective philosophies would simplify the collaborative reading of the two texts, an important question remains unasked: what does Melville offer in place of the old colonial processes he critiques? The answer has much more to do with the Dream than Melville’s apparent opposition to social cannibalism suggests. Throughout Typee, although he praises the idyllic, almost Edenic lifestyle of the Typees for its unexpected beauty, Melville does not extend the unusual-for-the-time privileges that Polynesia’s indigenous groups enjoy in the text beyond a natural setting. The failures of indigenous peoples in “civilized” settings are often remarked upon, and these remarks do more than denigrate the prospective civilizer. Indeed, Typee’s final chapter praises the British Lord George Paulet’s time governing over Hawai’i, then called the Sandwich Islands, for the fondness it supposedly inspired in the native Hawai’ians, who “look back in gratitude to the time when his liberal and paternal sway diffused peace and happiness among them” (Melville 258). By Melville’s account, the trouble is that the Hawai’ians and their king are “half-civilized” (Melville 255). Although the act of colonization itself was inexcusable, once colonized, the denizens of the various Pacific Islands cannot be afforded equality; they are not equipped for independence, and it is hardly the fault of the individual governor that their subjects have already been hauled from “prelapsarian bliss,” as A Political Companion to Melville puts it (Frank 37). These are conditions conducive to the Dream that Coates describes, rather than precluding it: the individual acts of social cannibalism committed by parties such as the French sailors are inexcusable, but the broader system established by these initial acts must simply be accepted. Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that the America Melville calls home, reading Melville’s accounts of Polynesia, produces the Dream in spite of Melville’s apparent protests.

Melville’s protests—the anticolonial or imaginatively postcolonial content of his work—occupy uncertain space in the work in light of the Dream he enables. His objections to colonialism and social cannibalism still exist within the text, and his critiques that colonial forces “burn, slaughter, and destroy… and sailing away from the scene of devastation, call upon all Christendom to applaud their courage and their justice” hew closely to Coates’s suggestion that Dreamers rely on “the pillaging of life, liberty, labor, and land” (Melville 27; Coates 8). However, Melville’s tacit acceptance of the system that has been established in spite of his critiques is difficult to read past, and the momentary flashes of postcolonial space created by tearing away the image of the cannibal are obscured by the work’s apparent disinterest in accessing it on a wider scale. Coates’s presence in any reading of Typee further complicates the matter; in Between the World and Me, social cannibalism is problematic because of the systems that Melville seems to half-knowingly endorse,enforcing in Black life in America a series of altercations with the Dream and whiteness, as when a young Samori is shoved aside in a crowded theater. Coates’s encounter with this injustice is not personal—the figures he argues with are “a white woman” and “a white man,” not specific individuals (Coates 94-95). The woman pushes Samori because in the crowded, majority-white theatre her membership in the ingroup provides a basis for such an action. Modernity leaves no room and little justification for Melville’s suggestion that distinct cultural groups should remain entirely isolated, and no other models for the absence of social cannibalism exist in Typee.

Coates, however, offers no clearer account of a future absent social cannibalism than Melville does. Although his insights into the nature of the Dream are incisive and far more modern than Melville’s anticolonial language, Coates is hesitant to suggest that the world will ever actually change in accordance with these insights. Coates asks his son to struggle for the sake of his individual life, but also advises that Samori should not “pin [his] struggle on [the Dreamers’] conversion” (Coates 151). To Coates, no outside force can cause the Dreamers to change, and the comfort they are afforded as beneficiaries of the Dream makes them unlikely to change themselves. Dana Williams, summarizing criticism of Coates for this fatalist quality of his work, notes the absence of worthwhile new perspectives for Black readers already familiar with the broad-strokes systemic issues Coates depicts, exacerbated by “an unwillingness to offer even the smallest meaningful insight into the interior lives of those Coates narrates as powerless and disembodied” (Williams 182). The descriptions of Blackness used as fuel for the dream are not new to Black audiences, Williams says, making the white readers who might be surprised by these accounts an important part of Coates’s audience—but Coates has already established his belief that they will not change as a result of his outside input, making the function of his text an open question. Like Melville, Coates struggles to elaborate on any possible future beyond the flaws he critiques, and although the absence of such a blueprint for a future is unlikely to lead Coates to seeming acceptance of that which he critiques, as it did for Melville, there is a similar sense that the text is missing a conclusive takeaway for readers who still hope for a better world.

If neither Melville nor Coates satisfactorily produce a description of a future beyond social cannibalism, the connections between the two works may help to fill in the space left by both Typee and Between the World and Me. Coates’s reference to “a democracy independent of cannibalism,” cursory as it is, provides the essential connection to Melville’s work with the same subjects (Coates 105). In Melville, the literal cannibals, who possess complex and uncertain motivations for the practice of anthropophagy and are not defined by it, are obscured by the image of a cannibal conjured by colonists. Be they French or otherwise, colonial groups practice social cannibalism by reducing indigenous Polynesians to a single label, that of the cannibal, and reinforcing their own group’s boundaries and superiority in relation to the feared other who supposedly lusts after human flesh. By exposing the shallowness and inaccuracy of this conceit through a progressive exploration of the motives underlying Typee cannibalism, Melville gradually humanizes for the reader the formerly-obscured Typees. When Tommo’s failure to discover definitive evidence of the practice reveals the image of the cannibal’s total disconnect from reality, its absence briefly creates postcolonial space for the Typees, independent of the impositions of social cannibalism. Coates’s suggestion that any progress towards the death of social cannibalism in America must come from the Dreamers themselves is less hopeless in light of Melville’s success displacing an outgroup label, limited as it may be. Melville may be complicit in the creation of the conditions which produced the Dream in America, but if even he understood and was able to set in widely-read writing the flaws of the Dream 200 years before Coates, there is hope that the Dreamers may one day wake themselves in the manner that Coates suggests. Though Melville fails to extend his criticisms of social cannibalism and Coates fears that those who need to will never produce broadly-accessible self-criticism at all, a connected reading of Typee and Between the World and Me allows each to answer the gaps in the other.

In Melville and Coates alike, cannibalism is an object of criticism, and these criticisms are levied in often-similar terms. In Melville, the image of the cannibal supplants the humanity of Polynesia’s inigenous peoples in the eyes of colonizers, while in Coates the idea of Blackness as a designation used by the Dreamers to elevate themselves causes untold damage to America. Both authors criticize the use of humans as resources to enforce an ingroup’s superiority, although colonial forces and Dreamers alike aim to obscure the basic nature of the practice through systematization; the Dreamers have already achieved this, while Melville addresses colonialism in Polynesia at a time when its systems are still being established. It must be acknowledged, however, that the two texts do not read entirely neatly when set alongside each other. Melville is responsible for endorsing Lord Paulet’s governorship and other impositions on Polynesian natives with the justification that these indigenous groups, once removed from their natural isolation, will not function in society if they are treated as equals. This meek acceptance of the systems established by social cannibalism and casual racism, although common at the time Typee was written, fosters the conditions which ultimately lead to the Dream. Though Melville’s work opposing the image of the cannibal has utility to Coates precisely because of his proximity to the Dream, the fact remains that the postcolonial work in Melville’s text can only be accessed if the reader consciously pushes through his responsibility for the very situation that his text critiques. The effect of this conflict on the hopeful future that can be cautiously synthesized from Typee and Between the World and Me together is uncertain; perhaps uncertainty is appropriate, for opposition to the force of social cannibalism is a task as monumental as it is necessary.

 

 

Works Cited

Abramowitsch, Simon. “Addressing Blackness, Dreaming Whiteness: Negotiating 21st-Century Race and Readership in Ta-Nehisi Coates’s Between the World and Me.” CLA Journal,
vol. 60, no. 4, 2017, pp. 458-78. www.jstor.org/stable/26557006.

Bellini, Federico. “Herman Melville’s Typee: A Melancholy Look at Civilization and its Other.” American Studies, vol. 62, no. 1, 2017, pp. 5-17. www.jstor.org/stable/44982302.

Burgess, Miranda. “Lecture on Coates, Between the World and Me,” Arts 001, 1 March 2021,  University of British Columbia.

Coates, Ta-Nehisi. Between the World and Me. One World, 2015.

DeBlock, Hugo. “Cannibals in Paradise: The Exotic, the Familiar, and the Strange in Ritual and  Performance in Vanuatu.” Journal of Anthropological Research, vol. 74, no. 4, 2018, pp.
541-57. www-journals-uchicago edu.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/doi/full/10.1086/699944#_i2.

Frank, Jason. A Political Companion to Herman Melville. The University Press of Kentucky, 2014. muse-jhu-edu.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/book/27459/.

Gutiérrez, José María Hernández. “Traveling Anthropophagy: The Depiction of Cannibalism in Modern Travel Writing, Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries.” Journal of World History, vol. 30, no. 3, 2019, pp. 393-414. muse-jhu-edu.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/article/734751.

Hamdan, Mohammed. “‘Till We Stand on the Summit of Yonder Mountain’: Literary Geography and Re-Mapping Place in Melville’s Typee.” Comparative American Studies An International Journal, 2021. doi.org/10.1080/14775700.2021.1908872.

Marshall, Toph. “Melville Lecture,” Arts 001, 22 February 2021, University of British Columbia.

Melville, Herman. Typee: A Peep at Polynesian Life. Penguin, 1996.
Mukattash, Eman. “The Democratic Vistas of the Body: Re-Reading the Body in Herman  Melville’s Typee.” Journal of Language, Literature and Culture, vol. 62, no. 3, 2015, pp. 157-75. doi.org/10.1080/20512856.2015.1103978.

Jones, Sharyn, et al. “Kana Tamata or Feasts of Men: An Interdisciplinary Approach for  Identifying Cannibalism in Prehistoric Fiji.” International Journal of Osteoarchaeology, vol. 25, no. 2, 2015, pp. 127-45. doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1002/oa.2269.

Obeyesekere, Gananath. Cannibal Talk: The Man-Eating Myth and Human Sacrifice in the South Seas. University of California Press, 2005.
www-degruyter-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/document/doi/10.1525/9780520938311/html.

Sanborn, Geoffrey. The Sign of the Cannibal: Melville and the Making of a Postcolonial Reader. Duke University Press, 1998. archive.org/details/signofcannibalme0000sanb.

Williams, Dana. “Everybody’s Protest Narrative: Between the World and Me and the Limits of  Genre.” African American Review, vol. 49, no. 3, 2016, pp. 179-83. www.jstor.org/stable/26444245.

Rankine and The Pronoun Dreamworld: The Creation of Compassion

Photo via Unsplash

by Franklin Ma

 

In her series of lyric essays Citizen: An American Lyric, Claudia Rankine employs the pronoun “you” in both an accusatory and uniting fashion. The feelings of Black people are often neglected and scorned, and Rankine’s direct address to the reader highlights the microaggressions they experience. While these pronouns are often ambiguous and lead to a blurred understanding of Rankine’s message, this allows for the abstraction of pronouns, and we journey into a dreamworld. It is a place where the peaceful coexistence among ethnicities finally becomes possible. The specific anecdotes become universal, the pronouns a metaphor for the whole; but this also comes at the cost of individual significance caused by the permanence of the past. This is resolved by our recognition that second-person pronouns require two people and cannot function in isolation. Rankine’s desire then begins to take shape: for the idealized, imaginative, yet intimate compassion found in her dreamworld to blossom into reality on Earth.

Rankine heightens the weight of discriminatory words by positioning the reader as the victim: “you” is often a Black individual. After the trauma therapist opens her door and screams at us, she spits out a demeaning “[y]ou have an appointment?” (Rankine 18). The absurdity of a trauma therapist deepening her client’s trauma is manifested vividly in our senses. We have become the victims of microaggressions. This happens again when the woman with multiple degrees says “I didn’t know black women could get cancer,” and “you realize nowhere is where you will get from here” (Rankine 45). With this, Rankine makes it clear that even you cannot escape the systematically racist education of doctors: “[t]o think that one group of people cannot get cancer is, essentially, to place them outside of the Human” (Palmer 2017, 42). You cannot help “[likening] yourself to but an animal, the ruminant kind” (Rankine 60) after enduring this shocking remark. As a result, the non-Black reader also feels brutish and disturbed by the thought of inaccessible medical care. We are impacted by situations seemingly irrelevant to us, and the objectification of Black people is accentuated.

The sentiments of Black people are disregarded and viewed with derision by white America, which leads to their disqualification from being treated with human respect. Throughout the text, “you” is also frequently implied to be a white reader. When Rankine asks “[d]id you see their faces?” to an unnamed “he” (Rankine 86), her question about the victims of Hurricane Katrina is left unanswered. The silence that ensues affirms his position as an observer with no need to take action, which “indicates some privilege, and his inability to see their faces arguably renders this privilege white” (Adams 2017). This exemption from humanitarian responsibility then enables white individuals to openly violate the lives of Black people and deny them all respect. These brutalities cannot even be reprimanded because the reactions of Black people to the “gratuitous violence” inflicted upon them are “consistently characterized as inappropriate, exorbitant, and themselves gratuitous” (Palmer 2017, 33). Rankine recognizes this in her lyric when she expresses to have “[a] feeling that feelings might be irrelevant if they point to one’s irrelevance pulls at you” (Rankine 152). This promotes their objectification, as subhuman, by white people. Rankine regularly varies the positionality of “you,” and it now takes on another purpose: to represent Blackness as the second person.

Rankine magnifies the semantically objective role Black individuals are subjugated to by white societies, just as the object of a sentence is always determined by the actions of the subject. In an interview with Meara Sharma, Rankine finds it funny how Blackness is not the “first person, but the second person, the other person” (Sharma 2014). This supposedly other and monstrous being is treated like property when the speaker asks “whose are you?” (Rankine 76), which echoes the centuries-long enslavement and commodification of Black people. Palmer discusses how because the lyrical “I” arose from the Western poetic tradition and functions as the expression of universal subjectivity, Rankine’s decision to employ second-person pronouns then “marks blackness as a state of perennial objecthood—absolute affectability—unable to claim the subjective” (Palmer 2017, 49). Black individuals are seen as nonhuman and always the object to the racist white subject. Therefore, when “you” refers to a presumptively white reader, the interrogative accusations become particularly poignant, as if Rankine is demanding why this Black objectification still exists to this day.

Rankine uses second-person pronouns to blame the reader for the injustices she witnesses; ordinary utterances even feel accusatory. When the line judge says Serena Williams stepped on the line (when she clearly did not), Serena’s bewilderment feels directed towards us: “What! Are you serious?” (Rankine 29). Even if her emotional responses are acknowledged by the Grand Slam Committee, “they are done so in a distorted manner, which functions to further reinforce the purported abnormality of Black feeling” (Palmer 2017, 43). This effect is reversed in the readers, though, because the use of “you” allows us to feel attacked and accountable. We begin to grasp Serena’s anger. The lack of “you” consequently creates a sense of strangeness because no one is held responsible for the injustices that occur. The pages about the Jena Six (Rankine 99-101) make no mention of “you.” Rather, Rankine writes in the third-person and uses “he” or “the boys” (Rankine 99-101). The irrationality that “the litigious hitting back is life imprisoned” (Rankine 101) is indicated by the lack of an unambiguous offender, which suggests that the discrimination Black people face is imbued into the American character. Remember that “you” is also the second-person plural pronoun. Rankine is simultaneously accusing the reader and a whole collective—that of America. These pronouns are not always accusatory, however. Rankine asks us to “[s]it here alongside” her (Rankine 71), and this coexistence initiates a feeling of allyship.

Rankine brings us to her side by probing our imagination and allowing ourselves to personally experience her sentiments. The opening sentence states that “[w]hen you are alone and too tired even to turn on any of your devices, you let yourself linger in a past stacked among your pillows” (Rankine 5). By talking directly to us from the start of her poem, the rest of the text turns into an intimate message to the reader. The purpose of her verse becomes clearer as she encourages you to ruminate on the past found in your pillows, as if Rankine is immersing us into her dreamworld to establish mutual familiarity. She also positions the reader as a non-white person, no matter our ethnicity: “You assume she thinks she is thanking you for letting her cheat and feels better cheating from an almost white person” (Rankine 5). This allows her to appeal to speakers of all backgrounds. The opposite effect is achieved when the second-person pronoun is not employed. Although her verse in memory of Trayvon Martin is pained with nostalgia, the usage of “we,” “our,” and “us” (Rankine 89-90) complicates the reader’s ability to relate to her feelings. As a homage to an individual, first-person pronouns are appropriate to reflect the personal connection he has to his life, but when Rankine wishes to advocate for support from her readers, she returns to second-person pronouns:

It’s then the man next to you turns to you. And as if from inside your own head you agree that if anyone asks you to move, you’ll tell them we are traveling as a family. (Rankine 133)

We are called again to stand beside another and disregard our ethnic backgrounds. Rankine demonstrates the troubles Black people undergo daily through this allyship, but a true understanding is not easily reached.

Despite the effectiveness of second-person pronouns at creating empathy, Rankine puts the white reader into situations that are hard to comprehend. Although her words are clear in the analogy that racism is when “randomly the rules everyone else gets to play by no longer apply to you” (Rankine 30), her treadmill metaphor that “your body [is] running off each undesired desired encounter” (Rankine 79) is confusing. Perhaps it is about your unreciprocated desire to meet other people, and so you stay in place, not knowing where to go. Because the voices of Black people are ignored by the public, it could also be about the private catharsis of silenced and suppressed emotions. Rankine offers to the reader many possible interpretations, and when compounded with pronoun ambiguity, these lead to a destruction of self.
Who exactly pronouns refer to is unclear, and individuality is compromised. The lack of a direct reference makes pronouns applicable to anyone:

Who said that? She said what? What did he just do? Did she really just say that? He said what? What did she do? Did I hear what I think I heard? Did that just come out of my mouth, his mouth, your mouth? Do you remember when you sighed? (Rankine 63)

Rankine creates a sort of roundtable at which everyone and no one is talked about at the same time. Although “you” is assumed to mean the reader, the pronoun also proves to be ambiguous. The situation that the question “[w]ho do you think you are, saying I to me?” (Rankine 142) suggests is also impossible, because though “you” is the only proper way to address someone else, the speaker is addressed by the first-person pronoun “I.” This dissociation of self resembles Serena Williams’s claim that “she has had to split herself off from herself and create different personae” (Rankine 36). The whole self becomes fragmented, and pronouns can no longer fully represent the person.

Even so, the second-person pronouns have an all-inclusive nature. “You” evolves over the course of her pronoun work:

Rankine’s “you” is not primarily a kind of direct address, but rather a use of, or even a reference to, apostrophe: “A figure of speech in which a thing, a place, an abstract quality, an idea, a dead or absent person, is addressed as if present and capable of understanding.” (Clapp 2017, 177)

Although “you” often feels direct and accusatory to the reader, Clapp illuminates how it also functions as an all-purpose address. In English, second-person pronouns are also not gendered, and can apply to people of any age group or social status. All this ambiguity may seem to reflect how Rankine overuses “you,” but instead it speaks to the accumulation of emotion as we read her lyric, similar to the regular exclusion of Black people and their repressed ability to retaliate against America’s injustices. By inviting us to an imaginary space where pronouns are abstracted into conceptual forms, Rankine allows the reader to better understand her message. An individual, never mind their background or any of the traits that make them who they are, becomes represented by a singular existence.

The barriers between black, white, and all people of colour fade into a world of metaphor—existences interact, not individuals. In Rankine’s dreamworld, she breaks down the boundaries of race and nudges us to realize we are all members of the human race. As a Chinese-Canadian, I can now better apprehend the many years of agony experienced by African-Americans as Rankine impels me to exist through them. This allows the subjugation of humans by others to be viewed without any previous judgements or biases. A racist hierarchy no longer exists in her dreamworld. Now when Rankine asks “[h]ow difficult is it for one body to feel the injustice wheeled at another?” (Rankine 116), the truth behind her words is readily accepted. When a Black person is attacked the violation is often ignored, but Rankine forces the reader to think in terms of human wholes, and the specificities are universalized for the non-Black reader. Discrimination now becomes the problem of humanity: “I they he she we you turn | only to discover | the encounter | to be alien to this place” (Rankine 140). The piece “Uncertain, yet Reserved” by Toyin Odutola (Rankine 86-7) further illustrates how racism does not solely concern Black people. The ethereal gaze of the subject of the painting’s eyes penetrates the boundaries of colour, and any evil against “I they he she we you” (Rankine 140) becomes the experience and responsibility of everyone.

But is this abstraction of pronouns without fault? The ability of “you” and all these pronouns to embody anyone diminishes individual importance and meaning. Indeed, “[t]he worst injury is feeling you don’t belong so much | to you—” (Rankine 146). The lack of individuality in “Untitled (speech/crowd)” by Glenn Ligon (Rankine 110-11) from the merging together of faces also points to the erasure of an independent you. For Black people, this erasure is a shared experience. Palmer explains this in reference to Serena Williams:

Serena essentially “stands in” for “any other black body.” This is due to the synecdochal function of blackness—the “part” (i.e., a singular Black person) always already stands in for the “whole” (i.e., the putative Black “community”)—and the impossibility of a Black claim to individuality. (Palmer 2017, 45)

The routine violence on Black individuals in any time period results in their loss of self. In Rankine’s dreamworld, you become the sum of your ancestral past, both haunted and defined by it. “Sleeping Heads” (Rankine 147) by Wangechi Mutu illustrates how the face, composed of several individuals, is warped sideways by a grey hand. The person is pulled by the blending of Black and white history and scarred by it, which signifies the universal persistence of Black suffering.

The continuation and permanence of the past reinforces the loss of individuality. Rankine writes that “[t]he past is a life sentence, a blunt instrument aimed at tomorrow” (Rankine 72). The connotations of the adjective “blunt” convey the use of weapons that do not cut, such as knives, but rather ones that smash and distort people like baseball bats, hammers, or even guns. Though firearms are primarily used as ranged weapons, they can also be used as a blunt force at close range, and this reflects their prominent use as violence against Black people in the past and present. Even if white people do not want to acknowledge the white prejudice that plagues the present, the reality remains unchanged:

It’s disappointing to find out that the past is the present is the future … Maybe it’s a kind of surrealist move, to use language like “post-racial”—thinking that if you create the language for it, it will happen. I wish it worked that way. But that’s not our reality. (Sharma 2014)

Rankine expresses these thoughts when she asserts that “[y]ou can’t put the past behind you” and “it’s turned your flesh into its own cupboard” (Rankine 63). The past lives in the domestic space, and has become a daily reminder of history. It may be hopeless to hope, but in Rankine’s verse lies a sense of companionship. This is the reconstruction of you and I in the pronoun dreamworld.

The existence of “you” requires the existence of me, whatever the cruel circumstances we live in. Second-person pronouns can only be used if two people are present, because “you” cannot be said if one is alone. At least two individuals, therefore, frame the entirety of Rankine’s pronoun work. This is most clear when “[y]ou | shouted you” (Rankine 145). The speaker addresses a “you” who shouts back at the speaker, and a connection is made. Judith Butler remarks that “[o]ur very being exposes us to the address of another … [w]e suffer from the condition of being addressable” (49), and Rankine validates Butler’s words when “you” is able to make the reader feel accused of wrongdoing (Rankine 10, 29, 43, etc.). “You” is hurtful in these cases, but Serena Williams exemplifies how “[y]our alertness, your openness, and your desire to engage actually demand your presence” as well (Rankine 49). She exists in the moment by simultaneously affirming the lineswoman’s and her own existence by juggling between “you” and “I”:

I swear to God I’m fucking going to take this fucking ball and shove it down your fucking throat, you hear that? I swear to God! (Rankine 29)

Once “you” was said, I am brought into focus. “You” is more effective than “I” because “you” attaches another individual to the life of the speaker, while “I” means “so little, | holds the little forming no one” (Rankine 143). The value of individuals cannot be perceived in isolation.

 

The imagery of the chapter heading on page three of Rankine’s poem further reveals the loneliness of the first-person pronoun “I.” This is the roman numeral for one, but it also appears to be a singular person standing by oneself. “I” is also the same as the first-person singular pronoun, which implies that “I” is inherently lonely. The white pages are also thicker and of a better quality than in most books, which proves that Rankine purposely engages with the physical text to deliver her message. The reader then notices how “I” is printed in black ink. Despite this practice being normal, the subject matter gives way to secondary meanings. Many white people believe that we live in a post-racial era in which racism only exists in the past, but “monochromatic texts help to make whiteness visible against efforts to obscure it” (Adams 2017). The black “I” now reflects a Black person who is entrapped by a dense whiteness that illustrates the subtle, yet sustained, fear that Black individuals have whenever they are alone and interact with white people. The singular feels to possess no meaning because of the endless objectification by the surrounding whiteness, so when you come along and stand alongside me, living is not as scary anymore. Rankine brings the reader into her dreamworld to urge us to create compassion and empower each other, through each other, regardless of our own identities.

Only in compassionate intimacy with “you” can “I” feel structured and here as the future unfolds. Rankine states that she does not understand existence without intimacy, because even if she does not know the other person, she is “already in a relationship with them” (Sharma 2014). Her life is dependent on other people, such as the stranger in a car who could run her over at any time, and in these anonymous ways, “we’re in relationships” (Sharma 2014): it does not matter who is who. The question-answer format of “… is this you? | Yes, it’s me …” (Rankine 75) provides a sense of comfort, and the final exchange in Rankine’s lyric reveals that despite the world being unfair, at least you are not alone:

Did you win? he asks.
It wasn’t a match, I say. It was a lesson. (Rankine 159)

This fact can be abstracted into the collective experience of Black people, so that even as we may ponder the possibility of a kinder future, Rankine “want[s] to interrupt to tell him her us you me I don’t know how to end what doesn’t have an ending” (Rankine 159). We are stuck in this abstract dreamworld of pronouns for an indefinite period of time, and currently can only make “a truce with the patience of a stethoscope” (Rankine 156). This truce is the idea of mutual belonging: until that future where individual heartbeats, motions of life, can truly be detected in everyone, you and I will continue waiting in solidarity. Rankine believes in the possibility of another way of being: “[l]et’s make other kinds of mistakes; let’s be flawed differently” (Sharma 2014). This reflects her wish for a universal empathy towards all humans—that is, treating everyone as first persons who have their own individual authority and importance. As James Baldwin states, “[t]his endless struggle to achieve and reveal and confirm a human identity, human authority, contains, for all its horror, something very beautiful” (Rankine 128): the capacity for humanity to evolve, not only in the optimistic dreamworld, but the real world as well.

Rankine employs second-person pronouns to universalize the microaggressions, disdain, and objectification Black people face to help the non-Black reader develop a true compassion for them. The pronouns become abstracted to present violence as not an issue of race but of humanity. Although individuality is lost in this process, the dreamworld Rankine brings us into is comforting because the indiscriminate compassion beings share with each other is beautiful. The current world never seems to change for the better, but hopefully one day, perhaps through the second-person pronouns that proclaim our existence, Rankine’s dream of empathy for everyone will come true. You and I are together, whoever we may be.

 

Works Cited

Adams, Bella. 2017. “Black Lives/White Backgrounds: Claudia Rankine’s Citizen: An American Lyric and Critical Race Theory.” Comparative American Studies, 15.1-2: 54–71.

Clapp, Jeffrey. 2017. “Surveilling Citizens: Claudia Rankine, From the First to the Second Person.” in Spaces of Surveillance, ed. Susan Flynn and Antonia Mackay (London: Pallgrave Macmillan) 169–184.

Palmer, Tyrone S. 2017. “‘What Feels More Than Feeling?’: Theorizing the Unthinkability of Black Affect” *Critical Ethnic Studies* 3.2: 31–56. www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/jcritethnstud.3.2.0031. Accessed 21 Apr. 2021.

Rankine, Claudia. Citizen: An American Lyric. Penguin, 2015.

Sharma, Meara. 2014 (17 Nov.). “Claudia Rankine on Blackness as the Second Person,” Guernica. www.guernicamag.com/blackness-as-the-second-person/. Accessed 20 Apr. 2021

Crime and Punishment: Whatever Happened to the Man of Tomorrow?

Photo via Pixabay

by Own Finlay

 

“God is dead.” So said Friedrich Nietzsche in 1882’s The Gay Science, but for some, God had been dead long before Nietzsche wrote His death into the public consciousness and put in His place stood a new breed of men, the Übermensch. Before Nietzsche, there was Fyodor Dostoevsky who, at the time of writing Crime and Punishment in 1866, set out to deconstruct this type of man who epitomized a distancing from the church, something the reformed clerical reactionary could not let succeed. To accomplish this, Dostoevsky created the character of Rodion Raskolnikov whom the author posits as a precursor for what would become Nietzsche’s Übermensch, the superman or ‘extraordinary man’ as Raskolnikov refers to it in the novel. Dostoevsky, on his tours of Europe, had observed this type of person and despised them for having stepped away from the Orthodox Church that he so cherished. To this end, he portrays Raskonlikov’s proto-Übermensch philosophy as self-destructive and contradictory in the wake of his crime. Only through suffering and rebirth with the help of the church does Raskolnikov cease the raving and illness that plagued him. Additionally, Dostoevsky parallels Raskolnikov with the biblical figure of Lazarus, showing how both are reborn to praise God, very much to Dostoevsky’s liking. However, Dostoevsky also creates a character in Svidrigailov who is so far beyond Raskolnikov in his extraordinary ways that Dostoevsky’s belief that even the worst can recover by submitting to God seems to falter. Svidrigailov is one half of a deep and affecting divide in C & P that appears in the mind of both Raskolnikov and Dostoevsky and one that appears to haunt both throughout the novel.

The concept of the Übermensch was created and defined in philosophical and psychological terms by Nietzsche in his 1883 book, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, where he uses it to contrast the other-worldliness morality of Christianity and instead posits these superhuman men as able to do anything they wish within the moral vacuum of nihilism. Dostoevsky first observed these now archetypal figures on his various tours of Western Europe, mainly London, Paris, and Berlin, between 1862-3. In his Writer’s Diary, Dostoevsky, a proud Russian Orthodox, warily remarks of Western Europe that, “Do you know how many tears we shed and the pangs of heart we suffer at the fate of this dear and native country, and how frightened we are by the storm clouds that are ever gathering on her horizon?” (Dostoevsky 198).

Although not mentioned here by name, the storm clouds Dostoevsky refers to are the proto-Übermensch, very liberal figures who were forming the middle class of Western Europe and sprouting up in Western European literature of the time. The author’s worry is that, as scholar Vsevolod Bagno notes, “the tragedy of the Europe of his time was that it had gone away from Christ” (Bagno 50). Dostoevsky sees the emergence of the extraordinary man as a direct product from this distancing from the church, because they are people who believe they can act on a level above God. Bagno further remarks on Dostoevesky’s view of Western Europe that, “his complaints and forecasts are to be perceived as a view ‘from within’ whereas his compatriots, broad as their scope may have been, basically regarded Europe ‘from without’” (49). Perhaps because of his travels, Dosteovesky didn’t see Western Europe as quite so distant from his beloved Russia. As a result, his anxiety about a potential Übermensch ‘invasion’ of Russia can be seen in his writing of C&P, where Raskolnikov and Svidrigailov enact the values of an Übermensch to varying degrees. Even though C&P predates the publishing of Zarathustra by 17 years, this figure, the Übermensch persona, was flourishing in Europe and Dostoevsky, to say the least, eschewed it and set out to deconstruct it in C&P.

In the article that Raskolnikov writes prior to committing his crime, he outlines Dostoevsky’s view of the extraordinary man. Detective Porfiry Petrovich sums up Raskolnikov’s article as, “Ordinary people should live a life of obedience and do not have the right to overstep the law” (310), but “extraordinary people have the right to carry out all manner of crimes and to break the law as they please, all because they are extraordinary” (310). Raskolnikov is somewhat annoyed at how bluntly Porfiry summarizes his ideas, but Porfiry’s definition is accurate: the extraordinary man is able to circumvent laws and restrictions to further his vision. Raskolnikov adds some nuance to the definition in his response, “All I did was hint that an ‘extraordinary’ person has the right … not an official right, that is, but a personal one, to permit his conscience to step over … certain obstacles, but if and only if the fulfilment of his idea demands it.” (310). Raskolnikov modifies the idea into a personal choice; there is no official law stating extraordinary men are above it, but this is beside the point as an Übermensch most likely would not even observe, or maybe discard, these rules in the first place given his high status. He goes on to describe how humanity’s greatest leaders have been criminals, but also extraordinary people: “if for no other reason than that, by introducing a new law, they violated the ancient law held sacred … and it goes without saying that they did not fear from bloodshed, so long as the blood could help them.” (311). This is a perfect description of Raskolnikov’s mindset going into the murder. He believes that, by committing this crime, he will be able to fund his education and help hundreds if not thousands. However, this is only the argument Raskolnikov uses to patch over the emerging extraordinary thoughts that are bouncing around his mind. He overhears this very concept being discussed earlier in the novel between a man who tells a policeman that, “Won’t thousands of good deeds iron out one tiny little crime? For one life – thousands of lives saved from decay and ruin” (80). These are not extraordinary men. They make arguments to keep themselves confined inside the rules of the law; the crime may be outside of the law but the ensuing productive results are not; they don’t harbour the same nihilism that is so striking in Svidrigailov and is the reason he does not observe the law. A truly extraordinary man does not need to bother with middling utilitarian justifications for their actions when they are committed to furthering themselves and themselves alone, within the realms of the law or otherwise. In Giorgio Faro’s words, “Therefore it is no longer merely utilitarian or humanitarian reasons that explain Rodya’s deed, but the passage to the proud, contemptuous conception of the Übermensch” (277). Towards the end of the novel, Raskolnikov bluntly admits that he desperately wanted to be an Übermensch when he breaks down to Sonya and confesses, “I wanted to become a Napoleon, that’s why I killed” (498) and “I killed for a dare” (502) because that’s what Napoleon, an Übermensch, would do. Dostoevsky includes the important detail that Raskolnikov never truly is an Übermensch; he merely wants to be. No matter how hard Raskolnikov tries to become an extraordinary man, he never can be one just because he wants to. Dostoevsky installs this philosophy in Raskolnikov’s character in order to show the terrible effects and outcomes he perceives. By the end of the text, Raskolnikov has become a twisted and raving lunatic all because of the crime he commits to test himself.

Dostoyevsky’s portrayal of the many extraordinary contradictions that tear Raskolnikov apart demonstrates just how negatively he views the Übermensch philosophy. The most startling of these contradictions is the one most physically taxing on Raskolnikov. The Übermensch shouldn’t suffer for their crimes because they contribute to humanity’s progress. Yet, following his crime, Raskolnikov becomes viciously ill. Raskolnikov even admits this and contradicts his prior statements on foregoing suffering when discussing the matter with Porfiry: “Suffering and pain are always mandatory for broad minds and deep hearts. Truly great people, it seems to me, should feel great sadness on this earth” (317). Another fierce contradiction for Dostoevsky is why an extraordinary man should be so secretive if he is benefiting humanity. Raskolnikov tells Porfiry that he would “hardly tell you if I did step over them” (318) in reference to the lines of law and society. If he was making strides for the greater good then why would he not be inclined to share his actions? What perhaps hounds Raskolnikov the most is the ability of the superman to “utter a new word” (312), something he admits to desiring when he responds “Quite possibly” (318) after Porfiry asks him if it was his goal to express his Übermensch philosophy when writing his article. However, as Razumikhin points out, “this [Raskolnikov’s article] isn’t new and resembles everything we’ve read and heard a thousand times before” (315), which Raskolnikov reluctantly agrees with. The most damning contradiction is Raskolnikov’s quest to know whether or not he really is an extraordinary man, but, of course, an extraordinary man does not need to wonder about such things. Dostoyevsky clarifies his views on this when Porfiry asks Raskolnikov if there’s an identifier of an Übermensch and Raskolnikov’s answer is that “there’s nothing, in short, for you to worry about … There’s a law at work here” (314), which implies that an identifier is not needed because the extraordinary man will know of their extraordinariness. The great problem here is that Raskolnikov commits his crime to see if he can be a Napoleon, thereby proving he’s not a Napoleon. Raskolnikov’s regret and shame are palpable when he tells this to Sonya, “I was horribly ashamed when it finally got through to me that not only would he [Napoleon] not have been put off, it wouldn’t even have occurred to him that there was nothing grand about it [the crime]” (498-9). Faro aptly sums Raskolnikov’s contradiction and resulting illness as, “nobody is more prey to evil than he who believes he can put himself and his actions above good and evil” (282). Dosteovesky clearly portrays how Raskolnikov is haunted by the many contradictions of the Übermensch philosophy, one that picks apart his psyche and unravels his mind as each mistake becomes more obvious to him.

Raskolnikov’s only option then, as presented by Dosteovesky, is recantation. Raskolnikov must give himself up to God, admit his mistake and bear his suffering if he wishes to both repent for his crime and recover from the illness that stems from trying to become an extraordinary man. To illustrate this concept, Dostoevsky parallels Raskolnikov’s death as an Übermensch and rebirth into Orthodoxy with the biblical figure of Lazarus. In the bible, Lazarus is raised from the dead by Jesus because “he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live: And whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die” (11:25-6, KJV). In C&P, Sonya convinces Raskolnikov to give into God and be reborn a Christian, which Raskolnikov does, completing the parallel. Lazarus himself is referenced numerous times throughout the course ofC&P, including a near full description of his resurrection that Raskolnikov demands Sonya read to him (390-3). Indeed, when Sonya reads, “And the dead man came out” (393), it reeks of Raskolnikov’s disposition. Allusions to the concept of death and rebirth appear earlier, most notably when Raskolnikov is being treated by the doctor, Zosimov. He tells Raskolnikov that “your full recovery now depends mainly and solely on you … I should like to impress upon you how essential it is for you to eliminate the primary and, as it were, deep-rooted causes that helped bring about your illness; only then will you be cured” (267). These lines are not in direct reference to a repentance from Raskolnikov; they apply to his illness, but Dostoevsky is alluding here to how Raskolnikov must exorcise the Übermensch philosophy inside of him to return to health. Eventually, Raskolnikov repents of his crime and takes Sonya’s advice to “tell everyone out loud: ‘I have killed!’ Then God will send you life once more” (504) and that he must suffer for his crimes because he has to “Accept suffering and through suffering redeem yourself” (505). For Raskolnikov, that means he must spend the lawfully acquitted time in jail in Siberia, where we end the novel. By paralleling the two stories of Raskolnikov and Lazarus, Dostoevsky is showing how faith in God and accepting punishment will absolve your crimes. As Harold Bloom phrases it, “His [Dostoevsky’s] design upon us is to raise us, like Lazarus, from our own nihilism or skepticism, and then convert us to Orthodoxy” (4). For Dostoevsky, it is both a physical and a philosophical crime to believe in an ideology as conceited and sacrilegious as the extraordinary man that Raskolnikov almost becomes.

However, Dostoevsky doesn’t seem to fully commit to his evangelical side, as a certain character seems to escape his Christian redemption narrative. Svidrigailov is the Übermenschiest of the Übermensch; he is so extraordinary as to reject all the flaws of Raskolnikov’s precarious extraordinary status that cause his hysterical descent. Raskolnikov himself laments this fact when he’s questioning his actions in Siberia: “those people [extraordinary men] coped with the step that they took, which is why they are right, but I couldn’t cope with mine, so I had no right to take it” (651). Unlike Raskolnikov, Svidrigailov is able to cope with the three murders, at a minimum, to which Dostoevsky alludes. This is because Svidrigailov is an utterly selfish being with no remorse. He handles himself in an idiosyncratic and eerie manner, inhuman perhaps, an ability the former doesn’t have. Raskolnikov recognizes this when thinking of Svidrigailov’s suicide: “Was the desire to live really so strong, was it really that hard to overcome? Hadn’t Svidrigailov overcome it, despite his fear of death?” (651). More than anything, Svidrigailov is bored with life. His one goal seemed to be to have Dunya love him, but when she walks out on him after she fails to kill him, he loses the one thing his extraordinary capabilities cannot control. After he loses this goal that has kept him confined to this world, his nihilistic outlook becomes so strong as to decry life itself by committing suicide. To disregard the rules of life is as extraordinary as one can possibly be. If he had tried to stop her and rape her, something he certainly feels no qualms doing, it would seem to play into the Übermensch model. However, the “moment of dreadful, dumb struggle” (596) that occurs in Svidrigailov’s soul forms him into a being of only pure nihilism, the fuel of the extraordinary man. This is the harsh reality of the extraordinary men that Dostoevsky depicts: the nihilism that allows them to step over all boundaries is the one that crushes them in the end. Just as the five year-old girl turns into “one of those French ladies of the night” (611) in Svidrigailov’s dreams, Dostoevsky paints both Svidrigailov and Raskolnikov’s nihilism as initially beneficial, but as in the case of the former where his nihilism consumes him, it figures a mortal end.

Still, Svidrigailov plays counter to Dostoevsky’s Orthodox morals. He is a character for whom recantation can neither save nor is even an option, and in Dostoevsky’s creation of a character as supremely nihilistic as Svidrigailov, he lets the reader observe a place of doubt that plagues the writer’s mind. This place of doubt is seeded in Raskolnikov too, as the narrator remarks of Raskolnikov’s prior realization of Svidrigailov’s extraordinariness that “He couldn’t understand that this premonition might have been the herald of a future breaking point in his existence, a future resurrection, his view of life” (651). When Svidrigailov commits suicide, fully embracing his extraordinary status, he defies a fundamental belief for a devout Orthodox such as Dostoevsky, that anyone can be saved by God. If Dostoevsky believes Raskolnikov can be saved, and as Svidrigailov coolly observes, “wasn’t I right to say we’re birds of a feather?” (348), he too should be given the chance at redemption. The two aren’t so different as it first seems, yet Dostoevsky only chooses to save one. It suggests a fear in Dostoevsky; he’s not as sure of his faith as Raskolnikov’s salvation makes it seem. Dostoevsky doesn’t even seem to suggest that Svidrigailov will be worse off in the afterlife of a supposed hell. After all, Svidrigailov’s vision of eternity is “there’ll just be some little room, some sooty bath-hut, say, with spiders in every corner” (347) and this astonishingly, above all else, boring afterlife is “exactly how I’d arrange things myself!” (347). This extraordinary view of life becomes the demonic side of the divide in C&P that exists between Svidrigailov and Sonya, inside of Raskolnikov, and inside of Dostoevsky as well. Svidrigailov’s manner of existence serves to widen the chasm in Dostoevsky’s mind as much as Raskolnikov’s. Both appear to be fearful of his nihilism and this is the true reason for Raskolnikov’s ultimate repentance.

In Crime and Punishment, Dostoyevsky presents the reader with a thorough breakdown of the extraordinary man. He accomplishes this by drawing on his visits to western Europe and the figures he encountered there. He also makes the novel a catalyst to promote his own Orthodoxy as a means of redemption. However, like the fierce battle in Raskolnikov’s mind between his extraordinary and Christian thoughts, there existed a deep divide in Dostoevsky between his own Christian morals and his need to fully realize the philosophy of the people whom he viewed as harbingers of secularism. One side is embodied by the ‘to a fault’ saint Sonya who will love and thrust God upon anyone, while, on the other side, is the demonic Svidrigailov, whose nihilism drives him to death and renders all notions of God’s salvation futile. Raskolnikov acts as the bridge between the sides of the chasm. His decision to repent ultimately places him on the side of Orthodoxy, affirming Dostoevsky’s intentions to show the virtue of the church. Indeed, Faro succinctly explains Dostoevsky’s anachronistic conundrum: “To choose Nietzsche’s Übermensch, one must, therefore, bet on the inexistence of God” (283). However, Raskolnikov’s sudden embrace of faith and Dostoevsky’s tendentiousness may leave the reader unconvinced of both his change of heart and therefore Dostoevsky’s reactionary vision of a redeeming church. Perhaps, somewhere out in the world ‘Svidrigailov lives’ is spray-painted onto subway walls.

 

Works Cited

Bagno, Vsevolod E. “Europe as Goddaughter (Dostoevsky’s Second Homeland).” Russian

Studies in Philosophy, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 48-56.

The Bible. Authorized King James Version, Oxford UP, 1998.

Bloom, Harold. Raskolnikov and Svidrigailov. Chelsea House, 2004.

Dostoevsky, Fyodor. Crime and Punishment. Trans. Oliver Ready. Penguin Classics, 2015.

Dostoevsky, Fyodor. A Writer’s Diary. Vol. 2: 1877–1881. Trans. Kenneth Lantz. Northwestern

University Press, 2000.

Faro, Giorgio. “A criminal’s confession: comparing rival ethics in crime and punishment.”

Church, Communication and Culture, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 272-283.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. Penguin Random House,

1974.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Trans R. J. Hollingdale. Penguin Classics, 1961.

Rorschach’s Hypocrisy: The Moral Ambiguity of Watchmen’s Black and White Antihero

Photo via Unsplash

by Ingrid Sit 

 

From the saturated pages of Watchmen emerges Alan Moore and Dave Gibbons’ antihero protagonist Rorschach, a stark representation of black and white against the vivid colouring of Watchmen’s setting and other characters. As the only character that does not adorn any bright colours, Rorschach appears to become Watchmen’s moral centre—the black and white amidst the chaotic colouring of his environment. For Rorschach, the monochrome inkblot mask he dons serves as the physical embodiment of the set of impossibly rigid moral ideals that he places before his own identity. As a character, his championing of a clear sense of morality and a refusal to compromise added to the advantage of the story being told in his perspective earns Rorschach the reader’s favour as a clear-cut hero at first glance. However, upon examining his character without the inclinations one naturally develops for a story’s protagonist, it becomes evident that Rorschach’s unwavering moral code is underlain by the outright hypocrisy of his actions. Rorschach’s sense of morality is in fact, not so black and white and his actions venture into what many might consider morally questionable. The hypocrisy of Rorschach’s character is not difficult to uncover, yet upon its discovery, the reader still feels an inclination towards him and his motivations, because his inherent hypocrisy may very well be Rorschach’s greatest source of appeal as a compelling character. After all, a character that blatantly advocates strict morals but betrays those morals more than they realise is perhaps more relatable to the average person than one would care to admit.

Rorschach’s insistence on projecting his black and white sense of morality upon the world reflects on a need to categorise the world in an effort to simplify humanity. When discussing the concept of black and white morality itself, Swiss psychologist Philippe Rochat raises the example of Adolf Hitler being a vegetarian, a piece of information that finds many by surprise:

The majority reaction regarding Hitler’s vegetarianism captures something essential about our morals. It reveals that for the majority of us there is an inclination toward overly simplistic and categorical ways of judging the morals of others, typically in black and white, either/or, or knee-jerk eliminative terms, leaving little to no room for scepticism and critical thinking . . . Hitler was a vegetarian? A profound oxymoron, a blatant contradiction, a moral absurdity deduced from our majority categorical inclination to think of the world in black and white, good or bad terms with no shades of grey. (p.9)

Rochat dissects how the human need for simplistic explanations lends to a willingness to overlook anything that contradicts established moral assignments that were overly simplistic, to begin with. In actuality, the world is rarely so simple. Humanity is messy and often chaotic, as reflected by the oversaturation of Watchmen’s colouring. To look at the world through a monochromatic lens disregards the chaos of humanity, instead offering every encounter or event the simple assignment of either good or bad. The idea of being able to view morality as black and white accepts that immorality does exist in the world and is just as prevalent in humanity as morality. What it does not accept is that the two may not be all that removed from one another. This mentality reflects on a human need for simple answers, for plain categories that explain everything that is messy. To think of morality as black and white is to refuse the possibility of moral grey.

Across the colour-stained pages of Watchmen, not once is Rorschach’s “face” ever tinted by any trace of colour, representative of his adamant refusal of letting the world taint his sense of morality (Moore, 6.10.9). Upon his entrance, Rorschach is characterised as a no-nonsense vigilante who embodies moral absolutism. From how he views his peers, Rorschach definitively distinguishes between what he deems heroic and what he deems not heroic. He considers fellow masked vigilante the Comedian to be a hero for having “stood up for his country . . . never [letting] anybody retire him”, and “never [cashing] in on his reputation” (Moore, 1.17.6). Whereas Adrian Veidt, who retired from being Ozymandius to become a billionaire businessman, is described in Rorschach’s journal as “pampered and decadent, betraying even his own shallow, liberal affectations” (Moore, 1.19.2). Rorschach applauds the Comedian for remaining anonymous and active while expressing distaste for what he saw as Veidt capitalising on the vigilante cause. When handling the criminals of New York, Rorschach believes in matching the crime to the punishment. Speaking of his treatment of criminals before 1975, Rorschach describes himself to have been “soft”, for “[coddling]” criminals and “[letting] them live”, a treatment he did not think they deserved (Moore, 6.14.3-5). However, in the event of discovering Gerald Grice, a criminal that had abused and fed a young girl to his dogs, Rorschach fully takes on becoming Rorschach—the vigilante with an uncompromising moral code—and proceeds to kill the criminal’s dogs and set his house on fire with him handcuffed to a chair, repaying the violence that Grice had inflicted upon the girl upon himself. This is how Rorschach distinguishes between black and white and determines what consequences correspond to what actions. The comedian is a hero because he “didn’t care if people liked him”, and was “uncompromising”; Adrian Veidt is undeserving of the title of hero because he monetised his vigilante career; Gerald Grice deserved to burn in flames for what he did to a young girl (Moore, 6.15.3). Rorschach relies on his clear-cut morality to make sense of the world he lives in. Regardless of the moral ambiguity around him, he refuses to acknowledge it because doing so would threaten his entire worldview and sense of self.

In the act of wearing a Rorschach blot test upon his face, Rorschach erases his identity as Walter Kovacs and instead allows his rigid sense of morality to become his entire identity. In a case study of the costumes of Watchmen, Barbara Brownie and Danny Graydon suggest that Rorschach’s decision to devoid his “face” of facial features reflects on “his feelings of shame about all things human”(Moore, 6.10.9; Brownie, p.140). Such a decision may even be borne of Rorschach’s need to remove his past as Walter Kovacs from who he has become. Brownie and Graydon argue that “Rorschach’s anonymity seems to protect him from the cruelties that he experienced in his own past” (p.140). To take this point further, I would suggest that Rorschach’s reliance on his moral code compels him to simplify the world. Within his strict boundaries of good versus evil, he leaves no room for the complications of individual experiences. Hence, it is only by removing himself and his past from his persona of Rorschach completely, that he can enforce his moral code to its full extent. Since he depends on his sense of morality for every decision he makes, Rorschach must eliminate anything that could blur the lines he has clearly drawn between what is black and what is white, even if that includes the face of Walter Kovacs.

Despite the literal act of adorning his morals upon his face, the reader will come to find that Rorschach’s morals do not extend much further beyond the appearance of his persona. Regardless of Rorschach’s every effort to strip his persona of human bias and ambiguity, he still falls victim to the very hypocrisy and moral ambiguity he champions against. Even if the black and white on a Rorschach test never mix, its “meaning is projected onto it by its viewer”, thus shifting in shape and interpretation per person. Similarly, the character’s morals tend to vary depending on what situation they are applied to. At the mention of the sexual assault Sally Jupiter (the Silk Spectre) experienced at the hands of Edward Blake (the Comedian), Rorschach declares that he is not concerned with “[speculating] on the moral lapses of men who died in their country’s service” (Moore, 1.21.8). The “service” Rorschach refers to is the Comedian’s vigilantism as well as his participation in the Vietnam War on behalf of the US government, under Richard Nixon (Moore, 1.21.8). Seeing the Comedian’s contributions to the country as patriotic and noble, Rorschach has simply labelled him as morally good and is willing to disregard all other aspects of his character. Were the Comedian a common ruffian that tried to assault someone, Rorschach might treat him with the same violence he delivers to any other criminal, but because his rigid moral code allows no room for grey area, he cannot consider the possibility of the Comedian’s complicated moral standing. A study done at the University of Kansas defined moral hypocrisy as “the human capacity to appear moral—even to oneself—without being so”, finding that “In the masquerade of moral hypocrisy, moral rationalization and moral motivation are allies, not opponents” (Batson et al, p.12). To Rorschach, the Comedian’s classification as heroic denies the possibility of him being morally ambiguous. He relies on his oversimplified judgement of the Comedian to excuse any other behaviour he sees from him. Hence, he disregards all of the Comedian’s faults and rationalises his actions even if they inherently violate Rorschach’s moral code without even realising his hypocrisy. Whether he is able to recognise it or not, Rorschach’s morals may not be as black and white as he would like to think, and his actions come to reveal the deep-rooted hypocrisy of his views.

From Rorschach’s judgement of the Comedian, it is made clear to the reader exactly what he deems to be the qualifications that make someone a hero. But what is a hero? And how do we form our own ideas on what makes someone a hero? A study done for the Journal of Moral Education at the University of Kansas begins by stating that “our beliefs about and identification with heroes reflects on how we perceive ourselves, or at least what we hope to be” (White and O’Brien, p.81). A perhaps, more operational definition would identify a hero as someone courageous, noble, and admired for being so. Yet when asked to describe a hero, many of the mid-teens participating in the study described a hero as someone who “stands up for beliefs, regardless of consequences”, and “has own ideas and is not afraid to stand up for them” (White and O’Brien, p.88). The study found that with increased maturity, the students in their teens no longer find heroism in “glitz and glamour” but in those they deem worthy of emulating, people who “demonstrate moral excellence” (White and O’Brien, p.93). In other words, a hero is meant to be someone that represents a sense of morality that we can look up to.

With that definition in mind, one can turn to the character of Rorschach to determine whether he himself fits into his concept of a hero. From his idolisation of the Comedian emerges Rorschach’s partial adoption of Kantianism.The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy identifies Immanuel Kant’s “Categorical Imperative” as “an objective, rationally necessary and unconditional principle that we must always follow despite any natural desires or inclinations we may have to the contrary” (Johnson and Cureton, p.1). To Rorschach, the Comedian is admirable because he acts as an unsung vigilante that enforces a strict ideal of justice without compromise or public recognition, traits Rorschach sees as indicators of “moral excellence” (White and O’Brien, p.93). As a result, Rorschach tries to emulate the sense of morality he idolises, going as far as trying to impose his sense of morality upon the world. Rorschach fails, however, because as he excuses the Comedian’s less-than-moral actions, he excuses the same for himself. In the same manner he disregards the Comedian’s brutality and acts of sexual assault, Rorschach excuses his acts of extreme violence because he sees himself to be morally correct. Ultimately, Rorschach fails to be a hero because his idea of a hero does not exist, in the same way the world does not exist in black and white. The Comedian, whom Rorschach idolises is not simply good like Rorschach thinks him to be; Rorschach himself, therefore is not the morally upright vigilante he sees himself as either.

To counter Rorschach’s inability to see through his own hypocrisy, Watchmen presents Doctor Manhattan as a moral counterpart. If Rorschach fails as a hero because he does not realise the hypocrisy of his refusal to compromise, Doctor Manhattan presents a doctrine that is the exact opposite—he not only sees the value of compromise but unhypocritically acts on it, which perhaps makes him the true hero of Watchmen. While Rorschach embodies moral ambiguity disguised by moral rigidity, Doctor Manhattan offers the opposite—moral apathy that lends itself to a position in a moral middle ground. The difference between the two stems from their varying sense of connection to the rest of the world. Although Rorschach is socially isolated, he still sees himself as a part of humanity. Doctor Manhattan, on the other hand, feels no connection to the world other than through his relationship with Laurie Juspeczyk. Rorschach is willing to do whatever it takes on his way to achieving justice because he firmly believes in what is right, while Doctor Manhattan struggles to find a reason to care for the fate of the world. Following his self-inflicted exile to Mars, he explains to Laurie that she had been his “only concern with the world”, without which he no longer has any motivation to remain involved in its affairs (Moore, 9.8.8). Ironically, Doctor Manhattan’s disconnect from humanity is exactly what allows him to judge its state without the same degree of bias as the other characters of Watchmen. He embodies a sense of calm moral ambiguity that is able to adapt to the situation at hand, whatever it may be. At the end of Watchmen, Doctor Manhattan kills Rorschach to prevent the exposure of what Adrian Veidt had inflicted upon humanity. While Rorschach insists that one should “never compromise” “even in the face of Armageddon”, Doctor Manhattan calmly determines that a compromise must be made for what is left of humanity (Moore, 12.20.8-9). To preserve the unity that has formed amidst disaster, the truth cannot be revealed.

Doctor Manhattan’s sense of morality that allows for compromise makes him the true moral ideal of Watchmen. One that is arguably as unattainable as Rorschach’s hypocrisy is relatable. While the Doctor’s consistency between his actions and his preachings set an admirable example for the reader, the almost artificial smoothness of his overall character risks distancing the reader, who instead turns to Rorschach despite all his faults. Creator Alan Moore himself has mentioned in an interview that despite his intention of making Rorschach a “bad example”, he encounters readers on the street proclaiming that “[they] [are] Rorschach! That is [their] story” (Moore). Indeed, Rorschach was named the 16th “Greatest Comic Book Character” by Empiremagazine in 2008 and was famously named by American politician Ted Cruz as one of his favourite comic book characters. Realistically, Doctor Manhattan’s sense of morality is hard to find among the average person. In reality, humans tend to set a moral standard that they fail to reach even if they are unable to realise it themself. Yet, this unavoidable hypocrisy does not stop the individual from establishing a moral ideal for themselves. Carol Gilligan’s work on the Concepts of Self and Morality notes that the potential for “enhancement in self-worth” requires “a conception of self that includes the possibility for doing ‘the right thing,’ the ability to see in oneself the potential for being good and therefore worthy of social inclusion” (p.78). Despite Rorschach’s feelings of isolation, he still identifies with the rest of the world, which is why he holds on to his rigid sense of morality even if he cannot live up to it. Compared to Doctor Manhattan’s unrealistic positioning in a moral middle ground, this sentiment is more relatable to the average person than one might realise, which explains why the reader is more drawn to Rorschach’s character, even beyond his positioning as the protagonist of the story.

It is not until he has reached his final moments that Rorschach begins to realise the impossible standard he has set for himself and, by extension, for the rest of the world. After Veidt’s scheme causes the death of millions in New York City, Rorschach alone insists that “evil must be punished” and the “people must be told” the truth (Moore, 12.23.5). Even in a moment of crisis Rorschach latches on to his rigid set of principles in search of simple clarity—inflicting death upon millions is an act of evil no matter the intentions.  Yet, in the face of an impossible situation, even Rorschach himself begins to see that the situation at hand cannot be reduced to the simple classification of black or white. When Doctor Manhattan tries to stop him from announcing the truth, Rorschach removes his “face”, thus removing the physical representation of his moral code, and tells Doctor Manhattan to kill him, which he does (Moore, 6.10.9, 12. 24.1-4). The moment Rorschach realises his sense of morality may not have a place in humanity is also the moment in which he decides he can no longer bear to live. The black and white sense of morality Rorschach has placed before his identity is no longer enough to ground him amidst the chaos of the world. He strips off his inkblot mask, accepting the futility of his moral code, and lets his life end. Ironically, the crisis Rorschach witnesses is not much different from a situation he once wrote of. In a piece of writing from his childhood, a young Rorschach (Walter Kovaks) praises Harry Truman’s use of the atomic bomb:

I like President Truman, the way Dad would of [sic] wanted me to. He dropped the atomic bomb on Japan and saved millions of lives because if he hadn’t of [sic], then there would of [sic] been a lot more war than there was and more people would of [sic] been killed. I think it was a good thing to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. (Moore, 6.31)

Veidt’s plan of introducing an alien threat to unite the world follows the belief that by sacrificing the lives of millions, the rest of the world will be saved, a sentiment that echoes Rorschach’s views as a youth on the bombing of Japan. In theory, Rorschach would be willing to go along with the scheme for the sake of the rest of humanity. Yet, when he is personally involved, Rorschach struggles to find the clear-cut sense of right and wrong that he relies on, struggling to enforce the same moral code he champions. Even if concealing the truth would preserve the peace borne out of disaster, Rorschach refuses to carry the weight of protecting a lie that involved the death of millions. In his failure to abide by his black and white sense of morality, Rorschach is forced to face his hypocrisy. Upon realising the hypocritical nature and impossibility of his moral code, Rorschach’s entire identity crumbles, and whatever remains of Walter Kovaks cannot bear to live either.

By positioning Rorschach as the protagonist at the centre of Watchmen, Alan Moore seems to set him up to be the story’s moral compass. In actuality, the same attributes that have earned Rorschach a following among readers—his unwavering set of morals and unwillingness to compromise—only renders him a hypocrite. Rorschach constantly breaks the moral code he expects others to abide by, and upon the realisation of the impracticality of his principles, Rorschach, unable to face the reality of his own morality, chooses death. Rorschach spent his career upholding an impossible ideal, to the extent of making his moral code the sole foundation of his identity. His overreliance on his moral code is why Rorschach could not exist without the insistent belief that everything was black and white.  Rorschach’s determination to categorise everything in plain terms ultimately fails him becausehumans are complex beings that cannot and should not be explained away by a mere designation of good or bad. Despite being a failed advocate for the violent enforcement of moral uprightness, the underlying humanity of Rorschach’s character earns him the reader’s inclination regardless. Rorschach, in spite of all his glaring faults, is able to strike a chord with the reader as his hypocrisy is innately human and serves as the reason behind his relatability; because ultimately, everyone is a hypocrite, whether they are willing to face it or not.

 

Works Cited

Barden, Jamie, et al. “‘Saying One Thing and Doing Another’: Examining the Impact of Event Order on Hypocrisy Judgments of Others.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, vol. 31, no. 11, 2005, pp. 1463–1474., doi:10.1177/0146167205276430.

Batson, C. Daniel, et al. “Moral Hypocrisy: Appearing Moral to Oneself Without Being So.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 77, no. 3, 1999, pp. 525–537., doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.3.525.

“Case Studies: Watchmen.” Superhero Costume: Identity and Disguise in Fact and Fiction, by Barbara Brownie and Danny Graydon, Bloomsbury, 2016, pp. 139–144.

“Concepts of Self and Morality.” In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, by Carol Gilligan, Harvard University Press Cambridge, 1982, pp. 64–105.

Hill, Patrick L., and Daniel K. Lapsley. “The Ups and Downs of the Moral Personality: Why It’s Not So Black and White.” Journal of Research in Personality, vol. 43, no. 3, 2009, pp. 520–523., doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2009.01.014.

Hubbard, Katherine, and Peter Hegarty. “Rorschach Tests and Rorschach Vigilantes: Queering the History of Psychology in Watchmen.” History of the Human Sciences, vol. 30, no. 4, 2017,

  1. 75–99., doi:10.1177/0952695117722719.

Johnson, Robert, and Adam Cureton. “Kant’s Moral Philosophy.” Edited by Edward N. Zalta, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 7 July 2016, plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/.

Kreider, S. Evan. “Who Watches the Watchmen?” Homer Simpson Ponders Politics: Popular Culture as Political Theory, by Joseph J. Foy et al., University Press of Kentucky, 2013, pp. 97–111.

Levy, Neil. Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press, 2011.

Moore, Alan, and Dave Gibbons. Watchmen. DC Comics, 2014.

Pindling, LeJorne, and Alan Moore. “Interview with Alan Moore.” Street Law Productions, 2008.

Rochat, Philippe. Moral Acrobatics: How We Avoid Ethical Ambiguity by Thinking in Black and White. Oxford University Press, 2021.

Sherman, Gary D., and Gerald L. Clore. “The Color of Sin: White and Black Are Perceptual Symbols of Moral Purity and Pollution.” Psychological Science, vol. 20, no. 8, 2009, pp. 1019–1025., doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02403.x.

“The 50 Greatest Comic Book Characters – #16 Rorschach.” Empire Magazine, July 2008.

White, Steven H., and Joseph E. O’Brien. “What Is a Hero? An Exploratory Study of Students’ Conceptions of Heroes.” Journal of Moral Education, vol. 28, no. 1, 1999, pp. 81–95., doi:10.1080/030572499103322.

Zarkadi, Theodora, and Simone Schnall. “‘Black and White’ Thinking: Visual Contrast Polarizes Moral Judgment.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 49, no. 3, 8 Dec. 2012, pp. 355–359., doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2012.11.012.

Herman Melville’s Typee and Margaret Cavendish’s The Blazing-World: A Comparison

Photo via Wikimedia Commons

by Emma Britton

 

There are many similarities between Herman Melville’s 1846 novel Typee and Margaret Cavendish’s 1666 novel The Blazing-World. Both texts focus on an outsider who is given an intimate view of a society fundamentally different from their own. In Typee, a sailor named Tommo spends four months with the Typee, an Indigenous tribe on the South Pacific island of Nukuheva. Melville, through the character of Tommo, expresses his views on the European occupation and “civilization” of the Marquesas islands. In The Blazing-World, an unnamed woman becomes the Emperess of the Blazing-World, a peaceful society filled with different kinds of talking animal-men. The Emperess is a reflection of Cavendish’s views toward British colonialism and imperial power. Tommo questions the accepted European view of the Typee people, eventually coming to respect them, but the Emperess does the opposite. She forces her beliefs and lifestyle on the inhabitants of the Blazing-World, eventually using them in a military effort to prove the naval superiority of her home country, a thinly-veiled allusion to England. Melville and Cavendish both tell stories of colonialism, with Cavendish advocating for European superiority and power, and Melville warning about the dangers of the very same thing.

At the beginning of Typee, Tommo’s view of the Indigenous islanders is influenced by rumours he has heard during his time at sea, and he believes them to be dangerous cannibals. The consensus among the European expansionists that occupy the island is that the Happar tribe is morally good and the Typee tribe is morally evil, but this belief appears to be based on rumour, not evidence. Upon his arrival to Nukuheva, Tommo contrasts the “the lovely valley of Happar” with “the valley of the dreaded Typees”, even though he has not personally met people from either tribe or visited either valley (Melville, pg. 24). Tommo feels hatred for the Typees, even saying “they who we denominate ‘savages’ are made to deserve the title” (Melville, pg. 26). Melville employs Tommo’s fear and hatred to demonstrate the extreme prejudice and cruelty of the white European and American expansionists toward Indigenous people. In the nineteenth century, this hateful prejudice was disturbingly common and universally accepted as the truth, something Melville is clearly aware of. He uses this prejudice, in Tommo and likely in the nineteenth-century reader, as a foundation to build on throughout the rest of the novel. European biases toward the islanders are consistently disproven as the story progresses, and Tommo is thus given a chance to grow and learn from his initial prejudice.

The Typee people show generosity and kindness to Tommo, which causes him to question his prejudices toward them. They provide Tommo and his companion Toby with food, water, and shelter, not asking or expecting anything in return (Melville, pg. 72-74). Tommo is hesitant at first, but soon grows comfortable in the valley, while Toby remains skeptical. After a few days on the island, the two men are fed meat, which Toby exclaims must be “baked baby”, refusing to eat it (Melville, pg. 94). Tommo is much more trusting of the Typees at this point and ventures to try the meat, discovering that it is roasted pig (Melville, pg. 95). Melville here illustrates this fundamental difference between Toby and Tommo. In contrast to Toby, who here represents stubborn colonial prejudice, Tommo doubts his preconceptions and displays a capacity for growth, learning, and compassion. Tommo’s willingness to learn means that Melville can use him as a blank slate, a canvas on which Melville can paint his own political ideas.

Melville’s criticism of colonialism and European expansion becomes clear as Tommo spends more time in the Typee valley. Tommo initially refers to the islanders as “cruel savages”, but after some time with them decides that “the Polynesian savage… enjoy[s] an infinitely happier existence” than the typical European man (Melville, pg. 51, 124). This causes Tommo to contemplate the dangers of “civilization” (meaning European civilization) and its impacts on the “now diseased, starving, and dying natives” (Melville, pg. 124). He even comes to question the use of the term “savage”, saying it is “often misapplied” and that Europeans display an equal or greater amount of “savagery” in their own behavior (Melville, pg. 125). This commentary is instrumental in understanding Melville’s progressive view on the dangers of colonialism. Tommo’s experience with the Typees exposes him to a peaceful way of life he is unaccustomed to, and he feels enlightened in the realization that the Indigenous way of life is not inferior to his own, but in fact equal, if not superior in many ways. Melville’s commentary on the treatment of the Indigenous people by colonial settlers evokes empathy and compassion in the reader, and he urges us to overcome our biases alongside Tommo. Melville’s progressive analysis, though a widely-established and accepted view in 2021, was likely largely influential on nineteenth century readers. The idea that white people could learn from Indigenous ways of life was extremely uncommon at the time, and the cultural and religious assimilation of Indigenous people into Christian European society was a major goal of colonialism. Melville forces the reader to question these norms by humanizing the Indigenous islanders and in turn demonizing the colonial settlers, turning typical stereotypes on their heads.

Margaret Cavendish voices an opposite opinion, advocating for colonialism in The Blazing-World. At the beginning of the novel, The Emperess fears the many different species of animal-men, but her fear quickly dissipates. When she first meets the bear-men, she is “extremely strucken with fear” and believes that “her life will be a sacrifice to their cruelty” (Cavendish, pg. 9). This description is nearly identical to Tommo’s reaction upon meeting the Typees. Unlike Tommo, however, the Emperess does not come to question her prejudice. Her fear dissipates for a completely different reason: she is given power. Astounded by her beauty and believing her to be a superior being, the Emperor of the Blazing-World gives her “absolute power to rule and govern all the world” (Cavendish, pg. 15). Upon an initial reading, this appears to be a declaration of love and a display of generosity and kindness on behalf of the Emperor. A deeper reading, however, reveals the disturbingly racist connotations of this scene.

The Emperor’s treatment of the Emperess is a clear metaphor for the way the Indigenous peoples of North America welcomed the European expansionists in the early seventeenth century. The Emperess refers to her subjects as bear- men, ape-men, fish-men, and other such animal-man hybrids. She also refers to them as “monsters” (Cavendish pg. 44). This terminology is reminiscent of that which colonial expansionists would use to refer to Indigenous people, and likely stems from Indigenous spiritual ideas about animals and nature. The animal-men’s happiness to have her in charge is a hollow depiction of historical Indigenous kindness and the ways that Europeans took advantage of it. European colonizers committed genocide against the Indigenous peoples in North America in order to seize absolute power over the land, yet according to the original British history, the land and resources were happily gifted (Canadian Encyclopedia). It is now understood that this was a blatant attempt to rewrite history. This context reveals the weight of the Emperess’s so-called “gift” of absolute power over the Blazing-World (Cavendish pg. 15). When we read The Blazing World as a metaphor for colonialism, we must question if the Emperess is truly given her power as freely and openly as it appears. The connotations of this metaphor implicate Cavendish’s overt prejudice toward Indigenous peoples.

The changes made to the Blazing-World by the Emperess echo some of the changes Europeans were making to Indigenous societies in America: cultural and religious assimilation and the annihilation of personal rights. The Emperess “convert[s] the Blazing-World to her own religion”, building churches and “preaching sermons” to the animal-men (Cavendish, pg. 50-51). She determines the jobs of all the inhabitants of the Blazing-World, and threatens punishment when tasks are not performed exactly to her liking. For example, she criticizes the bear-men heavily for their love of telescopes, even though the use of telescopes is a large part of their job as experimental philosophers (Cavendish, pg. 27-28). The Emperess also militarizes the fish-men, using them to serve her imperial agenda (Cavendish pg. 102). The novel ends on a dangerous advocation for British superiority, as the Emperess’ description of the “naval force and power” of her home country is a clear allusion to Cavendish’s home of Britain (Cavendish, pg. 103). The animal-men, who have been manipulated to serve the Emperess’ imperial interests, are used to gain power. Cavendish does not consider the ethics of these actions, nor does she prompt her reader to consider them, instead praising the Emperess and depicting her as the undeniable hero of the story. After winning the initial naval battle, the Emperess decides she will not “return into the Blazing-World until she ha[s] forced all the rest of the world to submit to that same nation” (Cavendish, pg. 104). The Emperess exploits and manipulates the Indigenous citizens of the Blazing-World for power and superiority in an abhorrent display of British colonialism, an action Cavendish presents as indisputably moral and brave.

Just as the animal-men welcome the Emperess in The Blazing-World, the Typees show nothing but kindness and generosity toward Tommo in Typee. Tommo embraces Typee culture in many ways, learning more of the language and dressing up in traditional clothing for the “Feast of the Calabashes,” a Typee festival (Melville, pg. 161-162). Tommo has developed respect for the Typee culture at this point, but his admiration has its limits. He repeatedly criticizes the tattoos that cover the Typee people, especially the ones that decorate their faces. At the beginning of the novel, Tommo’s ship’s captain describes the Indigenous tattoos as “damaging [a face] for life,” which demonstrates the general European attitude toward the practice (Melville, pg. 34). After spending several months with the Typees, they request that Tommo undergo this process of tattooing, as it is important to their culture (Melville, pg. 218). Tommo is “horrified… at the thought of being rendered hideous for life,” and it becomes clear to the reader that even after all the Typees have done for him, Tommo is still repulsed at the idea of a permanent connection to their culture (Melville, pg. 219). Melville intends this response to disappoint the reader, because it had appeared that Tommo had overcome this prejudice, when in reality, all it takes is slight discomfort to reignite his feelings of disgust toward the Indigenous culture. This development causes a shift in the peaceful tone of the novel and leads to its bitter conclusion.

 

Melville uses Tommo’s rejection of Typee culture to force discomfort upon the reader as the novel ends. Though the threat of cannibalism is dormant for the greater part of the novel, Tommo eventually discovers a pouch containing three shrunken human heads, confirming the cannibalistic practices he had initially suspected of the Typees (Melville, pg. 232). He is repulsed and reverts back to his prejudicial view of the islanders, forgetting all they have done for him. Although he had previously questioned if cannibalism was truly more “savage” than the Europeans’ treatment of their enemies, his reaction to the discovery of the heads is one of disgust, horror, and hypocrisy (Melville, pg. 125, 233). We are reminded of Tommo’s initial prejudice toward the Typees as Melville throws it back in our face, distorting the islanders into dangerous and violent cannibals. Tommo plots his escape, eventually leaving the Typee valley, and the last image we have of the gentle Typees is a haunting one: they swim after Tommo, knives between their teeth, “ferocious expressions” on their faces (Melville, pg. 252).

This depiction of the Typees as evil, animalistic, and dangerous is antithetical to Melville’s discussion of Indigenous people throughout the rest of the text and reminds the reader of the terrifying reputation the islanders carry among European sailors. The discomfort and disappointment of the novel’s conclusion illustrates the evolution of our perception of the Typees because Melville presents them in a way that has continually been disproven. He thus warns the reader of the dangers of prejudice and hatred, because without Tommo’s prejudice and hatred toward the Typees, he would never have needed to fear them. It was Tommo’s prejudice that pushed the Typees to act in a violent way (and even as such, they never did commit any acts of violence against him). This misrepresentation of fundamentally peaceful and kind people is what Melville leaves us with, and one can only assume that he hoped our disappointment in Tommo could extend to colonialism as a whole.

In recent weeks, the bodies of over one thousand Indigenous children have been found in residential school sites across Canada (BBC News). These schools, funded by the Roman Catholic Church during the 19thand 20thcenturies, were intended to “assimilate indigenous youth” into European culture (BBC News). Typee, written during the creation of the first residential schools in the mid-nineteenth century, feels move relevant than ever before. The hatred and prejudice exhibited by Tommo and the other European sailors is not hyperbolic or metaphorical, it was real in 1846 and it remails real in 2021. While Melville’s novel provides a relevant historical lens through which to view the European mistreatment of Indigenous peoples, it is far from a comprehensive guide to Indigenous cultural relations. If we want to truly understand the issues Melville introduces in Typee, it is imperative that we read Indigenous texts and listen to Indigenous voices, and analyze them as diligently as we do books from 200 years ago.

Melville employs the last chapter of Typeeas a microcosm for the dangers of colonialism and the mistreatment of Indigenous people. This is in harsh contrast to Cavendish’s message in the final pages of The Blazing-World. Although the two stories have many similarities, it is clear that the authors’ understandings of prejudice and colonialism are vastly different. Cavendish advocates for a system that benefits her, the same system Melville questions and criticizes. Typeeaddresses the horrifying repercussions of colonialism and criticizes the European and American treatment of Indigenous peoples, a much-needed opinion at a time of cultural assimilation and genocide. In 1846, Melville’s lens provided a guide for the deconstruction of the pro-colonial narrative presented in many popular texts at the time, including The Blazing-World.Typeeis a relevant historical tool which can and should be used as a foundation for correcting and reforming our treatment of Indigenous peoples—in 1846, 2021, and for all the years to come.

 

 

Works Cited

 

BBC News.“Canada: 751 Unmarked Graves Found at Residential School.” BBC News, 24

June 2021, www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-57592243.

Burgess, Miranda. “Margaret Lucas Cavendish, The Blazing World.” Canvas. 23 Nov. 2020.

Canadian Encyclopedia. “Genocide and Indigenous Peoples in Canada.” The Canadian

Encyclopedia, www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/genocide-and-indigenous-

peoples-in-canada.

Cavendish, Margaret. The Description of a New World, Called the Blazing World. Figgy Tree

Publishers, 1666, reprinted 2016.

Marshall, Toph. “Melville Lecture.” Canvas. 22 Feb. 2021.

Melville, Herman. Typee: A Peep at Polynesian Life. Penguin, 2001.

 

Outlawed but Not Alone: Friendships Out of Bounds in Grettir’s Saga

Photo via Wikimedia Commons

by Sophie Pavey

 

Icelandic Sagas all have in common the ubiquitous presence of friendships – among strangers, families, rulers, and members of a community. Two major currents of thought have aimed to explain the presence and function of these networks in Icelandic Sagas: friendship as a product of socially accepted morality, and friendship that exists to uphold Iceland’s legal and social infrastructure. I will be building on this work by examining friendships in Grettir’s Saga which do not fit into the prevalent theoretical frameworks. This essay will be interested in how Grettir’s friendships function when they are removed from their moral and societal contexts. I will first explore scholarship on the moral and socio-contextual grounds for friendship. Next, I will argue that Grettir’s status as an outlaw simultaneously relegates him from society and points to a lack of morality in accordance with eleventh century Icelandic society. I will explore three of Grettir’s friendships and what they accomplish for the outlaw. I will begin with the friendship between Grettir and his brother Illugi, arguing that their friendship demonstrates the distance between Grettir’s ideas about heroism and the Icelandic state’s; Grettir’s closeness to Illugi near the end of the text might point to a reconciliation with his community and its values. I will then investigate Grettir’s friendship with the Norwegian Thorfinn –– stemming from exchange and debt –– which allows Grettir to cultivate the heroic status he is unable to obtain in Iceland. Finally, I will argue that Grettir’s friendship with Hallmund, born of mutual kinship and respect, addresses the fundamental problem of solitude and isolation the outlaw faces. Grettir’s friendships invite readers to consider what elements of society are vital, and how one adapts when one is banished from a community.

Explaining friendship as a moral action is a common trend in Icelandic Saga analysis. The romantic perspective has been the prominent view, being one of the longest standing currents of thought.  It continues to be a common theoretical framework (Árnason, 157-158). The romantic perspective accepts the driving force of actions in sagas as morality, and analyzes morality in terms of personal qualities and attitudes; these qualities are governed by honour and the heroic character (Árnason,159). The actions of the hero are not necessarily good or bad, but they do align with a code of actions which stems from honour and is accepted by society. Action in sagas is driven primarily by the desire to embody these noble traits, and feuds often start when someone’s accrued honour is challenged. Subjective beliefs govern actions, and individuals who act poorly must have undesirable morals, or at least a morality that does not align with what their societal context demands. For the romantics, Icelandic saga friendships are a product of a certain type of heroic morality and noble character traits.

More recently, scholars have considered the social setting of Icelandic Sagas as a contributor to friendships, which also form the fabric of the social order of the Icelandic Free state. Vilhjálmur Árnason considers the view that actions of the saga characters can be explained in terms of the cultural norms and sociomoral principles that were operating in the Icelandic Free State at the time (Árnason, 165). Duties, virtues, and moral principles are underscored by the social context of medieval Iceland (Árnason, 165). To illustrate his point, Árnason references Hegel’s principle of Sittlichkeit. Sittlichkeit is the “objective ethical order that is the structure of rules, obligations, and normative principles which people internalize by living in a particular ethical community” (Árnason, 163). In traditional societies –– such as the one presented in Gretir’s Saga –– Sittlichkeit is strong (Árnason, 163). Árnason maintains that while individual qualities are still important, they are shaped predominantly by social practice and circumstance, rather than a personal ethic. Jesse Byock also argues that friendship creates legal and social order in Iceland. What Byock calls a “system of advocacy” is the process by which friendships act as a socially stabilizing process (Byock 193). Free State Iceland lacked an executive arm of government, and for the first 300 years of its existence, Iceland was self-regulatory (Gíslason, 14). Parties themselves administered and enforced claims, which required people to press or defend cases or act as moderators acting in the best interest of the community (Árnason, 166). For Byock, friendships placed disputes into socially accepted channels and prevented them from escalating to the point of rupturing the social fabric(Gíslason, 15). Byock, Árnason, and other academics sharing this socio-contextual perspective find friendships to be both an element of society in place of structured government and consequently a product of social setting.

While morality and social context explain friendship’s existence within Icelandic society, Grettir’s status as an outlaw removes him from both situations where friendship exists by default: as an outlaw he is considered amoral and is banished from society. The discord between Grettir’s ethical code and that accepted by agrarian Free State Iceland contributes to his outlawry; his ethical code and actions don’t align with his social context. Grettir’s actions are inconsistent and change based on the situation –– sometimes he is overbearing and arrogant, other times kind and helpful (Hume, 469). Grettir has an “unusual, aristocratic set of values” (Hume, 471), which are highly influenced by setting. In contexts where heroism is needed, Grettir acts accordingly. When his brother Atli is killed, Grettir is able to heroically demand vengeance (Hume, 474): “Now recompense comes to me / for the theft of my brother’s life / a deed unrevenged since Atli / sank in death on his fair lands” (Grettir’s Saga, 132). The only heroic thing to do is avenge his brother, and Grettir is determined to do so. His heroism is validated by his mother Asdis, who is pleased and declares him to be descended from the men of Vatnsdal (Grettir’s Saga, 132). Unfortunately for the aspiring hero, situations where heroism is needed are rare in peaceful Iceland, and though Grettir can avenge his brother, little other heroism is called for. When trying to work on his family’s farm, Grettir remarks that the work is “a weakling’s job” (Grettir’s Saga, 35). As a result of his prejudice towards agrarian labour, Grettir is generally unable to work on the farm. Icelandic society has moved on from needing a hero that works on Grettir’s terms, and he is unable to live peacefully in his community (Hume, 472). Grettir’s morality leads him to outlawry. He loses out on friendships because his morality, which outlaws him, is incompatible with that of the members of the Icelandic Free State.

Outlawry was the severest form of punishment that could be inflicted on someone during Iceland’s Free State period –– the individual was placed outside of the bounds of society (Barraclough, 366). Because the social sphere in Free State Iceland was synonymous with the law (Barraclough, 366), Grettir’s banishment by law resulted in his expulsion from society. The outlaw Grettir, no longer a member of society, is cut off from the particular friendships that form his community and enable it to function efficiently. Networks of friendships common in Icelandic sagas create obligations of support and alliance (Gaskins, 202). Friendship is presented as vital and networks in sagas are more resilient than individuals acting alone (Gaskins, 210). When individuals like Grettir disturb the social equilibrium they “meet with constraints signalled variously by determined adversaries, by customs embodied in law or public opinion” (Gaskins, 205). In Grettir’s case, these obstacles take the form of Thorir and his kinsmen, who “rode with a large following to the Althing… there was no chance for Grettir’s acquittal ( Grettir’s Saga 122-123). Thorir has many friendships which he uses in the Althing to push forward Grettir’s outlawry. In Grettir’s Saga, Thorir’s large network determines the outcome of the case and demonstrates what society believes to be best at that time. Friendships and networks dictate the decisions of the legal system which is designed to be a reflection of society’s needs in relation to a crime. The society which Grettir has disturbed reacts by ejecting him. When he is removed from society, Grettir also loses his network of trust, a key force driving friendship and social networks in Iceland (Gaskins, 212). While trusting oneself is reliable, being able to trust others is an added advantage that proves much more useful: “No man can trust / in his own unaided / strength” (Grettir’s Saga, 168). Though Grettir has great mental and physical strength, these traits have limited range and can only be supplemented by a network of friendships. These networks create reliable alliances of support. Grettir is robbed of these connections when living on the Arnarvatn Heath because “outlaws are untrustworthy” and several outlaws are sent to dispatch him ( Grettir’s Saga 148-149). By being outlawed, Grettir is cut off from friendships based both on morality and social obligation.

Grettir’s friendship with his brother Illugi serves as a way to show how far removed from society Grettir is, and how much his personal understanding of heroism differs from that of his community. The two brothers sit opposite each other, Illugi representing the ideal for eleventh century Iceland, and Grettir the pariah. Though Grettir is the hero of the saga, he is not heroic by eleventh century Iceland’s standards; valour is granted to his younger brother Illugi who embodies many heroic tropes found in Icelandic Sagas. This friendship highlights the stark contrast between both men; displaying how much Illugi acts within the bounds of morality and social context demonstrates just how much Grettir does not. Illugi embodies the heroic character, leading a life of honour and fulfilling his tragic duty to die rather than give up his honour. He wishes to die honourably, stating: “There is no chance that I would seek to spare my life by becoming a coward like you” (Grettir’s Saga, 215). Illugi would rather preserve his honour in death than live an honourless life –– a sentiment praised by those around him (Grettir’s Saga, 215). Illugi’s heroism is considered more appropriate than Grettir’s; he conducts himself heroically when it is socially acceptable, and in Grettir’s Saga this is when he must exact revenge or die trying. The act of vengeance was strongly sanctioned in the Icelandic Free State, and anyone who did not fulfil this obligation was seen as useless (Árnason, 172). Kinship obligations for revenge and inheritance were reckoned out to the fifth degree (Byock, 164). For the Icelandic Free State Illugi is a perfect hero –– he lives a peaceful agrarian life, and in the acceptable channels takes his heroic revenge. Illugi dies for his honour, and his character is granted the heroic motif of laughter at death (Hume, 481): “When Illugi realized that they intended to kill him he laughed” (Grettir’s Saga, 215). Although Grettir is the hero of the saga itself, he is not the hero of the Icelanders; his friendship with his brother highlights the difference between the story’s hero and the community’s hero.

The contrast between Illugi’s heroic character and Grettir’s outlawed one makes the pair’s friendship unlikely. Yet the brothers are friends, and Illugi loyally goes with Grettir to Drangey: “I will go with you, brother… and not desert you” ( Grettir’s Saga, 184). Though Illugi is only fifteen, he heroically gives his life to Grettir’s cause. The brothers’ cooperation coincides with the end of Grettir’s story and with the potential for him to return to society. While Grettir is on Drangey his case is reevaluated, and the Althing determines that he had been an outlaw only eighteen years and “Grettir would be pardoned the following summer” (Grettir’s Saga, 201). With one year left in his sentence, Grettir seems to be approaching a return to the Icelandic community. For scholar Lotte Motz, “Grettir’s struggles are part of a pattern of initiation in which the goal for a successful hero is to return and to be welcomed by society, hopefully with new status” (Motz, 93). By the end of the tale Grettir is exhausted, has no fight left in him (Grettir’s Saga, 214) and wishes to return to society, which he may do in a year. Grettir and Illugi’s friendship illustrates the potential reconciliation Grettir could have with society. The closeness of the brothers –– with such opposing ideas on heroism –– signals Grettir’s inclination to give up his heroic ideals and be potentially “welcomed back by society.” By demonstrating this need for reconciliation, Illugi and Grettir’s friendship speaks to the harshness of being an outlaw; much of Grettir’s success as an outlaw is based on his ability to merely survive outside (Hawes, 31) and by the end Grettir approaches the idea of giving up his personal honour (quite un-heroically) to be let back into Icelandic society. Grettir’s shift away from his perceived heroism together with his connection to the heroic Illugi illustrate the sacrifices Grettir will need to make in order to return home.

While Illugi is the hero for Icelanders, Grettir forges a friendship in Norway which allows him to act as a temporary hero in the saga. Because Grettir’s outlawry prevents him from being a hero in Iceland, he must go elsewhere for his heroism to be accepted. Grettir’s Iceland greatly limits him; the social patterns have shrunk to a narrow range of permitted behaviour and tasks were so “trivial, if necessary” that the hero like Grettir had no place within them (Hume, 477). As an outlaw Grettir fails to become a hero, and instead becomes an outsider. Grettir’s friendship with Thorfinn in northern Norway exemplifies Grettir’s heroism when removed from his home. Though typically the home of enemies in Icelandic sagas (DeAngelo, 265-266), northern Norway provides Grettir with the context he requires to become a hero. In Icelandic society there are “given rules which assign men their place in order and with it their identity also prescribes what they owe and what is owed to them and how they are to be treated and regarded” (MacIntyre, 116). In Iceland, Grettir’s heroic code outlaws him and he is owed little by society. Yet in Norway Grettir garners high status for saving Thorfinn’s estate from berserkers. By defending the hall, Grettir is a hero and preserves the honour of the family: “We would never have rid ourselves of the shame, if your guest had not helped us” ( Grettir’s Saga, 63). As a result of his actions, Grettir is owed a great deal and is afforded a hero’s friendship: “They parted in great friendship, and Thorfinn asked Grettir to stay with him if he ever returned to Norway” ( Grettir’s Saga 75). Thorfinn’s means of repaying Grettir involves lasting friendship –– the men do not trade in material goods, but rather in loyalties. Thorfinn swears enduring loyalty to Grettir: “I wish that you will find yourself in need of help … I will never be able to repay you for this deed of generosity if you do not find need for me” (Grettir’s Saga, 63). Grettir’s friendship with Thorfinn cements Grettir as a hero in Norway, and one who must be repaid in a way typical of heroes.

Grettir enjoys a friendship based on exchange with Thorfinn in Norway but one based on kinship with Hallmund in Iceland. Grettir and Hallmund’s friendship functions outside of both society and morality because neither man is part of society and morally there is no reason for the men to be friends –– neither will gain honour from the other. The kindness that the two express towards each other has no inherent value insofar as gaining honour. Grettir and Hallmund’s friendship speaks to the aloneness of being an outlaw. While outlaws were meant to be excluded from society and “shunned from every world except hell,” practically speaking outlaws were still human beings (Barraclough, 366). While Grettir isn’t meant to be a part of society, he also can’t fit into the chaotic wilderness (Barraclough, 368). Grettir’s friendship with Hallmund addresses the issue that “[he] has to be somewhere” and can’t avoid all worlds while he is alive (Grettir’s Saga, 142). Grettir’s alienation from society might be caused by his different ethical code, and that he is unlike any other characters: “None of the young men were thought his equal” ( Grettir’s Saga 81). Because none are thought Grettir’s equal he is further isolated. In Hallmund, Grettir senses a kindred spirit. Hallmund is Grettir’s equal if not his superior: “It is said that Grettir killed six men in the fight, and Hallmund twelve” ( Grettir’s Saga 154). The two are vicious fighters, and the saga illustrates them as having a similar spirit. Grettir is no longer alone, and this friendship of mutual respect and similarity resolves some of his feelings of isolation: “Hallmund said ‘it is my wish that you come home with me, because you must find it lonely here on the heath.’ Grettir said he would gladly do that” ( Grettir’s Saga 153). Hallmund shows an appreciation for the struggle Grettir must face as an outlaw, and the kinship the two men share creates a lasting friendship of trust.

Grettir and Hallmund’s friendship works in Grettir’s Saga to exemplify the importance of the dark. Darkness is explored throughout the saga as Grettir is plagued by a fear of being alone in the dark. Scholar Katherine Hume has analyzed Grettir’s heroism and the dark, discussing that what Grettir wants is a world “in which human society is a small stronghold surrounded by darkness and chaos, and he, the hero, can venture beyond the pale to grapple with the forces of darkness, and be welcomed back as a savior” (Hawes, 21). Grettir wants to be a hero, yet the dark stands in his way. When Grettir goes out to fight Glam –– a typical enemy for saga heroes –– he expects to conquer the monster who lives in the dark. Instead, Grettir finds himself cursed: “You will be made an outlaw, forced always to live in the wilds and to live alone. And further, I lay this curse upon you: these eyes will always be within your sight, and you will find it difficult to be alone” (Grettir’s Saga, 102). Rather than returning to society as a hero who conquers the dark, Grettir is resigned to fear and inhabit it; he cannot grapple with the forces of darkness. The challenges of isolation by outlawry are heightened by Grettir’s fear of the dark: “He had become a man so scared of the dark that he did not dare travel alone after darkness fell” (Grettir’s Saga, 103). In the dark, Grettir can’t reach anyone, and he can’t see dangers coming. He can’t be the hero conquering the dark. Yet Grettir’s friendship with Hallmund takes on a heroic character when Hallmund brings Grettir away from the dark into a cave with a “fire [that] burned brightly” (Grettir’s Saga, 166). The heroic nature of their friendship implies “reliability in times of need, a test of a friend’s character, but it is the situation which decides the nature of the test” (Árnason, 169). Hallmund is reliable in Grettir’s times of need during a fight and when he is trapped in the dark. The two men fight together: “It is said that Grettir killed six men in the fight, and Hallmund twelve” (Grettir’s Saga 154). Without Hallmund’s help Grettir might not have survived the ambush. Grettir’s test occurs when Hallmund is killed by Grim. As he dies, Hallmund states: “I believe Grettir would seek to avenge me, if he were able to come” (Grettir’s Saga 169). Hallmund is sure Grettir would avenge him if he could. However, without assistance, Hallmund seems skeptical that Grettir could succeed: “Still, it will not be easy to go against this man’s good luck, because his future is bright” (Grettir’s Saga, 169). While Grettir will be thrown back into the dark without Hallmund, Grim is surrounded by good luck and brightness –– the reverse of Grettir’s circumstance.

Friendships in Grettir’s Saga often function outside of the bounds of morality and social contracts. While extensive scholarship exists on friendship within society — as a binding agent of the Icelandic Free State’s social system and as a morally driven effort — little work has been done to explore friendships outside of these constraints; this essay has begun to explore how friendships of outlaws function and what they accomplish. Grettir’s friendship with Illugi serves to illustrate how far removed from society Grettir is and how different his heroic ideals are from what is appropriate for eleventh century Icelandic society; the two brothers are heroes in different ways. Being friends with Thorfinn allows Grettir to recoup heroism he can’t accrue in Iceland. By becoming friends with Hallmund, Grettir tackles the fundamental issues with being isolated as an outlaw. The friendships Grettir forges invite us to contemplate not only their place in sagas, but what their presence and function in sagas tells us about Icelandic values and society. The longevity of Grettir’s success as an outlaw is in part attributable to his ability to establish a trusting network of friends with similar values. Grettir seems to take his outlawry in stride –– rather than being caught in limbo between civilized society and the wild he adapts friendships to accomplish what his community might have. The friendships Grettir enjoys provide insight into the ethical intention of saga authors, and what they might be trying to explore; Grettir’s Saga proves useful in examining which elements of society are fundamentally necessary, and which one can survive without. Grettir serves as a study of this idea of vital elements –– for the outlaw uses friendships to reclaim the things most important to him: feeling like a hero and not being alone. Readers are left to consider in what capacity an eleventh century Icelandic outlaw saga addresses the crux of what it means to interact with a community.

 

 

Works Cited and Consulted

Andersson, Theodore M. “The Displacement of the Heroic Ideal in the Family Sagas.” Speculum, vol. 45, no. 4, 1970, pp. 575–593.

Árnason, Vilhjálmur. “Morality and Social Structure in the Icelandic Sagas.” The Journal of English and Germanic Philology, vol. 90, no. 2, 1991, pp. 157–174.

Barraclough, Eleanor Rosamund. “Inside Outlawry in ‘Grettis Saga Ásmundarsonar’ and ‘Gísla Saga Súrssonar’: Landscape in the Outlaw Sagas.” Scandinavian Studies, vol. 82, no. 4, 2010, pp. 365–388.

Byock, Jesse L. Feud in the Icelandic Saga. University of California Press, 1982.

Byock, Jesse L., et al. Grettir’s Saga. Oxford University Press, 2009.

Byock, Jesse L. “Saga Form, Oral Prehistory, and the Icelandic Social Context.” New Literary History, vol. 16, no. 1, 1984, pp. 153–173.

Classen, Albrecht. “Friends and friendship in heroic epics: with a focus on Beowulf, Chanson de Roland, the Nibelungenlied, and Njal’s Saga.” Neohelicon, no. 38, vol. 121, 2011, pp. 121-139.

DeAngelo, Jeremy. “The North and the Depiction of the ‘Finnar’ in the Icelandic Sagas.” Scandinavian Studies, vol. 82, no. 3, 2010, pp. 257–286.

Gaskins, Richard. “Network Dynamics in Saga and Society.” Scandinavian Studies, vol. 77, no. 2, 2005, pp. 201–216.

Glendinning, Robert J. “Grettis Saga and European Literature in the Late Middle Ages.” Mosaic: A Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature, vol. 4, no. 2, 1970, pp. 49–61.

Gíslason, Kári. “Within and Without Family in the Icelandic Sagas.” Parergon, vol. 26 no. 1, 2009, p. 13-33.

Hawes, Janice. “The Monstrosity of Heroism: Grettir Ásmundarson as an Outsider.” Scandinavian Studies, vol. 80, no. 1, 2008, pp. 19-50.

Hume, Kathryn. “The Thematic Design of ‘Grettis Saga.’” The Journal of English and Germanic Philology, vol. 73, no. 4, 1974, pp. 469–486. Pavey 11

MacIntyre, Alisdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.

Motz, Lotte. “Withdrawal and Return: A Ritual Pattern in the Grettis saga” Arkiv for Nordisk Filologi, no. 88, 1973, pp. 91-110.

Sigurđsson, Jón V. Viking Friendship: The Social Bond in Iceland and Norway, c. 900-1300. Cornell University Press, 2017.

Tyler Flatt. “The Book of Friends: Hagen and Heroic Traditions in the Waltharius.” The Journal of English and Germanic Philology, vol. 115, no. 4, 2016, pp. 463–485.

Queering Melville

Photo via Wikimedia Commons

by Holly Maurer

 

Herman Melville explored the art of carefully placed sexual innuendo, implied romance, and extended metaphor across multiple queer-coded texts throughout his 19th-century literary career. Typee, Billy Budd, and Moby Dick are all examples of notable work by Melville that feature queer-coded protagonists and clearly defined same-sex romantic subplots. The largely negative outcomes of these romances seem to suggest Melville’s internal grappling with the idea that an openly queer lifestyle was not achievable or accepted in the time in which he lived and wrote.

Melville’s Typeeis an allegory for queer self-acceptance in the 19th century. Tommo experiences implied homoerotic urges almost immediately upon leaving his ship, first with Toby, then with Kory-Kory and Marnoo upon entering Nuku Hiva. Tommo also experiences strained interest in the young woman Fayaway, and in navigating his compulsory heterosexuality[1], masculinizes her to the reader in a clear effort to make her more attractive to himself. Melville uses sexual innuendo to emphasize Tommo’s queerness and attraction to these individuals in lieu of explicitly described sex scenes. Tommo’s exploratory queer journey in Nuku Hiva is brought to a close in a sudden, unfulfilling, and uncomfortable way, and the negative tone suggests Melville’s takeaway from Tommo’s depicted queerness: during the era and environment in which Typee was written, the life of open queer expression that Tommo pursues is unachievable. Tommo retreats to the ship, symbolizing his return to a lifestyle in which he represses his sexuality.

Tommo’s sexualizing gaze of Toby indicates that Tommo perceives him and his masculinity as godlike, ethereal, and deeply attractive. When Tommo first meets Toby he notes his “remarkably prepossessing exterior,” “great flexibility of limb,” his “mass of jetty locks,” and his “moody, fitful, and melancholy—at times almost morose [disposition]” (Melville 32). Homoeroticism pervades this description; it is much less that of a stranger than an object of sexual interest. This initial suggestion of Tommo’s fascination with Toby reads as his unconscious acknowledgement of same-sex attraction, which takes place at the precipice of Tommo’s immersion into the open-minded, welcoming, and expressive Typee culture. While Toby is initially presented to the reader as being downtrodden and erratic, there is a notable change in his demeanour once he spends more time alone with Tommo: “[b]eing with Tommo, the beast Toby is tamed … He sleeps peacefully, becomes reasonable and calm, and uses his natural instincts in wending his way through the jungle” (Beliele 34). Toby is Tommo’s tall, dark, and handsome object of interest, who, although at first seems unfriendly, later displays tenderness and warmth upon building a relationship with Tommo. This romanticized archetype seems to fit more into a slow-burn romance than a traditional voyager novel. Tommo’s interested gaze is what illuminates this likeness, because it is through his eyes that we see the deep attraction and admiration he feels for Toby.

The interactions between Toby and Tommo while they navigate the forest revolve around subtle sexuality, innuendo, and foreplay. Tommo’s intent fixation on Toby is evident in his engaged and focused narration of Toby’s actions, which Tommo recounts in a wholly erotic way. This heavily suggests that this scene should be interpreted as a courtship between the two. Tommo observes Toby to be “[t]hrusting his hand … into the bosom of this capacious receptacle” to retrieve the “wet and dripping” sea-bread (Melville 42). Toby then rescues more of the contents of his frock, and in “drawing [the] calico slowly from his bosom inch by inch, Toby remind[s] [Tommo] of a juggler performing the feat of the endless ribbon” (Melville 43). The use of sexually suggestive words such as “thrusting,” “bosom,” “wet and dripping,” “inch by inch” (Melville 42-43) are certainly no accident by Melville; these lines serve as their own indication of Tommo’s sexual yearning and budding interest in Toby. Tommo likens Toby to a juggler, which suggests a sexual atmosphere in Toby’s subtle performance; the men carefully and intently study one another, as if Toby were performing a sort of mating call or courting routine for the aroused Tommo.

The language Melville uses to illuminate Toby and Tommo’s dangerous navigation of the forest is also incredibly sexually charged and suggestive of mutual attraction:

My brain grew dizzy with the idea of the frightful risk I had just run, and I involuntarily closed my eyes to shut out the view of the depth beneath me. For the instant I was safe, and I uttered a devout ejaculation of thanksgiving for my escape.

“Pretty well done,” shouted Toby underneath me; “you are nimbler than I thought you to be, hopping about up there from root to root like any young squirrel. As soon as you have diverted yourself sufficiently, I would advise you to proceed. (Melville 61-62)

 

I want to draw attention to words such as “depth,” and “ejaculation,” as well as to Toby’s open praise of Tommo’s physical prowess. Tommo is “nimbler than [Toby] thought [him] to be,” (Melville 61) which not only implies that Toby is routinely evaluating Tommo’s shape and form, but also that he is paying close attention to his friend’s strength and flexibility. In fact, Melville uses the word “ejaculation” a second time within the same interaction when Tommo “utter[s] one comprehensive ejaculation of prayer” (Melville 63). Melville uses the deliberate repetition of sexual imagery to extend the metaphor of courtship between Tommo and Toby. Beliele supports this, and adds that “Melville has created a vision of paradise: the gay adolescent dream of being alone in a secluded, preferably pastoral, setting with the beloved– away from intrusive and restrictive societal mores and laws … Tommo has Toby to himself while they are in the hills, a partner, best friend, and collaborator” (Beliele 34). This connection with Toby establishes itself among Tommo’s first queer experiences; after identifying his latent same-sex attraction, the two men share these tender moments of pseudo-courtship in the privacy of the Nuku Hiva forest.

Tommo’s supposed attraction to Fayaway indicates his compulsory heterosexuality, rather than a legitimate budding romance. The image Tommo conjures of Fayaway seems as though it were a fill-in-the-blanks activity of his description of Toby. While Fayaway has a “free pliant figure,” Toby has a “great flexibility of limb”; while Fayaway has “a rich and mantling olive [complexion],” Toby has a “naturally dark complexion … deepened by exposure to the tropical sun”; while Fayaway has eyes that “in a contemplative mood, … [seem] most placid yet unfathomable,” Toby’s “mass of jetty locks clustered about his temples … threw a darker shade into his large black eyes”  (Melville 86, 32). These parallels suggest that Tommo’s experiences with Toby lay the groundwork for how the reader should interpret Tommo’s sexual identity. Tommo’s perception of Fayaway follows the structure of his perception of Toby, therefore his supposed attraction to women is only functional using the reference of his same-sex experiences. It is as if, upon meeting Fayaway, Tommo must refer to his “Toby” notes on how to be attracted to someone to ensure that he is correctly engaging in heterosexuality.

Tommo’s canoe expedition with Fayaway is, much like the forest scene with Toby, erotically coded and rife with sexual innuendo. Tommo masculinizes Fayaway in an effort to make her appear more attractive, and Melville leans heavily into male sexuality in both his word choice and his overall description of the scene:

As I turned the canoe, Fayaway, who was with me, seemed all at once to be struck with some happy idea. With a wild exclamation of delight, she disengaged from her person the ample robe of tappa which was knotted over her shoulder … and spreading it out like a sail, stood erect with upraised arms in the head of the canoe … In a moment the tappa was distended by the breeze—the long brown tresses of Fayaway streamed in the air—and the canoe glided rapidly through the water, and shot towards the shore. (Melville 134)

The scene indicates Fayaway’s nudity and physical liberation, which in itself implies a sexually charged atmosphere. Melville plays on phallic imagery through the diction of this scene. When Tommo is sexualizing Fayaway, she is “stood erect” (Melville 134) and effectively “standing up like a big penis” (Marshall 2021). Not only is her posture phallic, but she is turned around so that Tommo can only see her from behind. Her breasts are hidden from Tommo and he is androgenizing her through his gaze. Scholar Linda T. Shealey notes that “Melville’s language is sexually suggestive: the terms ‘erect,’ ‘upraised,’ ‘head, ‘straight,’ ‘distended,’ ‘mast,’ and ‘shot’ are replete with phallic undertones … [t]he canoe, a symbol of the phallus, ‘glides’ rapidly through the feminine ‘water’ and ‘shoots’ towards the shore in another unmistakably sexual metaphor” (Shealey 62). Earlier in the book, Melville chooses words such as “thrusting” and “bosom” (Melville 42) to bring nuance to Tommo’s forest expedition with Toby. This subtle sexuality is paralleled in the canoe scene with Fayaway, where once again Tommo cross-references the framework of his sexual experiences with Toby. This is a placeholder for intercourse as well as a checkpoint of Tommo’s sexually exploratory experience in Nuku Hiva.

The autoerotic fire-starting scene involving Kory-Kory, Tommo’s obedient body servant, serves as another facet of Tommo’s erotically liberating experience. Much like the canoe scene, Kory-Kory’s act of making a fire is replete with sexual language and imagery, and therefore serves as an indication of a sexual act without explicit acknowledgement by Melville. Tommo receives a massage from a group of Typee girls while Kory-Kory watches “with the most jealous attention,” (Melville 110) making fire in a manner that seems to suggest that he is watching Tommo whilst bringing himself to orgasm. The language in this passage is sexually suggestive, with the repeated phallic image of “[Kory-Kory’s] stick,” (Melville 111) but more prominently, the success of the fire-making progresses as if it were Kory-Kory’s engagement in masturbation and eventual climax. Kory-Kory suggests the very motion of autoeroticism when he “gradually quickens his pace … plying his hands to and fro with amazing rapidity,” (Melville 111). Melville then implies an orgasm: Kory-Kory begins to perspire, and  “approaches the climax of his effort … [and] pants and gasps for breath” (Melville 111).  Dr. Robert C. Suggs conducted a study on Marquesan sexual behaviours and found that “homosexual and autoerotic play is standard for Marquesan children and adolescents” (Suggs 31), and scholar Que Jun corroborates that “[Kory-Kory’s] autoerotic act in front of Tommo strongly alludes to his queer love” (Jun 22). Jun continues that Melville’s language suggests Kory-Kory’s ejaculation: “[he] symbolically dispers[es] seed or in this passage, ‘smoke’ that dissolves into the thin air” (Jun 22). This detailed sexual encounter involving Kory-Kory and Tommo is perhaps the closest instance Melville produces of explicit eroticism in Typee. Although Kory-Kory’s interest in Tommo is implied to be unrequited, the action of masturbation in this scene serves as yet another significant point in Tommo’s queer experience in Nuku Hiva. Tommo is not only lusting after others, he has also established himself as an attractive queer person on whom others may dote as well.

Tommo meets the enchanting Marnoo and immediately dives into an extensive explanation of how tremendously attractive and beguiling he is, describing him to be “built like a Polynesian Apollo [with] curling ringlets, which danced up and down [on the] feminine softness of his cheek” (Melville 135-136) as if he were “under the most favourable developments of nature” (Melville 135). Tommo is delving into an extensive account of Marnoo’s physical beauty, just as he did with both Toby and Fayaway. Upon meeting, Tommo and Marnoo join hands in what Tommo interprets as a subtly romantic manner:

I had hardly recovered from my surprise, when he turned round, and, with a most benignant countenance extended his right hand gracefully towards me. Of course I accepted the courteous challenge, and, as soon as our palms met, he bent towards me, and murmured in musical accents―“How you do?” “How long you been in this bay?” “You like this bay?” (Melville 139)

Tommo’s desire for Marnoo establishes yet another facet of his queer identity: Tommo finally feels the freedom to express his sexuality to such a great extent that he heavily implies his attraction to Marnoo. Tommo is flustered, marvelling: “Had I been pierced simultaneously by three Happar spears, I could not have started more than I did at hearing these simple questions … [f]or a moment I was overwhelmed with astonishment” (Melville 139). His reaction indicates that Marnoo’s extension of his hand is enough to send Tommo into the throes of queer panic. Scholar Que Jun notes that “the ‘piercing’ spears contain powerful queer strains, as they are charged with phallic significance; hence, physical penetration is metaphorically presented …  Tommo’s emotional response to Marnoo’s ‘simple questions’ reflects his queer desire to be ‘pierced’ by other males” (Jun 23). This shared act with another queer-coded character symbolizes Tommo’s commitment to his free expression of sexuality in Nuku Hiva.

The character of Marnoo is presented to the reader as androgynous, which in this case codes for “taboo” and indicates that he comfortably expresses his gender identity with both traditionally masculine and feminine characteristics. Marnoo’s masculine excellence and power is highlighted in Tommo’s observation that he is “one of the most striking specimens of humanity that [Tommo] ever beheld,” but this does not deny his alluring femininity: his smooth and untattooed cheek is “of a feminine softness” (Melville 135-36). Marnoo wears a “slight girdle of white tappa, scarcely two inches in width, but hanging before and behind in spreading tassels,” which is clothing traditionally intended for a Polynesian woman (Melville 136). Scholar Que Jun comments that Marnoo’s androgyny indicates Melville’s identification of latent sexual urges of Western male readers:

Though [the scholar] Said observes that “the ‘East’ has been a psychological sphere where heterosexual men can gratify their illicit sexual desires and explore a different type of sexuality in Western world (Said 190), he does not mention “queer love” as part of that “different type of sexuality.” Considering the fact that “the target readers of sea adventure novels were mostly males” (Said 191), the feminized “Polynesian Apollo” may serve as an erotic image for the latent queer readers in the 19th century America. (Jun 24)

This perspective demands the involvement of Melville’s awareness of the heterosexual norm as well as his own latent queer desires. Marnoo not only enjoys the sexual liberation that most others cannot, but he also comfortably expresses his gender identity in what Western ideology would consider non-standard ways. Tommo is a Westerner and we as the audience view the Typee valley through his eyes, so Marnoo embodies “taboo” not only through a Nuku Hiva gaze but also through Tommo’s Western gaze.

Marnoo proudly touts and enjoys his “taboo” status, which grants him full freedom of navigating the island, and the emphasis that the islanders place on taboo is a metaphor for queerness, sexual liberation, and non-conformity to gender norms. The Typee people consider women going out on the water as taboo, and as seen from the erotically charged canoe scene with Fayaway and Tommo, Melville codes a “taboo” canoe trip as a sexual encounter. In fact, Tommo androgynizes Fayaway during this expedition, and Marnoo, who has free reign over the valley, actively presents as androgynous. The similarity between androgynous, taboo Fayaway and androgynous, taboo Marnoo indicates that Melville intentionally positioned these two characters to be compared to one another as transgressive love interests of Tommo.

Tattooing is a theme in Typeethat is not considered taboo by the inhabitants of Nuku Hiva, but certainly is considered as such by Tommo. Despite Tommo’s apparent disgust at the heavily tattooed Typee people, he still considers tattooing as a “marker for what is sexually desirable” (Marshall 2021). Tommo immediately notices Kory-Kory’s tattoos and seems at once repulsed and interested:

His countenance thus triply hooped, as it were, with tattooing, always reminded me of those unhappy wretches whom I have sometimes observed gazing out sentimentally from behind the grated bars of a prison window; whilst the entire body of my savage valet, covered all over with representations of birds and fishes, and a variety of most unaccountable-looking creatures, suggested to me the idea of a pictorial museum of natural history, or an illustrated copy of “Goldsmith’s Animated Nature.” (Melville 83)

Although Tommo likens Kory-Kory to a prison inmate, he also compares his tattoos to the objectively delightful and interesting museum of natural history. This suggests a subtle conflict inside of Tommo, as he is clearly attracted to the tattooed Typees, but he grapples with his Western preconceptions and judgments. Tommo’s inclination to judge tattooed Typees is deconstructed later in the novel upon meeting Marnoo, which emphasizes Tommo’s increased comfort in his queer identity and his abandonment of traditional Western ideals. He remarks that “[t]he tattooing on [Marnoo’s] back in particular attracted [his] attention … [t]he artist employed must indeed have excelled at his profession” (Melville 136) and continues to give a detailed account of the beauty and intricacy of Marnoo’s tattoos. Both of these natives’ tattoos serve as signifiers to Tommo of what is sexually interesting and attractive, and this idea is supported by Tommo’s direct or indirect sexual engagement with both Kory-Kory and Marnoo. Tommo’s interaction with the tattooed natives poses an important development in his sense of self and queer identity, as well as his disengagement with his prior-held Western standards.

Tommo’s abrupt, dissatisfying, and desperate departure from Nuku Hiva symbolizes his inability to commit to the expression of his queerness. His journey is that of self-acceptance: gradual, rewarding, and passionate, while his act of leaving works to dismantle that. As soon as he finds it possible, Tommo escapes on a boat and violently hurls a boat-hook at the esteemed Mow-Mow, which “[strikes] him just below the throat, and force[s] him downwards” (Melville 252) shortly after bidding a hasty and half-hearted goodbye to Fayaway and Kory-Kory who are “both weeping violently” (Melville 248). This serves as a reminder from Melville that open queerness was not a viable path to take in the time in whichTypee was written, suggesting that it is easier, albeit more horrifying, violent, and upsetting, to return to a life of repression and confinement than it is to pursue self-expression in a time where it is not widely accepted.

Melville echoes this sentiment of latent queerness and repressed identity in his other texts, which may suggest that the inspiration for Tommo’s heavily queer-coded storyline is Melville’s own queer interest. The attraction Tommo feels for individuals such as Toby and Marnoo in 1846 Typee is paralleled in 1924 Billy Budd, a novella by Melville depicting the eponymous handsome sailor whose beauty is praised and envied by his shipmates. Billy is described to be “such a fine specimen of the genus homo, who in the nude might have posed for a statue of young Adam before the Fall” (Melville 53). Even the narrator, who is not ascribed to any particular character in the story, seems to be completely convinced of Billy’s ethereal beauty and superiority. This narrator may act as a manifestation of Melville and his own queer interest. Billy’s homoerotically charged dynamic with the ship’s master-at-arms Claggart is strongly implied, but the latter’s sexual advances go largely unnoticed:

Claggart, the Master-at-arms, official rattan in hand, happened to be passing along … Stepping over [the soup], he was proceeding on his way without comment, since the matter was nothing to take notice of under the circumstances, when he happened to observe who it was that had done the spilling. His countenance changed. Pausing, he was about to ejaculate something hasty at the sailor, but checked himself, and pointing down to the streaming soup, playfully tapped him from behind with his rattan, saying in a low musical voice peculiar to him at times, “Handsomely done, my lad! And handsome is as handsome did it too!” (Melville’s Billy Budd, 31)

In this passage, it is clear that Claggart is engaging in subtle flirtation with Billy. His “countenance change[s]” (Melville 31) when he notices that Billy was the one who made the small infraction of spilling soup, which indicates that another individual for whom Claggart does not have nearly as much fondness may have garnered a worse punishment. He flirtatiously hits Budd on his rear with his rattan, an action which scholar Dana Sliva interprets as Claggart being “[u]nable to control his homoerotic desires,” and that “[his] actions with his rattan suggest sodomy” (Sliva 2). The courtship and sexual tension is as clearly indicated here as it is between Tommo and his objects of queer interest in Typee. Melville’s pessimism regarding the acceptability of homosexual relationships becomes evident when Billy inadvertently kills Claggart and is executed for it, thereby nullifying any potential of the two to acknowledge their mutual attraction. Melville engages with what is now a common trope of killing LGBTQ+ characters, which suggests his writing to be an outlet for his sexual repression and pain. It is highly likely that the social climate of the 19th century and Melville’s consequential sexual repression spurred the sudden misfortunes of his queer-coded characters.

Melville’s Moby Dick is yet another homoerotically coded novel which prominently features perhaps the most glaring example of queer literary fantasy: a 19th century interracial queer marriage. Ishmael feels “mysteriously drawn towards” his friend Queequeg, an individual who, “[s]avage though he was, and hideously marred about the face … had a something in [his countenance] which was by no means disagreeable … You cannot hide the soul” (Melville’s Moby Dickch. 10). Ishmael makes a clear indication of his romantic interest in his “bosom friend”: “[t]hrough all [Queequeg’s] unearthly tattooings, [Ishmael] thought [he] saw the traces of a simple honest heart; and in [Queequeg’s] large, deep eyes, fiery black and bold, there seemed tokens of a spirit that would dare a thousand devils” (Melville ch. 10). The two routinely sleep together, and Chapter 4 opens with Ishmael reporting that he wakes up in the morning to “Queequeg’s arm thrown over [him] … in the most affectionate manner” (Melville ch. 4). Chapter 10 continues with the two engaging in an unmistakable instance of same-sex matrimony:

I began to be sensible of strange feelings. I felt a melting in me … [Queequeg] pressed his forehead against mine, clasped me round the waist, and said that henceforth we were married; meaning, in his country’s phrase, that we were bosom friends; he would gladly die for me, if need me … Thus, then, in our hearts’ honeymoon, lay I and Queequeg — a cosy, loving pair. (Melville ch. 10)

Melville is clearly representing queer romance, and unlike in Typee, this account of mutual attraction is not at all shrouded in innuendo. Ishmael and Queequeg spend the following day after their “marriage” engaging in a detailed account by Melville of the two cuddling and “enjoy[ing] [each other’s] bodily warmth” (Melville ch. 11). This serves as a manifestation of what Melville did not accomplish in his other queer-coded texts: a documentation in American 19th-century literature of same-sex marriage and overt romance.

Melville’s work was potentially, but not necessarily, an outlet for fleshing out his queer fantasies and his frustration with the inaccessibility of an openly queer lifestyle in the 19th century. Typeeserves as a clear progression of Tommo’s sexual identity and his various romantic interests in the Typee valley, and the suggested queer subplots in Billy Budd and Moby Dickecho Typee’s sentiment of acknowledging and enjoying same-sex romance. Tommo’s choice to leave Nuku Hiva in an act of violence forces the reader to face an unpleasant image: a man forced to turn against himself and those he grew to love during his queer journey and retreat to the very society which birthed his repression. Melville implicitly calls on a more accepting society for queer identities, by likening Typee’s Nuku Hiva to that which did not exist at the time of publication: a queer space in which individuals can express their sexual identity to the greatest degree. Scholar Steven B. Herrmann remarks on Melville’s potential queerness that “[w]hether Melville engaged in actual homosexual activity or not does not matter so much … [t]he fact that he leaves the question open for readers stands out as one of his greatest virtues as a writer” (Herrmann 71). Indeed, whether or not Melville himself was queer is not entirely relevant. His texts pioneered the representation of same-sex romance in 19th-century literature, which in itself is an incredible feat for the historical visibility of the queer experience.

 

[1]I refer to compulsory heterosexuality here as the acknowledgement of a heteronormative standard to which queer individuals feel they must conform. Generally speaking, compulsory heterosexuality is experienced through a queer person’s inability to identify in themselves what constitutes legitimate heterosexual interest and what is their feigned heterosexuality due to a subconscious self-encouragement to fit into a heteronormative society.

 

Works Cited

Beliele, Kelvin Ray. “Beloved Savages and Other Outsiders: Genre and Gender Transgressions

in the Travel Writings of Herman Melville, Bayard Taylor, and Charles Warren

Stoddard.” 2009. https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/engl_etds/5

Herrmann, Steven B. “Melville’s Portrait of Same-Sex Marriage in Moby-Dick.” Jung Journal:

Culture & Psyche, vol. 4, no. 3, 2010, pp. 65–82. JSTOR,

www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jung.2010.4.3.65. Accessed 23 Apr. 2021.

Jun, Q. “Queer Space in Herman Melville’s Typee.” Advances in Literary Study, 5, 22-28. 2017.

DOI: 10.4236/als.2017.51003.

Marshall, Toph. Arts One Tutorial. Zoom. 4 Mar. 2021.

Melville, Herman. Billy Budd. Edited by Jim Manis, Electronic Classics Series, 2001.

mseffie.com, https://mseffie.com/assignments/billy_budd/Billy%20Budd%20Text.pdf.

Accessed 22 April 2021.

Melville, Herman. Moby Dick; or The Whale. Project Gutenberg, 2001. The Project Gutenberg,

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2701/2701-h/2701-h.htm#link2HCH0010. Accessed 22 April 2021.

Melville, Herman. Typee: A Peep at Polynesian Life. Edited by John Bryant, Penguin Classics,

1996.

Said, E. “Orientalism.” New York: Vintage. 1978.

Shealey, Linda T. “Elasticity of Mind in Herman Melville’s Typee: A Quest for Individuation and

Voice.” 2011. https://minds.wisconsin.edu/bitstream/handle/1793/60975/Shealy%2C_

Linda.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Dana, Sliva. “Exploring Homoeroticism in Herman Melville’s Novella Billy Budd, Sailor.”

Agora, vol. 15, 2006. Digital Showcase, https://digitalshowcase.lynchburg.edu/cgi/

viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=agora. Accessed 22 April 2021.

Suggs, R. C. “Marquesan Sexual Behaviour.” New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 1966.

Gender? I Hardly Know Her Exploring the Hyperreality of Gender and Sexual Identities

Photo via Pexels

by Ridley Handley

 

At first glance, gender and sexuality have little to do with Jean Bauldrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation, with the irreversible collapse of the true, real, and referential. But Judith Butler, over the course of several essays, establishes that both constructs do, in fact, perfectly embody Baudrillard’s concept of the hyperreal. Untethered from the body, and broken down into a purely performative set of actions, corporeal signs, and discursive processes that denote nothing of significance, gender and sexual identities become precisely what Baudrillard calls the “imaginary of representation” (Baudrillard 2). In other words, they allegedly signify a true, physical essence that never existed, claiming to originate from the very bodies they produce. And to maintain this illusion, and the meaning of conventional presentations, the heteronormative standard also manufactures “abject” identities, creating a Baudrillardian Disneyland wherein traditional binaries manifest their reality by rejecting the unacceptable, unreal, and illegitimate. Sociologist C.J. Pascoe brings this particular phenomenon to light in Dude, You’re a Fag: Masculinity and Sexuality in High School, an ethnography that details the ways in which the prospect of failed gender and unreality governs her subjects. She unveils how River High’s students used the spectre of the “fag” to delegitimize nonconforming identities, and ultimately exposes the baselessness of such labels. Thus, this essay examines how gender and sexuality, as imitations without originals, reapproximations of an invented ideal, generate their own hyperreality, a simulation endlessly reinforced by the belief that it hasn’t already encompassed us all.

In order to first examine gender as a hyperreal concept, generated without a physical antecedent, Butler devotes much of her work to uncoupling gender from biological sex, thereby severing it from a real, material origin. She fiercely challenges the “illusion of an inner sex or essence or psychic gender core,” or the notion that masculinity and femininity inherently belong to male and female bodies (“Imitation” 317). Instead, she argues that gender has neither a beginning nor a birth, that it “is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts” (“Gender” 140). In other words, the socially-accepted behaviours, styles, and appearances associated with each gender identity gives gender its meaning, the artificial and theatricalized costume of the body creates the phantasm of gender, but not the body itself. And without a corporeal entity or an origin to stem from, gender must endlessly recreate itself through “bodily gestures, movements and styles of various kinds,” through social scripts that “constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self” (“Performative” 519). But this “abiding gendered self,” rendered culturally intelligible by behaviours and signs “on the surface of the body,” neither exists nor causes gender (“Gender” 136). Instead, the concept of gender “no longer even knows the distinction between signifier and signified, nor between form and content,” but still purports to stem from material precedent in the body (Baudrillard 64). And this disentangling of gender from anatomy, combined with Butler’s assertion that it exists only as an endless series of performances, pushes gender, as a construct without a real origin, towards the hyperreal.

Furthermore, not only does Butler contend that bodies do not produce the meaning of gender, but she actually contends that gender produces the meaning of bodies, that the socially-constructed hegemony of heterosexual gender norms governs the material world. In Butler’s model, sex is not “a bodily given on which the construct of gender is artificially imposed, but… a cultural norm which governs the materialization of bodies” (“Bodies” 2-3). And if bodies only become gendered entities in communication with social others and cultural characterizations, then only by becoming gendered entities do bodies become significant. Thus, biology, and all its tangible materiality, gives neither gender nor bodies intrinsic meaning, and sex is “not simply what one has, or a static description of what one is: it will be one of the norms by which the ‘one’ becomes viable at all, that which qualifies a body for life within the domain of cultural intelligibility” (“Bodies” 2). According to this understanding, while anatomical differences among humans certainly exist and are certainly material, only the adherence to socially validated and constructed ideals of “sex” makes bodies matter, as it renders them comprehensible and recognizable. In this way, the relationship between sex and gender becomes like a “map that precedes the territory” (Baudrillard 1). Instead of gender simply representing a real body, gender as a hyperreality dictates and creates the real, and therefore sex, even as a physical reality, becomes retroactively installed, a counterfeit origin and empty designation used to give bodies cultural significance.

Another Baudrillardian aspect of sex that Butler examines is the discursive process that manufactures its social power. She argues that language maintains the idea of sex through the same reiterative process as gender, and that only in its endless citation does it become an authority. “Within speech act theory, a performative is that discursive practice that enacts or produces that which it names,” and in turn these linguistic constructions fashion our reality (“Bodies” 13). Thereby, culturally iterated gender norms become mere simulacra, “never exchanged for the real, but exchanged for itself” (Baudrillard 6). Performative speech acts do not represent reality, and the “citational practice of sex refers to the kind of ‘prior’ authority that is, in fact, produced as the effect of citation itself” but does not cause it (“Bodies” 109). Butler likens this rearticulation of gender norms to a judge who “does not originate the law or its authority,” but instead “reinvokes the law, and, in that reinvocation, reconstitutes the law” (“Bodies” 107). But from where do gender norms draw power other than in their own utterances? “The already existing law that he cites, from where does that law draw its authority?” (“Bodies” 107). Clearly, “‘sexed positions’ are not localities,” or roles that bodies naturally inhabit, “but, rather, citational practices instituted within a juridical domain” (“Bodies” 108). And through discursive performatives, the invention of an abiding biological sex becomes reality, the power under which all gender identities must organize. But in truth, the reality of sex relies exclusively on its repeated citation, on mere references to its name.

Fully disconnected from biological sex, itself a linguistic construct, and producing its own meaning, gender now enters a state of complete hyperreality, a socially-constructed illusion for which no real foundation exists. It is “a kind of imitation for which there is no original; in fact, it is a kind of imitation that produces the very notion of the original,” and in doing so, gender perpetuates its own false reality (“Imitation” 313). Therefore, in Baudrillardian terms, gender proceeds to the third order of simulacra, existing only to “mask the absence of a profound reality” instead of representing it (Baudrillard 6). “Gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to preexist the deed,” and in this endless performance, constantly reiterated to create the very idea of itself, gender confesses its own unreality (“Gender” 25). Learned methods of “doing” gender may give cultural intelligibility to otherwise meaningless bodies, but what gender claims to represent does not really exist. All the stylized behaviours and mannerisms that convey the gender identities of specific bodies merely constitute “a kind of impersonation and approximation” (“Imitation” 313). But instead of approximating a real and inherent concept, gender performances all mimic the “phantasmatic ideal of heterosexual identity,” an impossible and artificial standard that gets repeatedly “appropriated, theatricalized, worn, and done” (“Imitation” 313). And thus, as the “generation by models of a real without origin or reality,” reiterated and sustained exclusively through its own performance, gender precisely fits Baudrillard’s definition of the hyperreal (Baudrillard 1).

Furthermore, not only is gender a hyperreality, but the process of maintaining its binaries creates a simulation akin to Baudrillard’s Disneyland. In Baudrillard’s world, “Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real,” (Baudrillard 12) but this comforting illusion merely conceals the fact that “reality no more exists outside than inside the limits of the artificial perimeter” (Baudrillard 14). And according to Butler, neither the boundaries of Disneyland nor gender mark the line between real and imaginary, and instead both serve as “deterrence machine[s], set up in order to rejuvenate the fiction of the real in the opposite camp” (Baudrillard 13). Under this system, masculinity and femininity achieve meaning through the continual repudiation of an “abject” identity, the threatening spectre of failed gender that reinjects the real into conventional identities (“Gender” 133). For example, successful masculinity often involves rejecting femininity and homosexuality, thereby disowning unacceptable and unintelligible identities to reaffirm its own validity. Thus, just as conceiving of Disneyland and the outside world as “opposite camps” establishes where reality allegedly exists, so too, does the “ideal dimorphism, heterosexual complementarity of bodies, ideals and rule of proper and improper masculinity and femininity…establish what will and will not be intelligibly human, what will and will not be considered to be ‘real’” (“Gender” xxiii). In other words, the gender binary fills its Disneyland with failed and noncomforing identities only to reject it, to simulate the existence of valid genders where none exist.

Sociologist C.J. Pascoe describes how this repudiation of the abject plays out in Dude, You’re a Fag: Masculinity and Sexuality in High School. For months, Pascoe dwelt among the halls of River High, a secondary school in the United States, to observe the gendered rituals of its inhabitants. In her analysis, she concludes that establishing successful masculinity involves, among other things, the “continual iteration and repudiation of an abject identity,” represented here by the “fag,” a haunting spectre of failed gender (Pascoe 14). And by “repudiating and mocking [the] weakness” associated with the “fag,” the students could assert their own validity and culturally intelligibility (Pascoe 166). River High’s attitude toward the Gay/Straight Alliance perfectly encapsulates this phenomenon, as the school omitted its meetings from announcements, prevented its inclusion in the club fair, and banned its members from the wearing gay pride shirts to homecoming. The principal argued that the problem with the shirts “was not homosexuality but sexual activity,” yet in the background of his protests, the homecoming skits featured girls running “their hands down the front of the boys’ bodies” and “wiggling their hips in the boys’ faces” (Pascoe 150). Evidently, the principal did not object to sexually-charged displays, but to the GSA’s triumph of non-normative identities. Thus, this tolerance of “explicit expressions of heterosexuality,” and the rejection of the noncomforing, creates a Baudrillardian Disneyland, in which the artificial delegitimization of an “abject” identity allows the appropriately masculine, feminine, and straight to feign their reality (Pascoe 150).

Pascoe’s analysis exposes another component of gender that this essay has yet to examine in depth: the hyperreality of sexuality. Just as masculinity is not an identity “any boy possesses by virtue of being male,” Pascoe’s observations reveal a similar lack of real, concrete origins with regards to sexual orientation (Pascoe 5). For example, many of River High’s male students claimed that they would never call an actual homosexual “fag,” a phenomenon Pascoe dubs the “Eminem Exception.” When asked how he could constantly degrade gay men yet perform alongside Elton John, the rapper Eminem confessed he didn’t “‘mean gay as in gay, ’” but rather as in “‘weak and unmanly’” (Pascoe 58). Similarly, Pascoe discovered that the boys at River High don’t always use “fag” to degrade specific sexual orientations, but to insult other men for effeminacy. And if “the lack of masculinity is the problem, not the sexual practice,” if the labels and identities have no basis in an abiding sexuality, then they, too, become absorbed by simulation (Pascoe 59). Sexualities are “not images, such as an original model would have made them, but perfect simulacra, forever radiant with their own fascination” (Baudrillard 5). Heterosexuality itself, which alleges to belong beyond Disneyland’s borders, must be endlessly recreated and substantiated by repudiating femininity, asserting sexual ownership of girls, and “lobbing homophobic epithets” at other males (Pascoe 5). Thus, sexuality becomes just as performative as gender, stylized, repeated, and ritualized, a hyperreality created by its own production and not by a true source.

Butler further discusses the hyperreality of sexuality in Imitation and Gender Insubordination, which posits that “compulsory heterosexuality often presumes that there is first a sex that is expressed through a gender and then through a sexuality,” and thus manufactures for itself a false base in something enduring, biological, and real (“Imitation” 318). But since the simulation constantly demands this “performance of sex, then it may be only through that performance that the binary system of sex comes to have intelligibility” (“Imitation” 318). The normative scripts associated with each sexual orientation actually create that orientation, and “are disingenuously renamed as causes” (“Imitation” 318). Furthermore, Butler contends that sexuality can never be “fully ‘expressed’ in performance” because “there will be passive and butchy femmes, femmy and aggressive butches” (“Imitation” 315). In other words, while acceptable butch lesbianism, for example, requires exhibiting masculinity, there will always be butch lesbians who present more effeminately. And yet, all those who violate expectations “will turn out to [be] more or less anatomically stable ‘males’ and ‘females’” (“Imitation” 315). Effeminate butches and dominant femmes still have societally valid bodies, and often identify with their assigned sex, but this does not guarantee that their sexuality aligns with it. Therefore, there are no “causal lines between sex, gender, gender presentation, sexual practice,” and sexuality, untethered to the physiological and endlessly recreated in its own staging, becomes hyperreal (“Imitation” 315).

This conception of gender and sexual identities, rendered culturally intelligible only by the rejection of an abject identity, also illuminates the ways in which the social world simulates its hierarchies. As Baudrillard defines it, “the only weapon of power is to reinject the real and referential everywhere, to persuade us of the reality of the social,” and gender does just that (Baudrillard 22). In fact, the power of gender relies exclusively on this reinjection of the real into the “effect of its own originality,” into the “ontologically consolidated phantasms of ‘man’ and ‘woman,’ [that] are the artificially produced effects that posture as grounds, origins, the normative measure of the real” (“Imitation” 313). In other words, the false belief in the illusion of gendered categories, and in their purported origins, manufactures their reality. And this “heterosexual matrix” attains significance only in the simulation of its own existence, in manufacturing a “reality of the social” that excludes and devalues nonconforming identities (“Imitation” 316). The fact that masculinity, for example, relies on “the threat of feminization, an imaginary and, hence, inadequate identification,” testifies to how male gender identities claim the throne of the gender hierarchy (“Bodies” 101). According to this framework, masculinity’s acceptance and existence necessitates the degradation of femininity, creating the hyperreality of its dominance through the alleged inferiority, and even illegitimacy, of female and queer bodies. Thus, the belief in the reality of gender not only reinforces its continued hegemony, but it also debases the identities that the gender simulation artificially designates as invalid.

To speak more specifically to this system of gendered and social hierarchies requires an examination of compulsory heterosexuality, and of how the belief that sexuality, not just gender, stems from a true origin actively harms nonconforming identities. Since “compulsory heterosexuality sets itself up as the original, the true, the authentic,” it implies that queerness “is always a kind of miming, a vain effort to participate in the phantasmatic plenitude of naturalized heterosexuality” (“Imitation” 7). Hence, this regime simultaneously posits the “notion of the homosexual as copy” and “heterosexuality as origin,” providing the normative, naturalized identity that all others hope to assume (“Imitation” 8). Compliance with this heterosexual real, with the alleged origin of all other abject sexualities, brings with it cultural intelligibility, safety, and recognition. Failed imitation of these “norms brings with it ostracism, punishment, and violence,” and in this way, the performance of heterosexuality becomes mandatory (“Imitation” 315). But since, just like gender, “heterosexuality is compelled to repeat itself in order to establish the illusion of its own uniformity and identity,” it becomes just another construct advancing up the precession of simulacra (“Imitation” 315). The effect of heterosexual “naturalness is only achieved as a consequence of that moment of heterosexual recognition,” but that naturalness does not actually produce it (“Imitation” 317). Evidently, compulsory heterosexuality merely constitutes the “desert of the real,” manufacturing a false reality through endless citations and reenactments (Baudrillard 1).

Ultimately, examining Butler’s models of gender and sexuality through a Baudrillardian lens reveals not only that both are imaginaries, contrived systems of ascribing meaning to certain bodies, but that these systems must continually recreate themselves, through various iterations, performances, and stylized presentations, in order to survive. Moreover, untethered from any origin in the physical reality of bodies, gender becomes the means by which these bodies express their sexuality and cultural intelligibility, and without it, bodies would cease to have social significance. Therefore, gender adheres precisely to Baudrillard’s definitions of hyperreality, an imitation without an original, a continuous reapproximation of simulated heterosexual ideals. And by extension, these counterfeit ideals also manufacture the deviant, “abject” identities like Pascoe’s symbol of the “fag,” the unintelligibility of which establishes the reality of conventional gender norms in the same way that Disneyland establishes the reality of its surrounding territory. Pascoe’s discussion of phenomena such as the “Eminem Exception” provides yet more insight into the ways in which labels, and sexual orientations themselves, lack real causes regardless of what compulsory heterosexuality alleges about its naturalized origins. Thus, tackling this heteronormative regime must entail bringing queer, nonbinary, and other noncomforming identities into the folds of hyperreality, since according to Baudrillard, it can no longer be escaped. But by accepting that the imaginary does not end at the borders of Disneyland, that the heterosexual norms that set themselves up as valid and true are themselves copies of nothing, and by ceasing to define intelligible gender in relation to examples of “failed” gender, perhaps currently impermissible identities can achieve legitimacy. Perhaps, the gender simulation built on the degradation and rejection of abject people, may one day disintegrate, leaving all of our identities equally unreal.

 

Bibliography

Baudrillard, Jean. Simulacra and Simulation. Translated by Sheila Faria Glaser, The University

of Michigan Press, 1994.

Butler, Judith. “Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’.” New York and London:

Routledge, 1993.

Butler, Judith. “Imitation and Gender Insubordination.” The Judith Butler Reader. Ed. Sara Salih

and Judith Butler. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.

Butler, Judith. “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and

Feminist Theory.” Performing Feminisms: Feminist Critical Theory and Theatre. Ed.

Sue-Ellen Case. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1990.

Pascoe, C.J. 2007. Dude You’re a Fag: Masculinity and Sexuality in High School.

Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

Painting with Words – The Illusive Art of Representation Appearance and Reality From the Perspective of Visual and Literary Art in Zbigniew Herbert’s Still Life with a Bridle

Photo via Wikimedia Commons

by Mia Gregg

 

Still life with a Bridle navigates the stories conveyed by art and other artifacts from the Dutch Golden Age. Herbert records his “artistic journey”, with the keen eye of a historian, weaving in poetic “descriptions of places and artefacts of interest to him” (Slodczyk 127). The text ties many accurate facts loosely to reality, forming a collage of fact and fiction, both imaginative and informative. Playing with the binary of appearance and reality in many ways; the work explores visual and literary art as both illusive and accurate, the text itself as a manner of representation, and evaluating ekphrasis as a form of description. This exploration blurs boundaries between appearance and reality in representation, and yet sheds light on topics of perspective and the individual experience. The relationship between visual and literary forms of art and how they inform appearance and reality in Zbigniew Herbert’s Still Life with a Bridle demonstrate the ways in which representations can be both illusive and illuminating. Herbert’s exploration of art through literature is essentially an exploration of perspective, the “deceptiveness of seeing” (Slodczyk 122) and the gap between “seeing and description” (Slodczyk 123).

This paper will examine contrasting arguments for art as both illusive and accurate in the visual art described by Herbert and the literature itself. The paper will then examine ekphrasis as a tool to combine visual and literary arts to create an integrated representation of reality. Ekphrasis can be defined as a poetic description often of visual art or a “reproduction through the medium of words of sensuously perceptible objects d’art” (qtd. in Slodczyk 124). References to secondary sources, including Slodcyk’s work on “Modes of Ekphrasis”, which discusses the nuances of a specific ekphrastic poem by Herbert and Andrew Miller’s work on lyrical representations of art, “The Shadow of the Former Self” provide additional insight into the art of ekphrasis. This exploration finds the combined effort of both literary and visual art forms augment reality. Although both forms of representation have limitations, together they strengthen truth and speak to the reader on an emotional level.

 

1. The Illusion of Art

From early in the novel, Herbert introduces art as both an illusion and reality. On one hand, paintings themselves are not “faithful representations of reality” (Slodczyk 127). While on the other hand, Still Life with a Bridle designates art as an accurate representation of reality, able to reach “the heart of things” (Herbert, 5). Herbert explores the “disharmony” between “the faithful rendering of appearance” and “a suggested allusion or symbolic statement” (Slodczyk, 127). The discussion of illusive art elicits many questions; What is the purpose of art? Is it to please the eye? Is it to affirm reality? How does art establish truths? In what ways does art limit understanding?

At many points in the text, Herbert indicates that art is a deceptive form of representation, often pointing to historical inaccuracies. Paintings are representations of reality that can be true artifacts while at the same time only “[shadows] of existing things” (Herbert 39). One example is a painting of tulips, which is viewed as a beautiful image and celebration of the flower. Herbert informs the context surrounding the painting to find it was only commissioned because the owner couldn’t afford real tulips during Tulipomania. Herberts argues that the painting stands in for the real flowers, but cannot accomplish the same effect. A still life painting or a landscape, although seeming to have captured a moment in time, has been created over many hours. Trees move and light shifts, giving the artist power to transcend time and space by curating the image from their minds eye. Portraits are one example Herbert provides to explore appearance and reality in art as “Everyone wants to look better and more dignified than in reality.” (Herbert 31). This brings to question art as a tool to record history in which flaws may be softened with the paintbrush in order to please the viewer. Art is a “deadly abstraction” that feeds on “the blood of reality” (Herbert 97). In this way, visual art can be a deceptive representation of appearances and cannot possibly capture reality with accuracy.

Although art is an illusive form of representation in many cases, Herbert also contradicts this perspective, often reflecting on the admirable accuracy of art. The authenticity of art is championed, along with its ability to express the “heart of things” (Herbert 5). The painters of the Dutch Golden Age “Augment the visible world of their small country and to multiply reality by the thousands” (Herbert 21). Art offers reflection on the real world by augmenting perspective, as if through a microscope. Herbert praises “the painter’s precision” (Herbert 116), presenting paintings as able to “immortalize” people, events, objects and landscapes at a certain point in time, preserving reality in an artifact and immortalizing the perspective of the artist (Herbert 31). Herbert praises art’s ability to render an image that “seems alive” to evoke a sensual and emotional reaction in the viewer (Herbert 99). Herbert says of painting, “From pigments dissolved in oil arise flowers, towns, bays of the ocean, and views of paradise truer than the real ones” (Herbert 80). Here, art is elevated above reality, possessing more truth than reality.

The contradiction between art as illusive and informative is well expressed in the role of the artist. Herbert argues that Dutch painters “[worked] to please the public” (Herbert 37), suggesting they altered reality for the sake of appearances. At the same time “They affirmed visible reality with an inspired scrupulousness and childish seriousness” (Herbert 37). Artists worked at once to preserve reality and to alter it forever. A painting lives by “its own light, the clear, penetrating light of clarity” (Herbert 105). Artists depict light while altering reality to display precision, true detail and though it sounds contradictory, preserve reality. This results in a paradox of preservation; in attempting to reproduce reality, a painting remains a representation of reality. The talented artist Torrentius is described as a “Master of illusory realism” implying that artists are deceptive in their ability to reproduce reality (Herbert 99). Herbert further discusses the authenticity of artists in apocrypha 9. “Letter” :

“We artists record appearances, the life of shadows and the deceptive surface of the world; we do not have the courage or ability to reach the essence of things. We are craftsmen, so to speak, who work in the matter of illusion” (Herbert 148)

Here, art is an illusion tied to appearances and cannot be seen to accurately depict reality. Vermeer concludes that although art cannot completely uncover reality, it may “reconcile man with surrounding reality” and “speak of joy from recovered harmony, of the eternal desire for reciprocated love” (Herbert 150). Art, even if illusive, proves also capable of capturing truth.

The ability of art to express truth is further explored in “The Nonheroic Subject” which explores the value of art. Herbert investigates why paintings of average, everyday objects were highly valued over paintings depicting glorious historical events during the Dutch “Golden Age”. Herbert questions the value of art, “Is it dignity and truth? Is it greatness? Is it beauty?” (Herbert 108). He concludes, “There is no division in their art between what is great and what is small, what is important and unimportant, elevated and ordinary” (Herbert 118). Herbert’s exploration of Art from the golden age finds value in the truth of the ordinary. “The Nonheroic Subject” demonstrates how the art of the everyday can furnish a more accurate depiction of life, though still influenced by the painter. What remains of these artifacts in museums of historical events may not represent the whole truth because the paintings were greatly influenced by their context. Art can represent both illusion and reality. Thus, Herbert warns that one painting cannot represent the whole picture. “Many works of art have been condemned to a secret life, and what we see in the museums and art galleries, accessible to everyone, is only a part of the existing heritage of the past.” (Herbert 94). Herbert gives the example of the cauldron in the Leids museum and the painting “History from the perspective of God” as the remaining artefacts from the attack of the Dutch flotilla against the Spanish entrenchments (Herbert 113). These remnants do not capture in entirety the epic battle, however they do hold some portion of the truth. Although art is not always an accurate representation of reality, it remains meaningful. Herbert presents art as a part of a whole, one idea of reality possessing the power to influence history by either excluding some details or glorifying others.

 

2. The Illusion of Literature

Herbert’s literary art form and the very structure of his novel attest to the indistinct boundary between appearance and reality. Herbert explores the accuracy of literary art and poetry throughout the text with the use of unreliable narration, genre mixing and ekphrasis. The use of ekphrasis, essays and apocrypha that both beguile and inform cause the reader to question appearance and reality within the book itself. The coalescing genres of essays, poetry and apocrypha present literature as another illusive art form, though still able to provide valuable insights and perspective.

The confusion of genre and varied writing style found in Still Life with a Bridle are used to question the authenticity of the literary arts. Essays are considered fact-based argumentative literature which weigh arguments and come to a conclusion. Herbert’s use of the genre combines factual analysis with intimate reverie. “Herbert’s style is flexible and has an unusually wide range: it can be factual, concise, and stringent, but it can also be poetic and sensual.” (qtd. in Slodczyk 130). The apocrypha are another illusion within art, hiding truth within fictional tales, to provoke questionable accuracy and reliability. Poetic, descriptive language along with the apocrypha contrast the factual and the fictional throughout the novel. Literature is an illusive and often inaccurate form of representation. Miller recognizes the limitations of language in depicting appearance and reality, “language will always form a net or a chasm between us and any sense of union or reunion with our origins” (Miller 27).

Herbert’s all too reliable narration also points to the constraints of language. Herbert’s honest narration goes so far as to question the authenticity of the work itself. “I know well, too well, all the agonies and vain effort of what is called description, and also the audacity of translating the wonderful language of painting into the language – as voluminous, as receptive as hell- in which court verdicts and love novels are written.” (Herbert 97) Herbert is minutely aware of distinguishing speculative language from objective language. He also makes the reader aware of this distinction and in doing so leads them to trust his authenticity. Herbert even comments on the authenticity of his own sources in the apocrypha “Letter”. Herbert discusses the letter and the flimsy evidence that it is authentic, supposedly between Vermeer and Van Lewenhoek. Language is seen by some as only a “cacophony of echoes, none of which draw one any closer to feelings, but instead render one isolated in a seemingly disingenuous house of chatter” (Miller 28).

Although the narration and defiance of genre paint language as a poor informant of reality, Herbert’s poetry also demonstrates the value in literature’s ability to promote understanding. Ekphrasis allows Herbert to write his essays from a unique perspective with accurate yet vivid descriptions, while also demonstrating how they may be biased in some ways. Through the use of ekphrasis, the reader learns to question the role of art (both visual and literary) in history and society. The reader is led to question the objectivity of the viewer and their own subjective interpretation. Ekphrasis, used to describe the painting “Bouquet against a vaulted Window” not only describes the painting, but also details the effect it has on the viewer. Herbert depicts the bouquet under a “clear and objective” light, painted with the “impartiality of a botanist and anatomist” (Herbert 41). The limited quality of these descriptions is not hidden from the reader. “I have invented all this unnecessary anecdote to motivate these two heads against the heavy, dark background” (Herbert 67). Herbert explains that he relies only on the painting and “the museum of [his] imagination” (Herbert 14) to conjure an image for the reader. Everything has been touched in some way by the past, the painter is not a clear lens through which to see the past but has also, in some way, given shape to the past. “Language is a cheap and unreliable harlot”, while visual representations are “alive with the loveliest feelings” (Miller 26). At the same time art is capable of reuniting the past with the future, evoking “lovely feelings and satisfying longing” (Miller 28). “We should apologize that we dare to speak about painting. I was always aware of committing a tactless act” (Herbert 97). The ability of visual art to evoke the senses and provoke thought and emotion is valuable, perhaps more valuable than any attempt at accuracy in descriptive representation. Herbert’s recognition of both the constraints and strengths of representation allows for a better understanding of truth and the value of accuracy.

Herbert’s process of describing art using artful language helps to impart the view that literary and visual arts may be at once illusions and contain essential truths. “One should approach them by degrees of meaning, carefully and on tiptoes, because literalness renders their meaning shallow and frightens away mystery.” (Herbert 101). Herbert describes his own artistic method: “The gray abstractions of philosophers are replaced by graceful symbols and images; everything connects with everything else and moves towards the desired Unity.” (Herbert 102). Herbert views academic analysis as “blind to the essence of a work and concentrated solely on its dry analysis” (Slodczyk 129). “Scholarly, scrupulous treatments seemed to Herbert bare, boring; which does not mean, however, that he did not make use of them” (qtd. in Slodczyk 129). Therefore the essays do not attempt a complete description but rather “an inquiry into the mystery that is hidden in art and into individual experience.” (qtd. in Slodczyk 129). Throughout the novel, Herbert accomplishes this task with the use of both fact and fiction, art and history.

Herbert’s writing recognizes its own inaccuracy, but still attributes meaning to literary art. Herbert’s historical inquiry does not claim to be objective, istead it actively preserves the myths found within history. Literature may be incomplete but also legitimate. Herbert reclaims the boring desert of factual analysis with speculation. “I did not manage to break the code. The enigmatic painter, the incomprehensible man, begins to pass from the plane of investigation based on flimsy sources to an indistinct sphere of fantasy, the domain of tellers of tales” (Herbert 106). Although Herbert’s “investigation” into the life of Torrentius is not complete with historical accuracy, there is still value in literary exploration of the past. Herbert concludes that although he cannot relay a perfectly accurate history of Torrentius, the confounding of fantasy and history in literature is able to reach “the heart of things” more authentically than either method on its own. Still Life with a Bridle is “suspended between fantasy and reality”, constructed with pieces of scrupulous research held together by fantasy to prove that literature can be a limited, yet valuable representation of reality (Slodczyk 126).

 

3. Ekphrasis : The Illumination of Art and Literature Combined

Herbert’s ekphrasis is the culmination of truth, bringing the overlapping stories and perspectives together, “both forms of artistic expression into confrontation with one another.” (Slodczyk 122). Slodzyk offers a helpful analysis of Herbert’s ekphrasis alongside a piece of art. Slodczyk also points to the inaccuracies of ekphrasis as a form of description.

“The images beneath our eyelids create our own private museum of imagination. The remembered look of a work of art can, however, differ from works in real museums, churches and palaces. This, in turn, has consequences in the case of attempts to recreate encounters with artefacts” (Slodczyk 122).

Ekphrasis provides “evidence of the deceptiveness of seeing, of the mixing and superimposition of images” (qtd. in Slodczyk 123). Slodzcyk comments on supplementing descriptions with commentary to provide the reader with a specific perspective. Presenting both a reproduction of the image’s “faithful description” as well as the subjective interpretation and the emotional and sensory reaction elucidated by the viewer (Slodczyk 123). Herbert’s combined analysis and emotional response transport the reader to a specific perspective which allows exploration of the individual experience. Ekphrasis enables the reader to perceive art through the eyes of the describer, questioning appearance and reality in art and literature. Herbert’s ekphrasis provides the reader with “the perspective of a concrete viewer” (Slodczyk 131). This description is not neutral, but “filtered through the personality and language of the poet.” (Slodczyk 131). Herbert’s accurate descriptions contain “traces of emotion” along with “speculative interpretations” (Slodczyk 132). These “assertions may be read both as a private judgement and as an objective affirmation.” (Slodczyk 129). Both the art and the description of the artwork provoke thought and reflection on perspective and subjectivity.

The “Mutual illumination of verbal and visual works” furnishes a deeper truth which art and literature alone cannot access (Slodczyk 124). Although Herbert is aware of the challenges to the accuracy of ekphrasis, he uses it to provide insight, that perhaps neither art form alone can. Herbert does not believe in one clear truth, but believes there is a way to access the “heart of things” (Herbert 5). The authentic heart of things is found in a mixture of fact, fiction and embellishments of history, combinations of art and literature. Herbert believes not in one singular truth, but in a full picture of many overlapping perspectives. Ekphrastic description is able to bridge some of these overlapping perspectives to create a more integrated view. There is truth in everything for Herbert and also truth in nothing. It is all just a matter of perspective.

In his work On poetry and Photography Miller posits that Herbert values poetry’s ability to “evaluate photographic evidence”, relegating it to a “secondary status under language” which is the true “agency of meaning” (Miller 26). Throughout history, many poets have hailed the power of art and celebrated its accuracy (Miller 27). Miller argues that “the rivalry between the image and the text” manifests in ekphrasis (Miller 3). This “rivalry” is a problem of accuracy and “power to express the past”. Miller views poetry as the victor in the work of Herbert (Miller 4). Miller’s argument assumes that Herbert views visual art as a “threat” to literary art and wishes for a “return” to the art of language (Miller 27). I however would argue that Herbert celebrates both and his poetic descriptions express the value of both arts in establishing appearance and reality. As previously argued, Herbert recognizes the deficiencies of both literary and visual art forms and yet still celebrates both. Instead of a “return to language” I would postulate Herbert emphasizes a return to art, both literary and visual. Herbert recognizes both the inaccuracies and the powers of visual art and literature. This is apparent in the celebration of their combined ability to “reunite the past with the future, bringing “lovely” feelings and satisfying longing” The struggle to evaluate which is more powerful becomes meaningless when both are equal. Rather than “relegate art to secondary status behind language”, Herbert celebrates the illuminating power of the two.

 

Conclusion:

The exploration of visual and literary arts ability to express truth has led to the conclusion that both forms of representation, although limited, possess invaluable and genuine perspectives both on their own, and when combined in ekphrasis. Although both literary and visual arts can be seen to both inform and detract from reality in a number of ways, when fused in ekphrasis, they provide a unique perspective. Life is not still, it cannot be captured in a single frame. Herbert’s exploration of art and how it informs appearance and reality gives the reader a greater sense of the role of art in establishing truth. This truth may not be entirely accurate or factual in an empirical sense but rather a sensual and emotional experience able to capture a specific perspective. What makes art both beautiful and valuable is its ability to represent a singular perspective and resonate with another individual in some way to connect people with their surroundings, thus creating a sense of community and belonging in the shared experience. Although meaning, truth, appearance and reality may all be foggy, art (both literary and visual) embodies the presence of another human being and their perspective. Art can be meaningful though not necessarily true. Herbert’s truth is elusive but can be meaningful even if not entirely accurate. The carefully crafted essays, apocrypha and ekphrastic descriptions of paintings found in Herbert’s writing collide to establish art as a powerful and important informant of reality, past, present and future. Although art at times may appear to capture reality, it cannot fully represent the truth. Individual interpretations of art can lead one closer to reconcile with reality by representing the essence of perspective.